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15th ANNIVERSARY OF THE GERMAN REVOLUTION

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THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER

The 16th Anniversary of the October Revoluti on in the U.S.S.R. and the 15th Anniversary of the November Re volution in Germany.

THE world imperialist bourgeoisie are seeking salvation from revolution, and a way out of the crisis by means of war and counter-revolutionary intervention.

Never since the Twelfth Plenum of the E.C.C.I. has it been so completely clear as at the present moment that the partial stabilisation of capitalism has come to an end, that *we have arrived at the period of a new cycle of revolutions and wars.* All the international treaties and agreements on which the stabilisation of international relations was based—the Versailles Treaty, the Washington Agreement and the Locarno Treaty — are cracking to pieces. The vaunted League of Nations is collapsing. Following on the resignation of Japan, Germany has now left it. The preparations for war at present are taking place at a furious speed, and in some sectors war has already begun. Japanese imperialism is driving its puppet government, Manchu-Kuo, to openly violate the treaty on the Chinese Eastern Railway. Imperialist intervention has started against Soviet China, and Chang-Kai-Shek, with the direct participation of the combined forces of the imperialists, has begun his sixth campaign against the Soviets. The U.S.A. is feverishly reorganising all its industry in preparation for war. The government of Hitler, in connection with its complete helplessness to carry out even one of the demagogic promises which it gave on coming to power, and in connection with the growth of indignation and discontent inside the country, is seeking salvation from revolution in a new wave of frantic terror and provocational acts intended to produce a new rise of the chauvinist wave. The resignation of Germany from the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference is intended to show to the disillusioned masses of the petty bourgeoisie that the fascist government is making the greatest efforts to overthrow Versailles slavery. But this is for home consumption. In reality, the resignation of Germany from the League of Nations, by sharpening the contradictions between Germany and France with its vassals, is chiefly aimed at forming more favourable conditions to enable German fascism, for a suitable price (armaments, territory, etc.), to take the lead in the campaign against world Bolshevism and its main centre—the Soviet Union.

In all parts of the world, there can be seen the lightning flashes of approaching war and intervention. Simultaneously there is growing, sometimes openly and sometimes in concealed forms, the revolutionary upsurge of the masses, tormented by starvation, unemployment and fascist terror. A revolutionary crisis is maturing.

Under such conditions, the proletariat of capitalist countries is faced, more sharply than ever before, with the question of the revolutionary way out of the crisis, the *question of power, of the struggle for power, of the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat.* At this menacing moment, the proletariat of capitalist countries and above all the proletariat of fascist Germany must think again and again of the *two paths and the two results—the victorious path to October along which the Bolshevik Party led the proletariat of Russia and led to the victorious building of socialism, and the path of defeat and unprecedented calamities along which German Social-Democracy led the proletariat of Germany to the fascist yoke.* The proletariat of capitalist countries, above all the proletariat of Germany, must vividly realise these two paths, so that they can come to a definite conclusion as to what must be the Party, what it must look like and how it must act, to be able to lead to victory, and who personify and what are the manifestations of the chief social buttress of the bourgeoisie which must be destroyed, removed and liquidated at all costs so that they can be victorious.

What was the path of the Bolsheviks to October? This path was clearly described by Comrade Stalin in his article: "The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists."*

The October Revolution arose directly from the imperialist war, and the entire policy of their entire course was one which, on being consistently followed, must lead to the October victory. During the war, one fundamental peculiarity of the Bolshevik Party, led by Lenin, which had characterised it from its very foundation, became clearly evident. In connection with the war, Lenin gave the fundamental principles for the party, and indicated the revolutionary outlook, not on the basis of what was taking place, at that time, on the *surface* of political life, or under the influence of patriotic sentiments, which with the help of Social-Democracy, seized the masses at the beginning of the war, but on the basis of a Marxist penetration into the *essence* of the new epoch, the epoch of imperialism —

* "Leninism," Vol. I.

dying capitalism, with all the contradictions inherent in this epoch, on the basis of a Marxist analysis of the imperialist character of war. From this analysis Lenin deduced the whole depth of the treachery of the Second International, and the opportunistic roots of this treachery, and hence drew the conclusion as to the necessity for a split with the Second International and the formation of a new International, the Third International. From this analysis he deduced his slogan—the conversion of imperialist war into civil war, his slogan of the defeat of the capitalist fatherland in imperialist war. Simultaneously, on the basis of the law of the inequality of economic and political development under capitalism, especially in the epoch of imperialism, Lenin came directly to the conclusion that "Socialism cannot conquer simultaneously *in all countries*. It will conquer first in one or several countries." Lenin placed before the Bolsheviks the task of breaking the imperialist chain at its weakest link—and this weakest link was Russia.

All these bold slogans were in direct conflict with the patriotic feelings which seized the masses at the beginning of the war, were in direct conflict not only with the social-chauvinism of the right Social-Democrats and the social patriotism of the centrists, concealed by pacifist phrases, but also they were in conflict with the views of the Marxists of the "left" radical wing. But Lenin and the Bolsheviks went *against the stream* from the first with unswerving confidence and history soon justified them. The Bolshevik slogan of defeatism aroused a lively response among the proletariat, and it was precisely owing to this slogan that the Bolsheviks, and only the Bolsheviks, prepared the victorious February Revolution in Russia *politically*, and ensured the hegemony of the proletariat over the masses of peasants and soldiers in this spontaneous rebellion.

This same peculiarity of the Bolshevik Party —not to build its work on the basis of what can be seen on the surface, on the basis of the transient political feelings of the masses, not bowing before spontaneity, but obtaining their revolutionary energy and building up their policy on the granite basis of revolutionary Marxist dialectics, on a materialist analysis of the contradictions of concrete reality—was once more clearly apparent during the February Revolution, when Lenin brought forward his famous April theses which formulated the second strategic plan of the Bolsheviks. The fact of dual power in Russia, the existence of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which grew up out of the rebellion as the organ of the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasants—and at the same time the existence of the bourgeois Provisional Government to which the Soviets, led by the Mensheviks and S.R.s voluntarily handed over their power, all this unique situation and the conditions of imperialist war caused Lenin—when the basic question of power had already been solved in the bourgeois revolution which had taken place — but at the same time a number of most important questions of the democratic revolution (the question of war, of land, of national self-determination) had not yet been solved at all—to immediately take the line of a Republic of Soviets as the form of proletarian dictatorship, on the calculation that the proletarian revolution would solve these important tasks of the democratic revolution *in passing*. Lenin formulated this strategic plan to the Party in his April Thesis, basing himself on the fact that these democratic tasks could not be solved under *dual power*, basing himself on the fact that the existence of war between the two camps of the imperialists made it possible for the bourgeois democratic revolution to grow much more rapidly into a Socialist revolution.

And this step, in the conditions of post-war devastation, seemed wild and doomed to certain defeat to all except the Bolsheviks, even to the "left" radical Rosa Luxemburg and even to some right opportunist elements in the Bolshevik Party. And in this case also, Lenin at first went *against the stream* (it should not be forgotten that at the first Congress of Soviets the workers' deputies of the Bolsheviks had only 100 votes out of 800-900). In this case also the Bolshevik Party (at the April Conference) stood on the side of Lenin against the grouping of Right opportunists, faint-hearts, Kamenev and others. In this case, also, history soon justified the bold slogan of Lenin. In October this slogan was carried into practice.

Once more the Bolshevik Party, on the path to October, displayed this peculiarity—its soundness of principle, its absolute firmness, its ability to go its own road in any weather. After the July days "dual power ended and power passed into the hands of counter-revolution at a decisive place." (Lenin.) What conclusion did the Bolsheviks draw from this? That they should retreat? On the contrary, their conclusion was that they should intensify the form of attack! The same unfailing compass—the Marxist analysis of the new situation which had arisen — showed them that, in spite of the *outward apparent victory of counter-revolution,* which drove the Bolshevik Party underground, which dragged out the war; the growing devastation, the elimination of democratic illusions by the masses, the disillusion-

ment of the masses with the conciliatory parties, hastened the process of the maturing of the proletarian revolution. Accordingly, when the July defeat gave the advantage of force to the counter-revolution of the Cadets and the generals, and threw the Mensheviks and the S.R.s, who led the Soviets, into the embraces of counter-revolution, Lenin, and with him the VI. Party Congress, temporarily withdrew at the given stage the old pre-July slogan—"All power to the Soviets." Instead of this slogan, the VI. Party Congress now took the line of preparing for the violent overthrow of the dictatorship of bourgeois counter-revolution. (The slogan, "All power to the Soviets," was restored later, when Kornilov's counter-revolutionary rising was defeated, and the Soviets were regenerated and rapidly became Bolshevik.)

This first fundamental peculiarity of the Bolshevik Party, as the main prerequisite for the October victory, should receive the fixed attention of the proletariat and the Communist Parties of capitalist countries at the present time, when in a number of countries there appears *on the surface* to be a frantic attack of fascism, but deep down, owing to the complete helplessness of fascism to liquidate or even ameliorate the unprecedented economic crisis, there are rapidly maturing the prerequisites of a revolutionary crisis, the counter-attack of the proletariat. An attentive attitude to this peculiarity of the Bolshevik Party is the best antidote to the opportunist theories which were recently developed in Germany by Comrade Hertzen and his supporters (fortunately, very few in numbers), against the theory that the present period in Germany is a "period of fascism," a "period of reaction," that "the fascist dictatorship signifies a thorough change of the system," that "the proletariat have suffered a defeat," etc., while in reality, a new revolutionary wave has commenced in Germany.

The second peculiarity of the Bolshevik Party was displayed on its path to October in the fact that, when capably putting forward agitational slogans which were best able to mobilise the masses in the given concrete circumstances (e.g., the slogan "Down with the ten capitalist ministers"), it steadily led the spontaneous actions of the working masses, steadily led their revolutionary struggle, demonstrating to the masses that it was the *only* Party leading the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat, the *only* Party which struggled in deeds—not in words — against its exploiters. Even when the Party considered that an armed insurrection was premature, because the Soviets were not yet Bolshevik, because the peasants still trusted the conciliatory parties, even, for example, when a spontaneous armed demonstration took place on July 3, the Party did not remain aside from the armed demonstration once it had spontaneously arisen, but led it, so as to lead the basic masses of the revolutionary proletariat from under the blows of counter-revolution. This close contact of the Party with the revolutionary proletariat was also a necessary prerequisite for the October victory.

The third peculiarity of the Bolshevik Party on its path to October was expressed in the fact that it avoided all revolutionary adventurism, that it did not play at revolt, that it considered the *winning of the majority of the working class and the isolation of the conciliatory parties from it,* to be a necessary condition for a victorious revolt. In this respect also, the tactics of the Bolsheviks in the pre-October period are the best example of the *tactics of the united front.* In carrying out these tactics, the Bolshevik Party steadily made a sharp distinction between the conciliatory leaders and the "honestly mistaken" masses, mercilessly criticised the former and showing the greatest patience with the masses. In this connection, the Bolshevik Party did not carry out these tactics in a single stereotyped manner, but changed the form according to the concrete circumstances of the time. In one form, it carried out these tactics of the united front in the pre-July period, when they took place under the slogan, "All power to the Soviets." "Down with the ten capitalist ministers," making it possible for the Bolsheviks to expose to the masses the conciliators, Mensheviks and S.R.s, who were on the leading strings of the bourgeoisie. In another form, the Bolshevik Party carried out these tactics of the united front in the Kornilov days. At that time, Lenin wrote:

> "In what, then, does our change of tactics following on the Kornilov rising consist?
>
> "In this: that we modify the form of our struggle against Kerensky. Without diminishing the least bit in the world our hostility, without withdrawing a single one of the words we have pronounced against him, without renouncing our intention to beat him, we declare that consideration must be given to the circumstances of the moment, that we shall not concern ourselves at the present with overthrowing Kerensky, that we shall now conduct the struggle against him in another way by emphasising to the people (and it is the people who are engaged in fighting Kornilov) the *weakness* and *vacillations* of Kerensky. That we were already doing previously. But now it is this which comes to the forefront of our plan of campaign, and therein lies the change.
>
> "Another change: at this moment we place equally in the forefront of our plan of campaign

the reinforcing of our agitation for what might be called 'partial demands': Arrest Miliukov, we say to Kerensky; arm the Petrograd workers; bring the troops from Kronstadt, from Viborg and from Helsingfors to Petrograd; dissolve the Duma;* arrest Rodzianko; legalise the handing over of the big estates to the peasants; establish working-class control of cereals and manufactured products, etc. And it is not only to Kerensky that we should put these claims; it is not so much to Kerensky as to the workers, soldiers and peasants who have been carried away by the struggle against Kornilov. They must be carried further, they must be encouraged to demand the arrest of the generals and officers who side with Kornilov; we must insist that they immediately claim the land for the peasants, and we must suggest to them the necessity of arresting Rodzianko and Miliukov, of dissolving the Imperial Duma, of closing down the *Rech* and other bourgeois newspapers and bringing them before the courts. It is particularly the Left Social-Revolutionaries† who must be pushed in this direction.

"It would be erroneous to believe that we are turning away from our principal objective: the conquest of power by the proletariat. We have, on the contrary, got considerably nearer to it, but *indirectly*, by a flanking movement. We must at the very same moment agitate against Kerensky — but let the agitation be *indirect* rather than direct — by insisting on an active war against Kornilov."‡

By a flexible and capable application of the tactics of the united front in the process of the development of struggles, the Bolsheviks rapidly won over the masses, and after the Kornilov days they won the majority of the Soviets. As soon as this moment arrived, not earlier but also not later, Lenin raised the question of the immediate organisation of an insurrection, with the greatest energy and insistence, declaring Zinoviev and Kamenev to be "traitors" and "strike-breakers" when they displayed strong and open opportunist wavering's on this question. The revolt, appointed at the proper time and led by Lenin and Stalin, was victorious.

The fourth peculiarity of the Bolshevik Party was displayed on its path to October in the fact that, when taking the line of the proletarian revolution, it clearly realised that for the victory of the proletarian revolution it was necessary for this to be a genuine revolution of the people, that it was necessary to mobilise the reserves of the millions of toilers, and in the fact that the Party displayed the greatest ability to lead the masses to the revolutionary slogans of the Party, and convince them of the correctness of these slogans by their own experience.

In this respect, we may give three clear illustrations. The first was when the Bolshevik Party, on the basis of the decisions of the September peasant congress, became convinced that the peasant masses sympathised with the S.R. agrarian programme of the "socialisation of the land." The Bolsheviks adopted this programme, while not agreeing with it, merely in order to attract the peasant masses to the side of the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat, being convinced that when this chief and fundamental task—the armed revolt and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat — had been carried out, it would be possible later, when the commanding heights were in its hands, to convince the peasants by experience and re-educate them on the question of the "socialisation" of the land. This has taken place before our own eyes. The second illustration is as follows. From the moment when the Bolsheviks launched the slogan of the Soviet Government (from April) they naturally considered that the Constituent Assembly was already historically doomed to extinction. Nevertheless they put forward this slogan, demanded the calling of the Constituent Assembly, and did not abandon this even after the victory in October, on the basis of the popularity of this slogan among the masses and the fact that the Provisional Government had delayed the calling of the Constituent Assembly in every way; with the fullest confidence that when the power of the Soviets had been won and when the Soviets issued and began to carry out their fundamental revolutionary decrees, the Constituent Assembly, if it tried to oppose itself to the Soviets, if it did not submit absolutely to their revolutionary decrees, would lose all its popularity and could be dispersed without the slightest difficulty. This is exactly what happened. But the best illustration of the extent to which the Bolsheviks were able to launch slogans, and speak in a language which "brought the Party nearer, and to a certain extent fused it with the masses of the toilers," is to be found in the transitional revolutionary slogans which Lenin put forward on the eve of October, and the treatment of these slogans in his famous article, "The Approaching Catastrophe and How to Avert It,"† a treatment which took good account of all the arguments by

* This demand was satisfied on October 6th, but the others not until the October revolution.

† Not then in existence as a separate Party, but as a tendency inside the Social-Revolutionary Party.

‡ "Preparing for Revolt," p. 11 M.B. W.L.P.

† "Preparing for Revolt."

neans of which the conciliatory parties, the Mensheviks and the S.R.s, tried to paralyse the determination of the masses to enter the revolutionary struggle and the revolt, and to cause vacillations among them.

Thus the Bolsheviks made all-round preparations for the victorious October revolution. But he first condition for carrying out these bold and unswerving revolutionary tactics, rich in varied forms, and at the same time distinguished by the greatest flexibility which ensured the close contacts of the Party with the widest masses, was the existence of iron discipline in the Party and a merciless struggle against all hesitations and vacillations, especially against the right opportunist deviation as the chief danger. The Party had to carry on this struggle at every turn of the path, especially in the April days, when Lenin advanced his famous April Theses which dumbfounded the opportunist elements in the Party, and in the October days, when Lenin raised the question point blank of the immediate organisation of the armed insurrection, despite the combined howls of all the petty-bourgeois socialists and all the "democratic intellectuals" against the "Blanquist" Bolsheviks, who were "murdering he revolution."

The Russian Bolsheviks gave a classical example of how the correct leadership of the proletariat can ensure the victory over the bourgeoisie. German Social-Democracy gave an equally classical example of how treacherous leadership of the proletariat can throttle the proletarian revolution and ensure victory against the proletariat for the most bloody and barbarious fascist dictatorship.

The November Revolution in Germany arose out of the war, just as the February Revolution in Russia. The November Revolution of 1918 in Germany opened out before the German proletariat still better prospects than the February Revolution presented to the proletariat in Russia. As distinguished from the February bourgeois revolution, the November Revolution in Germany from the very beginning bore the character of a proletarian revolution. It was a proletarian revolution, because Germany was a highly-developed industrial country which had long since carried out its bourgeois revolution. It was proletarian in its driving forces, because it was carried out by the proletariat. It was proletarian in the aims—which the proletariat set itself. The slogan of the November Revolution was the slogan, "For peace, for bread, for socialism, for Soviets!" The slogan of the socialisation of industry was the most popular slogan among the workers in Germany in the November days. It is not surprising that German Social-Democracy, to quieten the masses down and deceive them, immediately called the German Republic a "socialist" Republic, which was utterly impossible in the February days in Russia. The Proletarian Revolution in Germany in November, 1918, had great chances of success. The people had suffered tremendously from the war. When the revolution broke out, the German bourgeoisie lost their heads, became terrified, and hastened to hide behind the backs of Social-Democracy. Thirty-two German crowns flew off the heads of the great and small monarchs and princes in one day, with insignificant resistance. The German proletariat were armed. The German proletariat had before it the experience of the victorious October Revolution in Russia. In the conditions of victory, it was possible for them to make common cause with the Soviet Union and thus to offer the most powerful resistance to counter-revolutionary intervention from the Entente.

The November Revolution had tremendous chances of success, and nevertheless the German bourgeoisie were able to save themselves. What was the advantage in the situation of the German bourgeoisie over that of the Russian? Above all, it was that owing to their economic power they had succeeded in forming a very strong social buttress consisting of German Social-Democracy and the reformist trade unions, with which the weak Russian Mensheviks could not be compared. The advantage of the situation of the German bourgeoisie was that there was not yet in Germany a Bolshevik Communist Party, and the leadership of the German proletariat was in the hands of the German Social-Democratic Party.

Just as the entire strategy and tactics of the Bolshevik Party, when consistently carried out, were bound to lead to the October victory, the line taken by German Social-Democracy during the war predetermined its entire further evolution and the immediate fate of Germany. German Social-Democracy had degenerated opportunistically even before the war. During the war it carried out the greatest treachery, establishing civil peace with its imperialist bourgeoisie, directing all its energy to bringing the bandit imperialist war to a victorious conclusion. This predetermined all its later treachery, all its later evolution to fascism, its conversion into social-fascism. In the long run this led to the establishment of the open fascist dictatorship in Germany.

The November Revolution in Germany began as a proletarian revolution, but as a *spontaneous* proletarian revolution. The German proletariat spontaneously tried to establish a socialist Soviet system, and spontaneously solidarised with the

October Revolution. They did not realise that the path to Socialism leads through the dictatorship of the proletariat, through *Bolshevik* Soviets. They owed this misfortune to the long years of Social-Democratic education in the spirit of "democratic" socialism, in the spirit of "parliamentary democracy." But during the November revolution, German Social-Democracy not only pressed on the proletariat with their *old* reformist traditions. It acted as an active and conscious counter-revolutionary force which, under the flag of "pure democracy," Weimar democracy, on the one hand deceived the workers, and on the other hand violently crushed their revolutionary struggle.

Even in October, 1918, when the defeat of Germany in the war had become obvious and the threat of revolution palpable, the representatives of the biggest capitalists, headed by Hugo Stinnes, on the one hand, and the leaders of the reformist unions, headed by Legien, on the other hand, made an agreement for "business collaboration." After the first victory of the revolution over the monarchy, which took place despite the Scheidemanns, who were still trying to save the monarchy even at the last moment, the united Social-Democratic Government, consisting of the rights and the independent Social-Democrats, published on November 12, the famous proclamation calling for the "saving of property from the attacks of private persons." From the very beginning of the November Revolution, a definite division of labour was established between the right Social-Democrats and the Independents. The rights violently crushed the Revolution, while the "left" Independents occupied themselves in tricking the masses.

The imperial Social-Democratic Chancellor Ebert began his activity with the organisation of the "Committee of Action of the troops of Berlin and suburbs," which was to have been subordinate to the military authorities and independent of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, and was thus intended in advance for the crushing of the proletariat. When the workers began to demand the socialisation of industry louder and louder, the Social-Democratic Council of People's Representatives hastened to hand over all the powerful war industry of Germany to the puppet of the barons of heavy industry, to Ober-Lieutenant Ket, who headed the new ministry which had been formed for this purpose, in order to save it from socialisation. The same Council of People's Representatives took steps to rapidly call a Constituent Assembly with the plain intention of liquidating the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. With the same aim they specially formed an "information bureau," which occupied itself with spreading lies and slanders against the Soviet Power. Then open counter-revolutionary actions began. According to the decision of the Social-Democratic Soviet of People's Representatives, an armed attack was made on the revolutionary "People's Naval Division." On January 4 the chief of police, Eichorn of the "Independents," was removed from his post. This caused a revolutionary demonstration of protest from the workers, after which the "bloody dog," the Social-Democrat Noske, came in his place and arranged a blood bath for the workers. In this connection, in connection with the bloody suppression of the rising of the "Spartacists," the counter-revolutionary officers, at the instigation of the Social-Democrats, murdered Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxembourg.

While the right Social-Democrats were thus acting as the executioners of counter-revolution, the "left" Social-Democrats, the "Independents," tried in every way by "left" phrases and manoeuvres to trick and soothe the workers, and restrain them from resistance and the struggle against the counter-revolutionary Social-Democratic Government. While the right Social-Democrats took the line of dispersing the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, the "left" Independents proposed to lead the Soviets "into the framework of the Constitution," to subordinate them to the "general democratic assembly," while Hilferding appeased the workers with the story that the Constituent Assembly would undoubtedly be "Socialist," because the German proletariat were sufficiently conscious of the right thing to do, not like the Russians. While the right Social-Democrats organised, with the money of the capitalists, a special press bureau for spreading slanders on the Soviet Power, the "left" Social-Democrats, the "Independent" Herr Haase, on the question of admitting the Soviet Ambassador into Germany, spoke in favour of "tactics of delay," in view of the fact that "Soviet Russia would not last long and would be liquidated in a few weeks." While the right Social-Democrats were shooting the workers, the "Independents" signed a decision on the surrender of arms and ammunition by the workers, threatening everyone who did not carry out this decision with immediate imprisonment up to five years and a fine of 100,000 marks. While the right Social-Democrats were hastening to hand over the entire war industry to the puppet of the big bourgeoisie to save it from socialisation, the Independent Herr Kautsky was sitting in the socialisation commission together with bourgeois professors and working out with them plans for "gradual" socialisation by "civilised" methods and for payment so as to show to the

Bolshevik "barbarians" how "civilised" people bring about socialism. As the result of the work of this laughable commission of professors, a report on the socialisation of the mining industry, worked out in detail by Herr Kautsky with the professors, was read. It was simply shelved.

By such "combined" methods, German Social-Democracy, under the flag of "democratic socialism," crushed the spontaneous proletarian revolution in Germany. After all this, things went smoothly. Social-Democracy entered into a coalition with the Catholic Centre and the Democrats, while Kautsky, in a "scientific" work, entitled, "The Proletarian Revolution and its Programme," provided a theoretical basis for this bourgeois policy, proving that a "correction" must now be made to the old thesis of Marx. Kautsky quoted Marx, where he says that between capitalist and Communist society there is a transition period in which the government cannot be anything but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat. He then continued: 'At present, on the basis of the experience of recent years, we can "correct" this statement as follows: Between the period of the *purely* bourgeois and the *purely* proletarian democratic government there lies a period of the transformation of the former into the latter. To this corresponds the political transition period, in which the government as a rule will take the form of a coalition government."

While Herr Kautsky was thus "correcting" Marx, the Social-Democratic practical men were acting in coalition with the Catholic Centre. After the murders in December, 1918, and January, 1919, there came the March pogroms in Berlin, then the brutal murder of the revolutionary workers after the defeat of the Bavarian Soviet Republic. After the Kapp-putsch in 1920, the annihilation of the Red troops in the Ruhr district, began under the leadership of Severing, one of the leaders of German Social-Democracy, then the destruction of the revolutionary movement in mid-Germany, etc.

The German Social-Democrats, who did not participate in the Weimar Coalition for nothing, promptly paid pensions to the Kaiser, the princes and the counts who had been driven abroad. It was not for nothing that they took such great care that not one hair of the heads of Wilhelm's officers be harmed. The Social-Democrats needed these officer skunks for the bloody suppression of the revolutionary movement of the proletariat, for the "saving of pure democracy" and the "democratic path to socialism." In reality these bloody exploits of Social-Democracy laid the first stone for the future fascist dictatorship. The second stone for the future fascist dictatorship was laid by Social-Democracy in the Weimar period by its policy of open subordination and fulfilment of the Versailles Treaty. While the October Revolution threw off imperialist chains and all bandit contributions for ever from the peoples of the late Czarist Russia, German Social-Democracy, which betrayed and defeated the November Revolution, was not only unable to liberate Germany from the yoke of Versailles, but actively assisted in making Versailles slavery permanent for the sake of building up an anti-Soviet front uniting the victims and vanquished. Whereas the bloody vengeance on the revolutionary proletariat created the first cadres for the future fascist gangs, the policy of "fulfilling" the demands of the Versailles Treaty which has been stubbornly carried out by Social-Democracy for 14 years has created excellent material for the future fascist demagogy against the "Marxists," as the people responsible for the national humiliation of Germany.

In the Weimar period, German Social-Democracy liquidated the November Revolution in the name of the defence of democracy. In the period of the partial stabilisation of capitalism, the Social-Democrats made equally strong efforts to prevent a new revolutionary upsurge by their lying propaganda of organised capitalism. And when the economic crisis broke out, shattering to pieces the theory of organised capitalism, German Social-Democracy with the same final aim—the saving of capitalism from the proletarian revolution—carried on the policy of the so-called "lesser evil." Step by step it took away, and later helped the government of Bruening, and the government of Papen, to take away all the economic and political gains which the proletariat had torn from the hands of the bourgeoisie in spite of it, and retained since the November days. German Social-Democracy justified this policy of the "lesser evil" by claiming that the proletariat, during the crisis, should voluntarily make sacrifices on the altar of the "nation" (read: the capitalist nation).

If it refuses to make these sacrifices, then things will be still worse for it. In this way the Social-Democrats at first abandoned a quarter of their beloved "Weimar democracy" in order to save the three-quarters, then they abandoned a half to save the other half, then three-quarters to save even one-quarter, and, finally, they gave up all. Thus German Social-Democracy, which even before the war had degenerated into a reformist party and later became a counter-revolutionary bourgeois-democratic party, finally turned into a social-fascist party. Thus, step by step, it prepared for Hitler's coming to power, under the hypocritical mask of the "struggle against

fascism." And when the German Communist Party, successfully developing the united front of the revolutionary struggle, began finally in 1932 to win votes at the elections more rapidly than the fascist party, when two successive election campaigns in 1932 showed that the tempestuous growth of fascism had ceased, that the fascist wave was beginning to roll backwards, that the fascists in a short interval had lost two million votes while the Communists had won a new 700,000 votes, when the bourgeoisie, on the basis of these symptoms, felt the approach of a revolutionary revolt and decided to accelerate the calling of Hitler to power, German Social-Democracy carried out a monstrously treacherous act, helping Hitler to establish his bloody régime to avoid a Communist revolution. On July 20, 1932, during the dispersal of the Prussian Social-Democratic government, and on January 1, 1933, when Hitler was called to the post of Reichskantzler, it was possible to defeat the Fascists if the proletariat had acted against them with a united front. But on both occasions, when the Communist Party proposed to Social-Democracy to reply to the attack of fascism by a general strike, the Social-Democrats disrupted the general strike.

In 1918 Social-Democracy saved bourgeois-democratic dictatorship from the proletarian revolution. In 1932-33 it made a big step forward. In order to save the bourgeoisie from the proletarian revolution, it helped them to establish an open fascist dictatorship. "The dead jump quickly."

Recently the leaders of social-fascism (Blum, Barlitsky, etc.) are prepared to admit that social-democracy made a "mistake" in crushing the revolution of 1918-19. They require this manoeuvre so as to keep the leadership of the masses, and so as to betray and crush the growing revolution as in 1918.

Such were the two paths—the noble path of the Bolsheviks to October and the treacherous path of the Social-Democrats to Hitler. Correspondingly there were two results. In Germany we have now an unprecedented orgy of fascist terror, unemployment such as never before existed in the history of Germany, an extreme lowering of the standard of living of the employed workers, the slave labour of the workers in the "forced labour camps," in the concentration camps and on the estates of the German Junkers, a severe agrarian crisis and the ruin of the small peasants, cultural retrogression, the return to medieval barbarism, and finally feverish preparations to convert the toiling masses of Germany into cannon fodder for counter-revolutionary intervention against the Soviet Union. In the land of the Soviets we have the world historic victory of Socialism, the completion of the Five-Year Plan in four years, the construction of the foundations of Socialism which clear the path to classless society, the final liquidation of unemployment, the increase in the army of workers from 2½ millions in 1921 to 20 millions in 1933, the seven-hour working day, the increased well-being of the workers, their tremendous cultural growth, the conversion of slavish hired labour into free labour filled with the greatest socialist enthusiasm. In the land of the Soviets we have also the greatest victories in the villages —the conversion of 20 million peasant families into collective farmers, the abolition of the village poor, the conversion of the collective farms, even at the present day, into Bolshevik farms and the collective farmers into well-to-do farmers. At the same time in the land of the Soviets we have a mighty growth of the power of the Soviet Union and its conversion into a tremendous factor for peace on the international arena, which has found expression in the non-aggressive pacts and in the agreements on the determination of the aggressor.

But this is not a complete summary. The October Revolution was not only a Russian Revolution, either in the minds of the Bolsheviks or in its results. It was the beginning of the world proletarian revolution. And modern Germany at the present day is not only fascist Germany, but also Germany which is pregnant, and ready in the very near future, to give birth to a proletarian revolution.

When the November Revolution broke out in Germany there were as yet no Bolsheviks there. There was no mass Communist Party but only the rudiments of a Communist Party (the Spartacus League). Therefore at that critical moment, German Social-Democracy as the chief social buttress decided the fate of Germany. At present in Germany there is a strong, firmly steeled, heroic mass Communist Party, which the fascist terror has succeeded in driving underground, but will never be able to destroy. In spite of all the boastful utterances of the Hitlerite bandits, in spite of their bloody terror which bursts with all its force on the German Communists, the German Communist Party is alive and unwavering. The best proof of this is the fact that, in spite of all their murders, all their tortures, all their unprecedented economic pressure which throws the workers out of the factories into the streets at the slightest suspicion of Communism, the Hitlerites cannot boast that the proletarian masses have come over to their camp. The best proof is the fact that in spite of all the oppression of the bloody fascist régime, the German Communist Party is still monolithic and has had no ideological vacillations in the recent period. The best proof

is the fact that, in spite of the great losses, the great dangers, which are now connected with the title of Communist, the Social-Democratic workers and especially the Social-Democratic working youth are now coming over to the Communists in whole groups. The best proof is the fact that, in spite of all the violence and bloody terror of Hitler, the revolutionary struggle has not ceased in Germany for a single day. On the contrary a new revolutionary upsurge is rising. And the only Party which stands at the head of this struggle is the Communist Party.

The struggle of the workers has not yet assumed a mass character in fascist Germany. The petty-bourgeoisie and the peasants are every day becoming more and more disillusioned with the Hitlerite régime (which is expressed in the unceasing mutinies of storm detachments and the partial actions of the peasants). Nevertheless, they are not yet coming over in masses to the side of the revolutionary proletariat. But the day when the ice will break and the floodtide of the revolution will overflow is near, and much nearer than it may seem to people who can still only see what is taking place on the surface. This day is near, because the Hitlerite régime is rapidly sliding down to economic and military catastrophe, and the Hitlerites themselves, sensing this, are beginning to lose their heads, as can be seen from the scandalous "trial" on the matter of the burning of the Reichstag, and their sudden resignation from the League of Nations.

* * *

The question of power and the path to power has become an urgent question for the proletariat of the entire capitalist world. The proletariat of the whole world are now becoming more convinced every day of the correctness of the Bolshevik path to October and the fatality of the Social-Democratic path to Hitler. *The slogan of the Soviet power is now becoming the central slogan.* The Communist Parties of all capitalist countries *must make known to every proletarian, peasant and worker, their programme of salvation from hunger, poverty, want and unemployment — the programme of Socialism which they will carry into practice immediately as soon as the proletariat win the power in a revolutionary manner, as soon as they establish the power of the Soviets. In the fascist countries and the countries which are rapidly becoming fascist in Central Europe and especially in Germany, the practical solution of the question of power has already been placed on the order of the day.* In Germany there is inevitable a rapid growth of the revolutionary upsurge which has already begun, a new upsurge of the strike-wave, the revolutionary actions of the unemployed, the desertion of fascism by the petty-bourgeois and peasant masses. In Germany the Communist Party in struggling against fascism has never yet had such favourable conditions for the liquidation of the last influence of Social-Democracy, in the struggle against fascism, as it has now. The German Communist Party has now a real possibility, by forming a united front with the Social-Democratic workers and attracting to its side the Christian workers, tricked by the National Socialists, and the non-Party workers, of becoming the only mass party of the proletariat, of winning the majority of the working class for the revolutionary overthrow of the government of criminals and adventurers. *The German Communist Party, rallying around itself all the anti-fascist forces of the country, must now prepare the conditions for the victorious proletarian revolution, this real national revolution, for the armed revolt to overthrow the fascist dictatorship and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat.*

In 1918 the fate of Germany was decided by the Social-Democratic Party; the fate of Germany is now in the hands of the heroic Communist Party. The historic period of existence of the fascist dictatorship depends on the energy, firmness, loyalty and initiative of every Communist, on the contacts of Communists with the masses, on their ability to rouse the masses to the struggle and organise them now. Therefore we can boldly throw into the face of the fascist "victors of an hour" the prophetic words of the Marx and Engels whom they detest: "Let the ruling classes tremble before a Communist revolution."

THE YEAR WHICH HAS PASSED SINCE THE TWELFTH PLENUM OF THE E.C.C.I. AND THE STRUGGLE OF THE C.P.G.B.

By Harry Pollitt.

"THERE is therefore ground for the argument that the distinct improvement which has occurred in the economic situation of this country over the past twelve months has been due to influences of a transitory character, and that in so far as more permanent progress has been made in certain directions, notably in the greater command of a number of industries over the domestic market, there have been permanent losses in other kinds of trade—our cotton textile exports are a case in point, our financial and shipping services another.

"The fact, however, remains that these adverse influences acting on the international economic situation, are realities, while the favourable factors remain for the time being highly problematical and uncertain forces."

So wrote the *Statist* of August 19, summing up the situation in the first six months of 1933.

What was the "distinct improvement" which was due to "influences of a transitory character"?

The *Statist* is here basing its statement on the fact that the volume of industrial production in Great Britain had been slightly increasing and there was a tendency for unemployment to fall. In the second quarter of 1933, the physical volume of industrial production was 3.7 per cent. greater than in the corresponding quarter of 1932.

Yet that this was due to "influences of a transitory character" was only too evident. There had been no increase in the volume of foreign trade in the period mentioned. British imports had declined by £35,663,821 and exports had declined by £8,700,081 in the first eight months of 1933, as compared with the similar period last year. In the same way, there had been no increase in constructional activity during the period. The total amount of new capital issues in the first six months of 1933 was £69,328,000 as compared with £74,772,000 in the previous year. Nor was there an increase in the demand for consumption goods. The money value of retail sales in June was 3.6 per cent. less than in the corresponding month of last year.

Such increased production as took place seems to be due to the same factors as are operating in other countries. In the first place, there has been increased expenditure on war orders. Five million pounds more have been budgetted for this year with respect to the army, navy and air force. Naval construction is being carried on at a considerably increased rate. In addition typical war industries like the chemical industry are increasing their production. Simultaneously there was a certain replenishment of stocks in industries whose production had fallen to a low level owing to the prolonged crisis. This was accompanied by the piling up of stocks on the speculation of a rise in prices produced by inflation. Perhaps the industry which has most clearly revealed these tendencies is the wool textile industry. Here production increased from 77.7 per cent. (1924 = 100) in the second quarter of last year to 85.1 per cent. in the second quarter of this year. In a number of countries the amount of wool clipped has been reduced. This resulted in a likelihood of a steady rise in the price of wool for some months ahead, which stimulated production for stock in this industry, which also benefited to some extent from the replenishment of the stock of wool in the U.S.A. All this increased production was not accompanied by any increased activity in the clothing trades, which continued on a low level. There is no basis for a real "recovery" in a transitory increase of production of this kind, and the capitalist class, which recently began to talk about "recovery," is now striking a more cautious note.

The great basic industries, such as cotton and coal, stood entirely outside of the slight increase of production. Here are the export figures of cotton for the first six months of 1932 and 1933. The industry, it will be remembered, had in 1933 the advantage of the reduced wages and the "more loom" system imposed in 1932, and yet its decline continues.

COTTON EXPORTS.

Piece Goods	1932	1933
Square yards ...	1,147,949,400	1,083,107,800
Value	£23,889,773	£21,158,178
Yarn		
Quantity lbs. ...	80,448,400	66,141,900
Value	£5,899,873	£4,893,854

This decline is often attributed to the inroads which have been made into British imperialism's Eastern market by Japan. The causes of this must be sought deeper, and are not limited to that, as the following facts show :—

The British consumption of cotton for the

twelve months ending July 31 fell from 2,800,000 bales in 1929 to 2,248,000 bales in 1933. The Japanese consumption in the same period increased from 2,766,000 bales to 2,900,000 bales —an increase of 134,000 bales. The Indian consumption of raw cotton increased from 1,997,000 bales to 2,636,000 in the same period—an increase of 639,000 bales. Chinese consumption of raw cotton increased from 1,957,000 bales to 2,584,000 —an increase of 627,000 bales. Not Japanese competition alone, but the competition also of the Indian and Chinese mills engaged in cotton textile production is narrowing the market of the Lancashire cotton textile industry.

The trend in the coal industry was equally unmistakably downward, as the following figures showing the amount of coal raised for the first six months of 1931, 1932 and 1933 show :—

1931	1932	1933
111,176,000 tons	108,109,700	104,228,000

In a third basic industry of extreme importance —shipbuilding—the tonnage commenced by the beginning of the present year is only one-fifth of that commenced by the beginning of 1930.

The British capitalist class, faced with those depressing facts, tries to console itself by urging that if its economic position is not improving, Britain is at any rate getting a proportionately larger share of whatever world trade is going.

It must not be forgotten, however, that in the years just previous to the outbreak of the crisis, Britain's share of world export trade was falling sharply. Thus it fell from 14 per cent. in 1923 to 11 per cent. in 1928. There can be no doubt that the comparatively large share of the ever-declining world trade, which Britain has been getting, has been the result of the depreciation in the value of British currency in relation to its competitors, who are still on the gold standard. This can be seen clearly in the recently published figures of Indian trade.

British imperialism's percentage in Indian trade increased from 35.2 to 42 per cent., while the share of the U.S.A. fell from 12 per cent. to 5.7 per cent., the share of Germany from 8.3 to 7.2 per cent., the share of Italy from 2.3 to 1.8 per cent. On the other hand, the share of Japan rose from 13.1 per cent. to 15.5 per cent. The effect of the depreciated pound, in comparison with the countries still on gold, can plainly be seen in those figures.

Now British imperialism is faced with the fact that the advantages which its depreciated currency has obtained for it are beginning to be decisively challenged. On top of the powerful inflation of Japan comes the still more menacing inflation on the part of the U.S.A., and the inevitable inflation on the part of Germany. Hitherto it had congratulated itself that, while getting certain advantages from its depreciated currency, it had managed to keep from raising rapidly the minimum cost of living inside of Britain, with all the consequences of fiercer class battles which that would have brought about. It is now being put up against the alternatives of either losing all its relative gains on the world market since 1931—yes, of being driven down to a lower position than it has ever occupied before —or of itself entering into the path of competitive inflation, with all the social and political consequences which that entails. Already the very slight rise in the cost of living caused by the policy of restricting foreign food imports in the interests of British and Dominion agriculture, has provoked murmurings in the ranks of the workers, murmurings which are not likely to be hushed by the appointment of a special committee to prevent profiteering in food. That, and the wave of strikes such as followed inflation in the U.S.A., and the fact that a considerable portion of its foreign loans are payable in sterling, is not likely to commend competitive inflation to the cautious British bourgeoisie. But the forces of the deepening crisis are dictating that it must tread the path of competitive inflation, whatever consequences may threaten.

THE POSITION OF THE WORKING CLASS.

Wages have continued to be cut steadily in Britain during the period under review. In the first eight months of 1933 the wages of 944,000 workers were reduced by £86,000 per week.

This is in addition to the cuts in the wages of agricultural workers, shop assistants and office employees.

But these statistics are not complete by a long way. The government statistics take into account wage cuts arrived at after negotiations, or strikes, or imposed by the pressure exerted by government trade boards. Its statistics do not take into account the numerous wage cuts imposed upon workers in industries like the Lancashire cotton industry, where the agreement with the textile workers' trade union was openly violated. It does not take into account wage cuts among unorganised workers.

Amongst the unemployed the Means Test has been operating with the most ruinous consequences.

There are no fewer than 1,065,500 unemployed signing on at the exchanges who are subject to the Means Test. No exact figures are available of the numbers who have been totally cut off, but an estimate can be made on the basis of the following facts :—

Out of 751,285 people on transitional benefit who applied for relief between July 3 and August 5, 1933, 299,924 had their scales of relief cut. If this is a fair sample of the 1,065,500 unemployed who are on transitional benefit, then we are justified in assuming that at least 406,200 men and women are having their scales of benefit reduced by the Means Test. 88,003 workers are still signing on at the Labour Exchanges after having been completely cut off under the Means Test. No fewer than 200,000 of those previously cut off have ceased to sign; so it is safe to say that there are at least 800,000 workers who have had their benefit reduced or are cut off entirely under the Means Test.

APPLYING THE LINE OF THE TWELFTH PLENUM.

What progress has been made by the Party in applying the line of the Twelfth Plenum? Undoubtedly the progress has been insufficient, and one cannot rest satisfied with it.

The greatest of this progress has been made in the independent leadership of economic struggles. The Party has participated in some exceedingly important partial strikes, strikes in which the workers gained some very definite concessions The Ryhope strike, in the mining industry of Durham, was followed by strikes at Ford's and at Briggs body works, then came the strike at Hopes in Smethwick and later the strike in Firestone's factory in London. There was also the bus strike in London, which took place without the official sanction of the union, at the beginning of January, although here the Party influence was not so complete as in the strikes named above.

Never at any previous period of Party history have we participated in the leadership of such a number of partial strikes.

A number of these strikes, notably the London bus strike and the Ryhope strike, were carried out by the union branches acting independently of the head office bureaucracy. The experience gained in these struggles showed that it is possible for the militants, after winning great influence amongst the workers, to get control of the union branches, and so enable the workers to successfully resist encroachment upon their conditions, even when the head office bureaucracy is prepared to grant concessions to the employers without a struggle. The "alternative leadership" displayed in such strikes was not leadership built up outside of the unions; on the contrary, it was a leadership basing itself on the lower organs of the unions.

The situation was not greatly different in the stubbornly fought strikes at Hopes and Firestones. While those strikes started in factories that were largely unorganised, the strikers not only set up in the very first days of the strike efficiently functioning strike committees, but joined the unions *en masse*. The union's help was welcomed, when it conduced to building up the strike, but the strike committee kept a firm grip of negotiations.

A characteristic feature of many of the strikes during the period under review was the fairly powerful solidarity actions which were carried out. Apart from strike relief from the unions, and the relief which was received from the public assistance committees, there was over £3,000 collected from sympathetic workers for the Hopes, the Firestones and the Ryhope strikes.

Most of the strikes under review won very definite concessions for the workers. The Hopes strike smashed the Bedaux system, the Ryhope strike succeeded in defending a number of standing customs with which the management intended to do away, the Firestone strike won concessions on all points; concessions of lesser magnitude were won by the London busmen, by the workers in Fords and in Briggs.

All of these strikes left behind them definitely improved organisation amongst the workers. The Hopes strike aided the establishment of a good shop stewards' committee and a powerful trade union branch. The Firestone strike recruited over 400 members into the union. Most of the other strikes resulted in a definite increase of union membership.

The success of these partial strikes showed, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that under militant leadership it is possible to win definite concessions from the capitalists and to develop organisation and class-consciousness in the midst of the deepening crisis, thus refuting the reformist lie that it is impossible to carry on effective economic struggle in a period of economic crisis.

While the leadership in economic struggles has definitely improved, it cannot be said that the development of rank and file movements in the unions is developing according to the necessities of the situation. The most successful of the rank and file movements developed by the workers have been the busmen's rank and file movement and the railwaymen's vigilance movement. Based on the trade union branches, and drawing large numbers of local branch officials into the struggle for the militant policy, both these movements have won a considerable measure of success. The busmen's movement is, however, based very largely on London, although there are many local centres in other parts of the country. It is clear that our Party members working within this movement must impress on the rank and file who are supporting it the necessity of extending the movement to other parts of the country, and of build-

ing groups of adherents of the movement in every garage, tram depot and union branch, at the same time encouraging the development of the rank and file movements in other sections of the transport industry.

It is clear, however, that this movement is faced with powerful opposition on the part of the bureaucracy. The Congress of the Transport Union held in July passed a resolution, without previous discussion amongst the unon membership, which declared that participation in the rank and file movement is incompatible with holding office in the union. Already the union bureaucracy is moving to carry out this resolution, and the rank and file movement is faced with the necessity of organising a powerful resistance, rejecting all defeatist counsels without allowing itself to be provoked into a split.

The railway vigilance movement is also faced with the necessity of forming groups of individual supporters in addition to bringing the greatest possible number of union branches into the movement. However, in the opinion of the railway militants who are qualified to judge, this movement has one very definite weakness—it does not seek to organise action on day-to-day issues through the branches and district councils of the union and through organisation on the job. The movement confines itself largely to seeking to change the tactics of the railway unions and to get members of the vigilance movement elected to union posts. This necessary activity must, however, be linked up with action to remedy the day-to-day grievances of the men. The bus branches in London, for example, did not confine themselves to influencing the head office officials. They took the initiative and took organised action against speed-up themselves. The railwaymen, by winning control of the branches, by building up organisations in the depots, must seek to organise partial struggles against de-grading and speeding-up. If this is not done there is a danger that the movement will stagnate.

A disquieting feature of the situation is the slow development of the rank and file movements in the basic industries. In the cotton industry the cotton workers' solidarity movement does not grow. It is true that the problems of working in the cotton unions—which meet only once every three or six months — are different from those existing in unions which meet once a fortnight. We have seen, however, that the militants in the Weavers' Union at Barnoldswick, by applying a correct policy, succeeded in getting a Communist elected to the position of union secretary, and that the union was able under militant influence to help the Clough Mill strikers to victory. Quite a number of local organisations in the Weavers' Union are beginning to organise an opposition to the bureaucracy, and the solidarity movement has big opportunities of development if it knows how to make a correct approach to the workers.

In no other industries in the country is there such great support for our Party as in mining, engineering and shipbuilding. The votes in the Clay Cross and Rhondda by-elections show the ever greater sympathy for our policy among the miners, as do the votes for the militants to the Trades Union Congress amongst the engineers. Yet in these industries there is only a small nucleus of a rank and file movement.

Work within the unions ha definitely improved since the Twelfth Plenum. The presence of the opposition, in which there were Communists, made itself felt very definitely in the National Committee of the Amalgamated Engineering Union, the Annual General Meeting of the National Union of Railwaymen and the Bi-annual Conference of the Transport and General Workers' Union. The resolution condemning the Trade Union Congress's refusal of the united front was only defeated by 49 votes to 31 at the conference of the National Union of Railwaymen, while a resolution calling for the wiping out of an anti-Communist resolution, passed in previous years, was only defeated by 21 votes to 18 at the Engineers' Conference.

The proportion of Party members working in the unions leaves much to be desired. And yet there is a terrific ferment amongst the trade union rank and file, and work in this sphere would bring tremendous results. What has been done in regard to increasing our activity inside the reformist trade unions since the Twelfth Plenum and the Twelfth Party Congress is only the indication of what could be achieved if the whole party membership were organised for this vital work. At the meeting of the Central Committee of the Party held in September, special attention was again given to this question and instructions sent out to all Party members that wherever they are eligible to join the trade unions they must do so, and that no further excuses can be accepted in this respect. In addition to this, it was also recognised that one of the reasons for weaknesses and mistakes in the conduct of the economic struggle, the work in the trade unions and among the unemployed was precisely the absence of active fraction work, which is necessary to ensure the winning of the organised and unorganised workers for carrying through the lead of the Party, and building up the mass movement of the working class.

Steps have now been taken to deal with this aspect of the situation, and all locals and districts instructed to make monthly reports upon what

they have done to see that the regular work of the Party fractions takes place.

It is interesting to note that those comrades who had doubts as to whether it was necessary to work in the trade unions, and expressed these doubts in the discussions prior to the Party Congress, have since given practical demonstrations that they have learned much and have become convinced of the necessity for that permanent and intimate contact with the masses without which no mass Communist Party can be built up.

In all the Party district organisations a big change in trade union work is to be witnessed, and all that has been done must now be utilised to gain further footholds and influence inside the unions on the basis of mass work in the factories and the trade union branches. The question of how important the winning of the trade union branches is, is best seen in the experiences of all the recent strike struggles the Party has taken part in. It is the actual fact that where we have had a strong foothold in the trade union branches we have had great and lasting influence with the strikers. Where we have openly recruited members into the trade unions, and organised militant trade union branches, there our influence has been of a permanent character, and has not been lost immediately the strike has been terminated.

The power these positions that are won in the trade union branches give the revolutionary workers cannot be over-estimated, and there can be no firm building up of the revolutionary opposition that is not based upon both the factory and the local branch of the trade union.

Further, it has also been seen in practice that where we have recruited for the trade unions and built up strong branches, we are in a stronger position, we are able—with all militant workers—to fight against the splitting policy of the trade union leaders. There is a very important fact to note. At the time when the reformist leaders are continually whining about the workers not wanting to join the trade unions, in every strike of recent times, due to the strong lead of the Communist Party and the militant rank and file movements, a big recruitment has taken place into the trade unions, and, so far as data is available, it has not been a fluctuating recruitment, but a solid type of worker who has consciously joined the trade union to help it fight its battle both inside and outside the factory. For Britain, where, in my opinion, we can make no headway unless it is done in close association with the organised workers, these facts are of enormous importance, and must serve to intensify all our activities on this section of the working class front.

THE FIGHT OF THE UNEMPLOYED.

The period since the Twelfth Plenum was a period of great unemployed activity led by the National Unemployed Workers' Movement. In the autumn there were a series of powerful unemployed struggles in areas like West Ham, Belfast and Birkenhead, culminating in the great unemployed march to London. The unemployed march was followed throughout the summer by a series of marches and demonstrations on a county scale. There were two marches to the Durham County Council, two marches to the West Riding Council, and an all-Scottish march to Edinburgh, a march to the County Councils in Lancashire, Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, Monmouthshire, Fifeshire and the unemployed march to the Trade Union Congress.

Demonstrations and marches on a county scale are rendered necessary by the fact that unemployed relief and the administration of the Means Test is, in many areas, in the hands of the County Councils.

With regard to the demands of the marchers it must be said that altogether insufficient attention was given to the necessity of formulating definite demands for work schemes and placing them before the local authorities. The demands of the unemployed marchers largely concentrated on obtaining increased relief from the County Councils, and on the abolition of the Means Test. At the present time, perhaps one unemployed worker in ten receives relief from the local authorities, in addition to, or as an alternative to, the unemployed relief which he draws from the Labour Exchange. A little over 800,000 unemployed find their conditions directly worsened by the Means Test.

These are very important sections of the unemployed. They are the sections of the unemployed whom the government will direct its attacks against in the new unemployed legislation now being introduced. Nevertheless, these sections represent only one-third of the unemployed, and in carrying out mass actions we must put forward demands which will appeal also to the remaining two-thirds. The struggle for concrete work schemes is the best way of attracting these sections of the unemployed into the struggle. This task was too often neglected. Indeed, one might say that, in some districts the reformists—notably in building workers' unions—were more active in this respect than the revolutionaries.

Another feature of the marches was the entirely insufficient application of the united front policy. We are not unmindful of the fact that most of the marches were led by marchers' councils, on which trade union branches were represented, that the Communist Party, and the Independent Labour Party, participated in the organisation of the

marches and that Trades Congress Unemployed Associations participated in the West Riding march, and in the march of the London unemployed to the Trades Union Congress at Brighton.

Nevertheless, there was insufficient united front activity. The demands of the marchers were not drawn up after consultation with the widest circles of the unemployed. They were generally drawn up by the N.U.W.M. branches and perhaps modified at the conferences of N.U.W.M. and trade union branches which elected the marchers' councils.

True, the demands were popular and easily understood, and represented the interests of the unemployed. But not to make every possible effort to call the widest masses of the unemployed into consultation, when the demands were being formulated, was a very considerable mistake on our part.

It was equally a mistake not to have systematic connection with the unemployed frequenting the social service centres (we refer particularly to the marches which took place in the winter and the spring, when the social service centres—which closed down in most cases for the summer—were still open).

To rouse the interest of these unemployed, to get them to participate in the election of the committees which would organise the march, was a task of the utmost importance.

The actual position was that the mass of the unemployed did not hear of the demands until they were formulated, and were called on to enlist in a march led by a March Council—set up by the N.U.W.M. and sympathetic trade union branches—a March Council which they did not participate in electing. That was the situation as far as the majority of marchers were concerned. The result was that the marchers were largely N.U.W.M. members, or as in the case of the London march to the Brighton conference of the T.U.C., definitely Communist sympathisers.

If more definite attempts had been made, however, to bring the unorganised unemployed into the preparations for the marches, the basis of the movement would have been widened and the possibility of electing, around the N.U.W.M., broad unemployed councils after the marches were over, would have been considerably greater. The fact that the Broad Unemployed Council is mentioned in all resolutions, and is forgotten when mass action is being organised, shows that much has yet to be done in applying united front tactics in the field of unemployed struggle.

It must be acknowledged, however, that the approach of the N.U.W.M. to the unemployed who are organised in the Trades Congress Unemployed Associations has definitely improved, as has also its approach to the trade union branches. On the other hand, the N.U.W.M. does not sufficiently organise its own members for activity inside the unions. This is a weakness which must be overcome.

We must struggle for sports and recreational facilities for the unemployed. We must fight for the use of halls from the town councils, for the use of sports fields, for free admission to the public baths, for sports and educational facilities, to be organised under the control of the unemployed themselves. By taking up this fight we will prevent the organisation of more social service centres under the control of the churches and of the capitalist class generally.

Where centres are established, however, we should put forward demands such as the election of a committee to control the centre by the unemployed out of their own ranks, the periodical re-election of this committee, the organisation of lectures and discussions for the unemployed. No topics barred, and the fight against all semi-military drilling. These tasks call for immediate attention.

The coming autumn and winter demand that the Communist Party shall do everything in its power to assist the fight of the unemployed workers, and especially in developing the mass unemployed movement, which can draw in those masses of unemployed which so far it has not been possible to draw into its ranks.

There is constant danger to benefits, through the latest attacks on the unemployed workers who are now being deprived of their health benefits, and maternity benefits because they have not enough stamps on their cards; while the banning of meetings by Lord Trenchard at the Labour Exchanges in London and of unemployed demonstrations in other towns is in preparation for the new Unemployment Insurance Act being introduced in Parliament, which will undoubtedly take the attacks on the unemployed farther than they have yet been. In addition to this, attempts are being made to introduce new proposals for the conscription of the unemployed workers, something on the lines of that carried out by Hitler, who concentrates the unemployed in forced labour camps. This is the perspective of the unemployed fight, aggravated by the rising costs of living, placing additional burdens on the unemployed. Our Party can only carry out its work correctly if it now makes a serious effort to organise its fractions inside the unemployed movement, and if the Local, District and Central Committees give detailed and serious attention to the work among the unemployed, to ensure the broadening out of the whole fight; and greater

unity of action between employed and unemployed workers.

The organisation of a great national conference and hunger march can be made the means of giving a fillip to the whole fight against unemployment and to breaking through all bans whose aim it is to prevent effective forms of action. It will only be in this way that the Broad Unemployed Councils can be established, and the N.U.W.M. itself develop into a really powerful mass organisation that leads the daily struggles of all the unemployed workers.

CONCENTRATION EXPERIENCES.

The whole work of the Communist Party of Great Britain since the Twelfth Plenum and the Twelfth Party Congress has been guided by the resolution adopted at the January plenum of our Central Committee that was held in 1932, popularly known in the Party as "The January Resolution." This important and decisive resolution for our Party concentrated attention upon the imperative necessity of a decisive turn towards revolutionary mass work, and laid down the basis for the improvement of our revolutionary work in the trade unions and factories; showed how to overcome sectarian obstacles in regard to mass work; to develop a broad mass movement among the unemployed; and how the differences in principle between the Communist Party and the reformist parties must be brought out and emphasised, and special attention be given to concretely showing what the revolutionary way out of the crisis was for the British working class.

This resolution showed the way to bind up the daily activity with the fundamental question of the revolutionary struggle for socialism. It showed that only when the Party is firmly rooted in the trade unions and factories will it be able to lead the workers forward in revolutionary struggle against capitalism.

And it has been on this basis that the Party has tried to carry out all its work. It adopted four main concentration districts: South Wales, Lancashire, Scotland and London, and in all other districts the same methods were applied. The main factories, trade unions, labour exchanges and streets were chosen for this concentration work and a drive made to get the new methods of work carried out. In the course of the last eighteen months, the Political Bureau of the Party has adopted the system of receiving regular reports from leading comrades from these districts who attend the Political Bureau, in order that the Party should be able to check up on the work, to correct mistakes and to advise how the problems of the various districts should be solved. This experiment, although far from achieving perfection, has provided a means of keeping the Party leadership in the closest touch with every phase of Party life, as many of the leading comrades in the districts are also members of the Political Bureau, which results in a closer working contact and better collective leadership in all phases of the work of the Party.

It is already possible to give the main gains from these concentration experiences, so far as every Party district is concerned. There is now a better knowledge of the actual conditions and problems in the factories and trade unions; a better understanding of many local issues that arise at the labour exchanges and in the working class streets. The work of the factory and street cells has been improved, and also the content of the factory papers, which now come much closer to the life and requirements of the workers in the various industries. Valuable contacts have been made and a break through can be registered in the dangerous isolation of the Party from the masses. There has also been a steady increase in the number of excellent types of workers entering the Party.

But there are still serious weaknesses to be recorded. There has been lately a tendency to ease up on the concentration work; elaborate plans have been made, but many times they have remained on paper. There is insufficient realisation amongst the membership as a whole of the valuable work that has been done, since the line of the January resolution was applied to the tasks set the Party by the Twelfth Plenum and the Twelfth Party Congress. If the good results achieved had been better popularised, we would no doubt have been able to mobilise the whole membership more effectively. Now new efforts are being made to overcome the main weakness in our work, which can be stated as follows:

First and most important—the failure to bind up recruiting for the Party with every phase of our daily activity, and, secondly, the failure to bring forward new leaders in the local, district and central organs of the Party from amongst those who have come forward in the course of the mass struggles and strikes. There is insufficient activity in regard to the united front work, and in the defence of the workers' everyday interests, and particularly in the struggle against reformism; the work on the day-to-day problems is too sharply divided from activity connected with the main political events. The content of the daily mass work needs to be changed so that out of it we can direct into the Party a steady stream of class-conscious recruits, for they will not only be a powerful aid in the development of a mass Communist Party, but will in the fac-

tories and trade unions help forward the rank and file movements, and the building up of a revolutionary trade union opposition. Also, there is still a failure to raise the political level of the whole Party, and this is one of the reasons why we do not bring forward the new leaders and do not recruit enough new members.

Now there is greater attention being paid to overcome these weaknesses. The London District Party Committee have, for example, decided to give practically their whole attention to the East End of London — the district of decisive importance—realising that unless we can win the East End of London with its docks, its munitions factories, shipyards and chemical and engineering works, there can be no successful advance of the revolutionary movement in London. The D.P.C. are therefore instituting a special system of instructors, to lead the work not from above, but coming out of the basic units; and in this way they will take area by area until the whole of the decisive areas have been covered, and powerful locals established. This experiment is being imitated by other districts of the Party too. We can declare that in the coming months the Party will make resolute efforts to overcome the main weakness that the concentration experiences have revealed.

THE UNITED FRONT CAMPAIGN.

There has been a great deal of work put in, in connection with the united front campaign, but so far it cannot be stated that we have been able to bring large sections of the organised working class into this united front. This is caused by the reformist leaders, who in spite of the desire of the masses for united action, are still able to prevent the various working class organisations from taking part in their official capacity in the united front campaign.

On the publication of the Communist International's Manifesto in March, our Party addressed letters stating its willingness to participate in common discussions with a view to formulating a programme of issues, upon which the united front of every section of the movement could be established, to the Labour Party, Trades Union Congress, Co-operative Party and the Independent Labour Party.

These letters gave our practical suggestions, but only the I.L.P. responded to our invitation to a joint conference, the rest of the organisations confined themselves to polite replies, and indicated that, later on, they would give the considered views of their various executive committees. These final views are now known to all; they took the form of a sermon on the merits of Democracy and demerits of Dictatorship, and evaded the main question at issue, namely, whether they were willing to take part in united action to defend the workers from the attacks of capital, the menace of fascism and war.

The net effect of the reformist refusal to take part in the united front has been, naturally, for them to intensify their efforts to make one with the capitalists, and this they have done more completely than ever before, as seen in the decisions of the Brighton Conference of the Trades Union Congress and the Hastings Labour Party Conference, where all things associated with the name of socialism have been betrayed, and the gospel of Roosevelt has been proclaimed. At the same time, the rank and file of the reformist organisations are taking part in united front activity both in connection with the British Anti-War Movement and the German Relief Committee, and also the International Labour Defence. All such united front work on the part of the rank and file is banned and barred by the officials, but in spite of all their power they are unable to completely smash these efforts, and now the rank and file are to be finally frightened off united action by the latest Labour Party pamphlet, *The Communist Solar System,* in which, like the Popes of old, they have compiled an "index" of working class united front organisations that have to be placed beyond the pale for the members of the Labour Party. But there is strong opposition to these tactics, as was seen in the last conference of the National Union of Railwaymen, the National Committee Meeting of the Amalgamated Engineering Union, and various important local trade councils, like those of Newcastle-on-Tyne and Bradford, where recent discussions have revealed a significant backing of all sections of the working class movement for united front action.

With the I.L.P. it was possible to come to an agreement in March, and after their annual conference at Derby a much wider and more important agreement was reached regarding the basis upon which the united front should be conducted with the aim of winning other sections of the workers' movement for their participation in it. But it must be openly said that while the attempts to establish a united front between the Communist Party and the I.L.P. have been warmly welcomed by large sections of the workers, while there has been a serious indication of what could be achieved in the struggle against capitalist attacks, fascism and war, if all sections of the workers took part, the united front activity has largely been confined to meetings; the I.L.P. leadership tried in every way to avoid carrying the struggle for the united front into the factories and the trade unions.

There can be no real, effective united front that

is not based upon day-to-day activity in the factories and the trade unions; the object of the meetings, at which the leaders make speeches, is only meant to be the step towards the achievement of this other aim, which alone can give life and meaning to the united front, which is built on the basis of mass action. But the May 5 united front agreement has remained a paper agreement, because amongst the I.L.P. there are two different tendencies, so that the net result is not merely the non-application of the Derby conference decisions, but a definite grouping of those leaders who are against any further collaboration with the Communist Party. It is this which, in such districts of the I.L.P. as Lancashire and South Wales, gives rise to resolutions calling for the withdrawal of the I.L.P. from the united front with the Communist Party. I doubt whether any decisions of such importance to the revolutionary workers, adopted by the conference of a political party, which spoke in the name of the working class, have ever been so consistently sabotaged by the leadership, as in the case of the Derby conference decisions of the I.L.P.

However, the attraction of the rank and file to the united front is so strong that so far the leaders have not risked any attempt to make a direct break, although it is significant that, as a result of the last meeting with the I.L.P. delegation, they could not come to any agreement until they had reported back to their National Administrative Council; and now the Council have sent a letter to the Communist Party, in which, while verbally agreeing with a number of our concrete proposals, it in fact tries to undermine the whole basis of united front activity so far as building it up in the factories and trade unions is concerned. We shall be prepared to wholeheartedly work together, at the same time deepening our work amongst the I.L.P. membership as a whole, to win them for the line of policy laid down in the letters of the Communist International, which would also mean an immediate strengthening of every phase of united front activity.

Wherever there has been any real mass work carried out by the C.P. and the I.L.P. under the slogan of the united front there have been good and immediate results; as in the Hunger March on Edinburgh, the Firestone strike, the May First demonstrations, and also the collaboration in such bodies as the Anti-War Movement. But all this is nothing to what could be done if many of the I.L.P. leaders did not sabotage carrying out the united front work on the basis of the May 5 agreement, for this would help in organising a real, effective mass movement especially in the trade unions, and we could win a much greater influence at the Trades Union Congress and the Labour Party Conference. But it has to be recognised that the I.L.P. is a Party based upon a parliamentary basis, whose organisation is absolutely unfit for carrying on revolutionary mass work in the factories and the trade unions. And if the present situation exists, where the leadership is a leadership of varying tactics, but at least united in their policy of not carrying out in practice the decisions of their own annual conference, that means that the revolutionary rank and file will have to find their own ways and means of seeing that what they want is carried out in practice.

The Communist Party has also shown many weaknesses in its united front work, which we will not attempt to gloss over. We have not been energetic enough in our work in the factories and the trade unions, we have not got deep enough down to the masses with our united front propaganda, or explained sufficiently the meaning of the refusals of the reformists to take part in it. Further, during the course of the united front campaign there has been a tendency to slow down on other aspects of Party work. The fight against reformism has not been as strong and as sustained as the situation demands. The differences between the Communist Party and the other political parties have not been sufficiently dealt with, and there have been tendencies to think that there is no need for Party independent activity and recruiting during the period of the united front campaign. These defects have been corrected, and an improvement can be expected in the course of the winter campaign that the Party is about to embark upon. One thing is clear: that there is such a strong desire for united action on the part of the working class, that in spite of all the barriers that are put in the way by the reformist leaders, we can win these masses for common action if the right approach is made, on the basis of the living issues of the immediate situation.

THE NEXT TASKS.

The last meeting of the Central Committee was devoted to making an analysis of the present situation and the definition of the next tasks of the Party. The C.C. stressed the fact that the general line laid down at the Twelfth Plenum regarding the economic situation and the near beginning of a new round of wars and revolutions was more than confirmed by everything that has taken place since then. The economic situation in Britain has been outlined in the beginning of this article, and, basing its decision on the analysis made at the meeting, the Central Committee endorsed a Manifesto drawn up by the political bureau and giving the line and tasks of the Party in the period immediately ahead.

This Manifesto deals with the international situation, and gives detailed attention to the situation, particularly in America, Germany and Britain, and then makes the contrast with what obtains in the Soviet Union. It then goes on to analyse the situation in the working-class movement, the strike struggles, unemployed marches, and the new developments in trade unions, showing how the reformist leaders split the workers' ranks and prevent unity of action. It gives the political reasons why the Labour Party and trade union leaders refuse to adopt the united front; the C.C. then takes up the question of what is to be done. It may be of interest to quote from the Manifesto itself from this point on, because it is on the basis of the following that all the current Party campaigns are now being carried through.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE.

In this situation the whole aim of every serious worker, whatever his political party and organisation, must be to use every ounce of energy and influence to develop the mass united front for the coming critical battles of next winter.

Already a tremendous response is being made to the growing united front movement which is being developed by the Communist Party, Independent Labour Party, and many local Labour, Trade Union and Co-operative organisations up and down the country.

This raises sharply before the rank and file of the Labour Party and Trade Union movement who are imbued with a passionate desire for unity, the necessity of fighting inside their organisations to smash the barriers erected by the reformist leadership against working class unity and struggle.

We should be proud to take inspiration from the magnificent example shown by our German comrades of fighting back in face of the most bestial and bloody terror the world has yet known, and the rising wave of struggle developing in Britain.

WORKING MEN AND WOMEN!

Time presses! There is not another moment to be lost in building up the united front of the working class—not a united front of fine platform speeches, of waiting for action until the co-operation of the Labour Party and trade union leaders is secured, but a united front for mass action, for mass demonstrations, strikes, hunger marches, and every phase of militant activity, around a common programme such as:—

Ten per cent. increase in wages.

Ten per cent. increase in all unemployed benefits.

Seven-hour day for miners and the 40-hour week without wage reductions.

Abolition of the Means Test.

No industrial conscription of the unemployed in test and task work centres.

The inauguration of work schemes at trade union rates.

Defence of every existing right of free speech and organisations, and removal of all bans upon working class demonstrations.

The organisation of material aid for and solidarity action in support of the German working class.

A fight against the war policy of the national government and for the defence of the Soviet Union.

The Communist Party believes that it is possible to win every trade union branch, Trades Councils, the workers in every factory and at the Labour Exchanges to achieve these aims, and pledges itself to co-operate wholeheartedly with every employed and unemployed worker and their organisations in order to build up the united fighting front of the working class around the fighting programme of action.

We believe that such a united front can give a new hope, a new aim to the millions of our class, that the experiences gained in this common struggle will close the ranks, will force back the ruling class and will hasten the end of capitalist exploitation, fascism and war.

If we workers who weave the cloth, hew the coal, build the ships, build the great engines and machinery, plow the land and till the soil, if we who have been thrown on the scrap-heap of starvation for so long now unite our forces in the factories, mills, mines, shipyards, the trade unions and streets, there is no power in Britain that can prevent us from achieving our aims.

THE WAY TO SOCIALISM.

For years the workers have seen in this and other countries Labour governments, National governments, Fascist governments, all trying to rescue capitalism from the crisis. All of them have robbed and oppressed the workers, but the crisis deepens.

All policies which maintain capitalist ownership can only make the crisis worse, can only result in worsening conditions for the workers. There is only one way to solve the crisis and bring better conditions.

The workers must rule—that is, definitely take power into their own hands. This means that the mass movement of the workers now spreading throughout the country must be

developed to the point when it will smash the capitalist state, take over control of the factories, mills, mines, land and banks, and on this basis establish the revolutionary workers' government.

The revolutionary workers' government will be based on workers' councils elected by the workers in field, factory and workshop, on the basis of the widest workers' democracy, and will maintain an iron dictatorship against the capitalist class in order to completely break all resistance to the establishment of socialism.

The workers' dictatorship in control of the mines, land, factories, shipyards, textile mills, railroads, banks and all transport communications, will organise planned production to satisfy the needs of the workers.

It will withdraw all the armed forces from the colonial countries and give complete independence to all colonial peoples.

In fraternal alliance with the Soviet Union and with the freed colonial peoples, it will exchange its socialist products for the raw materials and foodstuffs of its socialist neighbours.

It will help and assist great countries, like India, China, Africa and Ireland, to open up their territories for socialist industrialisation, to reorganise agriculture and in this way make prosperous their toiling millions. It will set every factory going at full capacity, it will employ every worker to meet the growing needs of the workers in the advancing socialist society.

REVIEW OF THE "DAILY WORKER" (U.S.A.).

(June-July)

(In the order of checking up the carrying out of the tasks put before the Communist Party of the U.S.A. by the E.C.C.I.)

IN its Open Letter to the members of the Communist Party of U.S.A., the extraordinary Party conference, which took place in the beginning of July, noted that the circulation of the D.W. had decreased and the Party had not carried out its tasks of transforming the paper into "a really revolutionary mass paper, into an agitator and organiser of our work." In the control tasks adopted by the conference, the task of transforming the D.W. into a mass popular Party paper was put before the Party. Concretely worked out, exceedingly important tasks of struggling for the carrying out of the instructions in the Open Letter, the struggle for the organisation of a mass Party basis in the main industrial centres, and the organisation of mass revolutionary unions, were put before the paper. The question of the D.W. has a special significance for the C.P. U.S.A. The condition of this paper not only shows the mass influence of the Party, but also which masses the influence of the Party is penetrating. With the presence of more than ten workers' foreign language papers with a combined circulation of more than 150,000, the D.W. on the one hand serves mainly the native American workers, and on the other hand involves the immigrant workers in the common class struggle. Therefore, the position of the D.W. is an indication of the influence of the Party among the native American workers, and also the inclusion of the immigrant workers, who form a considerable mass of workers in the most important industries and, as a rule, are unorganised, in the common class struggle.

I.—THE POPULARISATION OF THE OPEN LETTER AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CARRYING OUT ITS INSTRUCTIONS

In the control tasks, a special sixth paragraph gives directives on the popularisation of the decisions in the C.P. U.S.A. with the aim of assisting the widest development of practical, useful self-criticism from below. This is to foster the growth of political consciousness, activity and initiative of the membership masses, and the lower organisations, and the working out of the immediate concrete tasks and a plan of work for every Party organisation in its sphere of activity. To emphasise the importance of popularising the decisions, and taking into account the fact that previously (for example, the decisions of the Fourteenth Plenum of the C.C.) decisions were not popularised or explained, and there was no struggle in the paper for their accomplishment; the decision on the control tasks indicates that the wide popularisation of the decisions on American questions is the main prerequisite for their actual fulfilment. Every Party member should know these decisions and their significance for his practical work. It was pointed out, especially in connection with the D.W., that the paper should

conduct an explanatory campaign connected with current questions of class struggle, involving not merely Party members, but all workers.

Nevertheless, up to the 12th of July, that is, after more than a month, there was nothing in the D.W. directly concerning the Open Letter, as also regarding the coming Party conference.

Right up to the conference the D.W. did not popularise the ideas and tasks put forward in the Open Letter. There was nothing concerning the questions of concentration of the forces of the Party in centres of most importance, of the proletarian basis of the Party, the farmers' question, the building of the D.W., etc. Only the campaign for social insurance was renewed in the paper on the 10th of June, when from day to day the paper started to print material on this question.

On July 12 the paper carried information concerning the conference which was held on 7th-10th of July, with a brief report on it. On the 13th of July the text of the Open Letter was printed in a special supplement. But after that, until July 18, there was nothing concerning the Extraordinary Conference in the paper. On July 18 the D.W. printed a letter from a worker greeting the Open Letter as an editorial, with a "note" and the following comment:

> "This, comrades, is the spirit. It was because the Party conference wanted to arouse such a spirit that the Open Letter was written. We hope every unit of the Party, every Party committee as well as every individual comrade, will thoroughly examine our work with the view of decisively improving our approach to the workers, and in the first place, to those in the big factories."
>
> "The *Daily Worker* invites comrades and units to write to us on the tasks which you have set yourselves in the light of the Open Letter and particularly on your actual accomplishments in carrying out these tasks."

It would be apropos for the D.W. itself to state what tasks it has set itself in regard to the Open Letter, and particularly how it is carrying these tasks out. In such a manner the D.W. allowed itself to drift, and divorced itself from the popularisation of the Open Letter and the decisions of the Party conference, and the struggle for the carrying out of the directives of the Open Letter, from the rôle of organiser, the ideological leader of this struggle.

In the issue of July 19 two short letters on the Open Letter were published. True, in the issue of July 15 there was an article under the mysterious caption, "He Who Laughs Last," which pointed out that the capitalists do not understand this old proverb. The bourgeois press, in connection with the Open Letter, says that the Communists admit their defeat; whereas the D.W. is out to prove that there is no such defeat. The membership of the Party has increased from 9,000 to 20,000 during the last year, its influence is growing everywhere; but this growth of the Party, the D.W. writes, does not satisfy us, for it does not correspond to the full possibilities of the situation. This is not quite what the Open Letter tells us. The formula of forgetting the actual circumstances may also be applied, both to the evaluation of the position of the Party drawn up by the Sixteenth Plenum of the C.C., which the Open Letter admits to be incorrect, and that given by the Letter itself, namely, that the Party has not carried out the tasks which were set it over a year ago. The paper is right in saying that the Open Letter is not an admission of defeat, as there is no such defeat, for the C.P. has achieved certain definite successes. The revolutionary movement is making rapid strides forward. But it should have gone further, and said that the Open Letter emphasised that if the C.P.U.S.A. does not strengthen its foundations in large enterprises there is a danger that it will "succumb to the influence of petty-bourgeois views" and that it showed the way out of this situation. Without this, as the paper points out, it would not have been "a weapon in the struggle."

On July 22 an article by Comrade Browder was published on the struggle for social insurance, and the paper carried an excerpt from the Open Letter on the struggle for social insurance, but gave no explanation of the Open Letter, or evaluation of the execution of this directive from the time of the publication of the Letter.

On July 24, in one of the smaller articles, the paper gives an excerpt from the Open Letter, pointing out that Roosevelt's programme makes the fight for social insurance, and particularly for unemployment insurance, especially important.

The *Daily Worker* of July 25 printed a letter from a non-Party farmer from Pennsylvania, a German, who remarked that the Open Letter appeared at a very opportune time. But the paper limited itself to printing this letter without comment. But comment was necessary, because this letter advances a series of facts, from which it follows that the Party was not mobilised around the Open Letter. "A few days ago," reports the correspondent, "I met two Party members . . . I talked with them about the 'Daily'—and as true as my name is . . . not one of them was a subscriber to the *Daily Worker*! . . . I told them straight to the face that such Communists do not count much to-day in a period of revolutionary fermentation among workers and poor farmers." . . . Or this fact, that at a meeting in a workers'

centre where the well-known "Socialist" Maurer delivered a speech in connection with the Roosevelt Act, not a single Communist showed up to expose this "socialist." "Where were the Communists to expose the Slavery Act? Yes, the Letter (Open Letter) was necessary." Excellent material for the paper. But the *Daily Worker* remains strangely, mysteriously silent.

On July 26 an editorial appeared which was devoted to the growth of the strike movement and headed, "Who Will Lead These Strikes?" a question which is very timely—and directly related to the Open Letter.

However, after quoting the Open Letter on the increased activity of the reformists, and the necessity for concentrating on work in the leading industries, only at the end of the editorial does the paper, basing its statement on the Open Letter, declare:

> "We must raise the loudest alarm in the ranks of the Party and the revolutionary trade unions, stressing the burning point in the Open Letter—centreing our greatest energy, our strongest organisational forces, our constant activity in the basic industries."

However, neither small, nor "loudest" alarm is raised by the newspaper. In this number which the newspaper evidently considers devoted to the Open Letter, the regular excerpt from the speech of Comrade Browder at the Party Conference was given, and one from the Open Letter itself. As editorial, the paper printed merely an address to the readers and the Party organisations, urging them to write about the Open Letter. It is possible that the newspaper resolved to maintain a strictly democratic line in the popularisation of the Letter, "popularisation from below," giving excerpts from the speech of Browder until a response would arise from below to the paper's calls.

Only on July 26 did the paper raise the question of who was to lead the growing fight of the workers, and already the next day we find the question answered: the D.W.'s leading article is headed, "The Party Leads." In the course of one night the Party becomes the leader. "The Communist Party alone," the D.W. asserts, "stands at the head of the army of starving jobless workers, leading the fight for Federal Unemployment Insurance and for immediate relief." It is true that only the C.P. fights for federal insurance and immediate relief for seventeen million unemployed. But why make the "slip" of saying that the Party is at the head of seventeen million unemployed? After reading the editorials of July 26 and 27, the reader is left wondering about the true state of affairs. By such work the D.W. does not clarify this question. Possibly the editorial of July 27 was meant to answer the worker's letter, published on July 26, on the editorial exposing Roosevelt (July 10), which, however, did not mention the rôle of the Party. But such an answer hardly helps.

On July 27 the newspaper printed not only a letter of a reader, a member of the Party, but also an answer to it. But, unfortunately, we cannot consider this answer either satisfactory or correct. Comrade —— wrote a letter on the internal Party situation. It is possible that he reflects certain unhealthy frames of mind or tendencies in the Party. The question boils down to this, that the Party Conference and the Open Letter approached the problem incorrectly because to develop our work among the unemployed and in general, is very good, but how is it possible to do all of this without improving the inner Party life, particularly the education of the new members of the Party? And, as it happens, just this question is dealt with in the Open Letter; the Party must clean itself internally first and then it will be successful in its mass work. First of all this comrade should have received an answer to the question, "Is it correct that the Open Letter does not speak of the internal Party life, of the internal Party situation?" The newspaper hardly touches on this question, on the grounds that the Fourteenth Plenum has already dealt with the problem of internal Party life. Evidently the Editorial Board, for some reason, did not understand the vital point of this Open Letter, namely, that the questions of the internal situation of the Party, and the education of new Party members are very clearly defined in it, and that therefore a series of questions—the line of the Party, its leadership, the danger of factional fights, cadres, bureaucracy, initiative from below, apparatus, finance, etc.—are so sharply raised. The correspondent did not understand this point of the Letter, but neither did the Editorial Board. The letter deals a considerable length with internal Party questions, and for that reason it openly and authoritatively turns to all members of the Party, *although this is not the central point in the Letter.* The Letter calls upon the Party to overcome internal obstacles and emerge on to the broad road of revolutionary mass work. The Letter indicates the path to this, and mobilises the Party. True, the Editorial Board shows in its reply that the Open Letter speaks of the inner Party life, but it limits itself to a quotation from one of the points of the Open Letter, obviously insufficient for a characterisation of the attitude of the Open Letter —as the paper itself writes—to the "fundamental problem in connection with the work of our Party."

The Editorial Board is absolutely correct when it writes that the decisive question for the Party

a present, is its rôle as the advance guard in the struggle of the masses. It is also correct when it states that we cannot sever internal Party life from mass work. But does not the Editorial Board itself follow the road of this separation somewhat, when it declares that the internal Party life will be good, to the degree to which the mass work of the Party is so? At this point, the newspaper evades the question—How can the mass work of the Party be successful when its internal condition is bad? Evidently the newspaper simplifies the question. Evidently it should have pointed first of all to the principles involved in the matter; that when there is a bad internal Party condition, there really can be no good mass work. It is the Party that is carrying on this work. If things are not well inside the Party, it cannot carry on good mass work. And, vice versa, if the C.P. does not carry on systematic work among the masses, this will naturally be reflected in its internal condition. The Open Letter points out that the decisions adopted by the Fourteenth Plenum of the C.C. are correct. But they remain on paper, not being carried to the masses. This is the result of internal defects in the Party, and in turn sharpens these defects. For this reason the Party must energetically take up the struggle for carrying its decisions into life, into the masses, first of all among the workers in the basic industries, overcoming internal obstacles, strengthening the Party from within, transforming it into a mass Communist Party. The Party has on the whole cleaned its ranks from the Lovestonites and Trotskyists, and *now* the centre of attention is the execution of its correct decisions in practice. This *practice,* above all, at the present time, decides the question of the line. What is unhealthy in the comrade's letter (or is the reflection of the unhealthy tendencies in the Party) is that he questions the Party's readiness to touch on what he considers a sore place as it is—the internal Party situation. The Editorial Board evades this sharp question, too. It simply limits itself to pointing out that a "mechanical cleaning" does not solve the question. This is correct, but it is no answer to the question, or rather an answer to only a small part of it.

It should have answered the question directly, shown the internal Party condition, and pointed out to the comrade that, although there are some unhealthy tendencies in the Party, *the Party is, as a whole, healthy,* and hence it should have answered to the second question that the Party does not need a mechanical cleaning; it should have pointed out that the cleaning of revolutionary parties, under the present conditions in capitalist countries and the fascisation of capitalist domination, takes place in a different way, in the process of the class battles, in the process of carrying out the revolutionary line of the Communist Party in practice, of exposing those who accept it only in words, of the Party's struggle on two fronts, and of purging it of the remains of social-democratic elements in this struggle. And it should in connection with this, have shown comradely resistance to such feelings of suspicion, demands for an internal Party cleansing, etc. It should have pointed out that these frames of mind are not correct, not healthy. The last question is whether such a letter should have been printed. The paper is not obliged to print all letters, but there must be a serious reason for not doing so, such as that it is a useless letter, a harmful letter in that it detracts attention from the questions standing before the Party, a slanderous letter, etc. But once a letter which sharply raises certain questions is published, a serious answer must be given it, not rounding the sharp corners. In this case, the letter places acute questions before the Party—so much the clearer and more carefully thought out should have been the answer.

Finally, on July 28, in an article on the policy of the A.F. of L. and our tasks, which is not bad on the whole, there is a reference to the slogan of "concentrate on the basic industries!" July 31, we find one more quotation from the Open Letter in connection with the campaign for the *Daily Worker.* "Every reader remembers," writes the newspaper, "the terse and significant reproach of the Open Letter: 'The circulation of the *Daily Worker* had fallen off'." Later on it adds, "and the activities of our readers in gaining new readers are the only means we have of guaranteeing that the six- and eight-page daily will be an organ of revolutionary vigour, a paper capable of doing its key-work in the carrying out of all the tasks of the Open Letter." As can be seen, the newspaper itself is at present not carrying out the most necessary task in connection with the Open Letter—the popularisation of the Open Letter and the work of the Party Conference.

There can be only one conclusion—*the newspaper has not yet achieved the organisation of a systematic mass campaign for the popularisation of the Open Letter and the work of the Party Conference, as the most important prerequisite for the execution by the Party and the newspaper itself of the tasks placed before it by the Open Letter.*

The events which took place in the United States after the working out of the Open Letter—the intensification of the attacks of the bourgeoisie on the working class and the toiling masses under the flag of the Industrial Recovery Act and the increased feverish activity of social reformism in the deception and disorganisation of

the workers make the questions of the Open Letter much more actual. And the farmer correspondent from Pennsylvania gave the newspaper a splendid example of how actual the questions of the Open Letter are at the present time precisely in connection with recent events of the United States. The question must be placed this way: At the present time the most urgent task of the Party is the organisation of the united front for the fight against Roosevelt's last act;—consequently the fight for the Open Letter is particularly actual at the present time, since the Open Letter points out the only road by which the Party can become the organiser of this united front. The Open Letter places the central questions of the development of the Party and the central problems before it, without the execution of which the Party cannot be at the head of the basic sections of the American working class. The struggle for the carrying into life of the instructions of the Open Letter must be a weapon for the mobilisation of the Party in the organisation of a broad united front of the workers, in the fight against a new, extensive attack of the American bourgeoisie.

The newspaper must immediately correct the mistake it has committed, so much the more, as in other respects the newspaper shows an ability to improve its work. There is a basis for thinking, therefore, that the mistakes which have been pointed out will soon be corrected. We shall not make any proposals on how to popularise the Open Letter, such directives have been given and they must be carried out. It should be taken into account that the newspaper has already lost two months. The newspaper must take up, in the most decided manner, the task of explaining the problems of the Open Letter in connection with the actual course of events of the class struggle, to fight for the execution of these tasks in life. It is necessary to give accounts of the course of the discussion of the Letter, and at present it is clearly necessary to give, in the first place, material on how the instructions of the Letter are carried into life with informational material, elucidating articles should be published. The newspaper must *organise the verification of the execution* of the Letter through its contacts in the localities—the workers' correspondents. This is related to the work of the big cells, section and district committees, trade union fractions in the revolutionary unions and in the opposition, in the unemployed councils and mass organisations. The newspaper must summarise the work in connection with the most important questions of struggle and carrying into life of the Open Letter. All of this must be done not only from above, but unquestionably relying on the Party, non-Party and worker-correspondent masses, mobilising the social opinion of the masses, utilising its pressure on the weak and backward sections. An all-sided deep understanding of the Open Letter by the whole Party and sympathising non-Party elements, the mobilisation of the activity of the Party in the fight for its penetration into the fundamental branches of industry—this is the deciding question, at the present time, for the Communist Party of the United States and the *Daily Worker*. This task is not an easy one, but one quite possible of execution.

As early as May 29, the *Daily Worker* published the appeal of the T.U.U.L. to all members of the T.U.U.L., A.F. of L., independent unions, organised and unorganised workers, employed and unemployed, calling on them to organise their own committees in the factories, to formulate their demands, to strike for higher wages, and a reduced working day without wagecuts. In this appeal a special section dealt with the Roosevelt Recovery Bill (at that time, it was still a Bill and was passed on June 16), and, on the whole, gave a correct characterisation of it. However, after this the paper said nothing on the question of the Bill until June 3. On June 3, there was an article by Stachel on the growth of the strike struggle, where the section dealing with the Bill, in general, repeated what was said in the manifesto of the T.U.U.L. It was only on June 6 that letters were published from Washington on the discussion of the Bill in the Senate Financial Commission. On June 8 the paper issued a leading article on the strike-breaking nature of the Bill, letters from Washington and another paragraph. On June 9 there was an article by T. Todes, on June 10 a second article by the same comrade, on June 12 a small editorial article, and then it was only after June 15 that the paper carried something every day about the Act (on June 16 the Bill became law). However, it was only on June 22, *i.e.*, a week after the passing of the Bill, that the paper gave a full leading article on the Industrial Recovery Act. After June 22 the paper began to carry on a systematic campaign against the Act, and this campaign only assumed a really political mass character after the Conference. So that if we consider the matter of quantity, the picture is quite good from the end of June. However, it should be noted here, too, that the paper was *very late* in developing the campaign against the Industrial Recovery Act. If it was possible before June 16 to claim that it was still not law, nevertheless, after June 16, when the Act came into force, the immobility of the paper was a big political defect, the more so that the leadership of the Party fraction in the T.U.U.L. and there-

fore the leadership of the Party as a whole, correctly estimated the Bill, as can be seen from the manifesto of the T.U.U.L. on May 29. Thus we see that the newspaper *lagged behind*. But even after June 22 and up till the Party Conference, the paper developed the campaign against the Act very slowly.

But the chief weakness of the campaign of the paper is not the quantity of material published. From this point of view, up to June 22 the campaign was late, from June 22 up to the Party Conference it developed slowly, became satisfactory, and after the Party Conference it can be considered good. The newspaper systematically gave reports from Washington on the procedure with the Act, on the preparation and the discussion of the industrial codes, the speeches of Roosevelt, Johnson, Green, the employers, the representatives of the revolutionary unions, etc. The paper gave correspondence on the preparation of codes by the revolutionary unions. It gave a number of articles analysing the various aspects of the Act, the attitude of various parties towards it, exposing the A.F. of L. and the Socialist Party. The paper followed the strikes which had anything to do with the passing of Act. Since the second half of July the paper, from time to time, gave very good material (e.g., July 25), both in articles and in correspondence from the localities, dealing with the struggles of the workers and the work of the revolutionary unions against the Industrial Recovery Act. The paper particularly systematically exposed the Roosevelt boom, giving material day by day on this question, capably using the materials of the bourgeois press. The same can be said of the correspondence from Washington. But these things are not the most difficult and most responsible branches of the work of the paper, although we do not wish for a moment to belittle the importance of these branches of the work for the paper and the necessity for further strengthening them.

The weak part of the campaign was the *insufficiency of the political leadership*, the insufficiency of material from the *worker-correspondents*, the almost complete absence of *political organisation and utilisation of material to hand*. In general, during the two months the paper gave about 150 reports, articles, paragraphs and letters on the Act, of which about thirty were articles. But if we take the leading articles and political articles, during the two months, the paper did not give more than five or six altogether (leading articles on June 22, July 26, partly July 13, articles on June 28, July 4, 8, 27, 28 and partly July 15 and 17). This alone would be sufficient to show the weakness of the political leadership of the campaign. During two months the *Daily Worker* only gave two full leading articles against the frantic campaign of the bourgeoisie, who mobilised every government and social lever to carry through the "Recovery" Act. This means that the paper gave insufficient political leadership to the campaign. This was also evident in the weakness of the political organisation and the utilisation of the material possessed by the paper. In this respect, as a general rule, the paper limited itself to the rôle of information agent and photographer of facts, insufficiently working up and utilising the material politically. It must be admitted to be an undoubted achievement that the paper increased its information and obtained some improvements in the organisation of the material. Work in this direction should be intensively carried further. A newspaper cannot live without information. Information is the material basis of a newspaper — the richer this basis, the better the paper becomes. But however good the information may be and however much it may speak for itself, it is quite insufficient and cannot take the place of political leadership, and the paper should approach every line of its material precisely from this point of view. Of course, if the leading part of a paper is too large and the information is sparse, it will not organise the masses. But the result will be the same if the material is given without political leadership. The worker must be *helped* to understand the material, to get the political idea of it, to draw conclusions for the organisation of the struggle, for understanding its slogans. This is the task of a newspaper which is a propagandist, agitator and organiser. The propagandist part of the campaign was more or less satisfactory. In this respect considerable work was done by Comrade Gannes, whose articles, unfortunately, were long drawn out and without a sufficiently clear political and theoretical presentation of the question. But the agitational and organisational rôle of the paper in the campaign was considerably weaker. Day after day a stereotyped postscript is tacked on to the articles and to some of the letters: "We must intensify our work, we must penetrate into the big factories, we must . . . " One of the big articles of Comrade Gannes on how to struggle against the Act consists entirely of these "we must," "the workers must," "intensify and consolidate," etc.

And yet, even the scanty material which the paper has at present might serve as some kind of a basis for the organisation of leadership. As an example of the utilisation of the material and concrete leadership on the basis of material received, we may mention the issue of July 2, in which the paper, on the basis of material on how the workers of a cement works broke down the

attempts of the employers to form a company union, gives the lessons of this struggle and advice to the workers on their further struggle, not giving this advice in a condescending tone. Several such examples could be given, but they are units among hundreds of articles, letters, reports, etc. The paper registers facts and stops at this, or gives the recipe: "we must," "the workers must," "in every factory, in every mine, strengthen, consolidate," etc.

This expresses the basic weakness of the paper and the campaign—its weakness as an organiser and leader, the weakness of its *concrete leadership*. This is also explained by the weakness of the basis of the paper among the worker-correspondents, the weakness of the promotion and education of these correspondents. The paper sometimes gives good worker-correspondents' material or correspondence from the localities (e.g., July 25), but at present these are only occasional examples and even exceptions. *Unless the basis of worker-correspondents and the network of local correspondents in general is strengthened, the paper cannot live.*

But on the basis of the materials of the worker-correspondents, the paper should display its rôle of agitator and organiser. In this campaign this rôle was shown very badly. And yet this is the decisive link of the campaign.

And here the paper displayed the weakness of leadership, though it is true that it made some progress towards the end of the period under review. In a number of cases the paper itself makes such admissions as in the headline of July 26: "Letters From Workers Show Growing Desire for Union Under Own Control," and on July 18: "In a month or so Lewis and his representatives claim to have organised 300,000 new members." On July 14, in the report on the session of the Executive Committee of the T.U.U.L., during the Party conference, we find: "In connection with the activity of the A.F.L. and the attempt of the bosses to force the workers into company unions it was stressed that *the T.U.U.L. unions are not taking advantage of the tremendous desire of the workers to organise. Where this was done as among the miners of Utah some 1,300 miners joined the National Miners' Union.*" On July 28, in an article against the strike-breaking of the A.F.L.: "We must proceed to the most energetic organisation campaign of the revolutionary unions to smash these attempts (to form company unions, and to carry out the tactics of the A.F. of L. leaders). We must realise the danger and be able to cope with it by a most detailed and painstaking exposure of the policy of the A.F. of L. We must urge the workers to form their own unions, develop the initiative of the workers in all plants in the basic industries, stimulating the formation of strike committees . . . " Many such admissions could be found. However, one thing is very obvious. On July 14 the Executive Committee of the T.U.U.L. admitted that we are lagging behind. But two weeks later the paper again stated: "We must," etc. And what had been done, what was the practical experience, why not summarise this experience, draw lessons from it, instead of repeating a stereotyped phrase? The paper does not carry on any "most energetic campaign" for the independent organisation of the workers. It does not "urge" the workers to this, although it exposes the A.F. of L. quite well, although it gives information about independent organisation. It is a great thing to gather information and to give it. This is a great thing for the organisation of a few dozen people, but the paper must organise the masses, and for this purpose the Editorial Board and its correspondents must convert this material into a basis for the political leading, organising and appealing rôle of the paper. All the facts in the paper show that this is just what is missing in its work. For example, there is a letter from Rhode Island: "When we explained to the workers the real difference between the National Textile Union (T.U.U.L.) and the Amalgamated Union (A.F. of L.), they unanimously decided to join the National Union. There are similar letters from Youngstown, etc.

We must deal with some questions on the political line of the paper in this campaign. The Party and the paper in general correctly estimated the Industrial Recovery Act. But in the campaign there were, nevertheless, some weaknesses. The Industrial Recovery Act is a serious step by the American bourgeoisie in the direction of fascisation and war. However, at the beginning the paper closed its eyes to these new fascist features of the Act. The leading article on June 8 stated directly that the Roosevelt Act only means the extension to other branches of industry of the policy which the Republicans have carried on in the coal industry. In the same way, Comrade Gannes, in his first article on June 24, states that the Roosevelt Act in essence is the old policy of Hoover, the new features being "only" that the Roosevelt Act aims at finding a capitalist way out of the crisis. Comrade Craweth went to such an extreme that he found the predecessor of the Roosevelt Act in the so-called 1910 protocol, drawn up by Brandeis, now Judge of the Supreme Court, for the garment workers, and the regulations of the War Workers' Bureau in 1918. Of course it is quite indispensable to use historical examples of exposed heroes of the bourgeoisie for

e struggle against their present-day actions and aders, to show the consistency of the develop- ent of the policy of the bourgeoisie. However, ilure to put forward above all the question of e new features in the policy of the bourgeoisie a mistake. It may be that this was why the *ily Worker* developed the campaign against e Act so slowly—in reality *underestimating* its portance as a regular step in the development, e *fascisation* of the policy of the American urgeoisie in the circumstances of the sharpen- g of the general crisis of capitalism, the end of pitalist stabilisation and the growth of the volutionary upsurge. This denial of new atures in the Act went so far that even in respect its military significance Comrade Gannes states the *Daily Worker* of July 3: "But this is not a w programme. Preparation for war has always en an integral part of the capitalists during a sis." (Why only during a crisis?)

Among the other weaknesses we should mention e insufficient exposure of the demagogy on lanned economy" under capitalism, the insuffi- nt exhibition of the contradictions in the camp the bourgeoisie, although at the beginning une 6) the paper even stated that, owing to the ntradictions in the camp of the bourgeoisie, the t was almost as good as doomed to failure; the ashington correspondent stated that the capital- s do not even wish to recognise the principle of vernment control. This, he considered, was own by the disagreements in the Senate Com- ssion. At the same time the paper indirectly cognised the Act as one for economic planning, ting that the disagreements in the Senate show e inability of the capitalists to carry on any ogramme of economic planning. But these stakes were not ones which determine the line the paper.

The same can be said of the unclear formula- n of Comrade Gannes on July 4 that the future velopment of American capitalism, if it is ssible at all, can only take place through the argement of foreign markets, and the formula- n in the *Daily Worker* of July 1, which con- es the general crisis of capitalism with the sent cyclic economic crisis (see paragraph 2 in article, "Lag of Markets and Inflated Output ill Make More Unemployed").

However, the *Daily Worker* did not commit any re serious errors.

On the whole, the *Daily Worker* took up a rect line regarding the Industrial Recovery t, and the entire Roosevelt programme. It uld be pointed out as a service of the paper t it not only refused to allow itself to be con- ed by the campaign in the bourgeois press on return of prosperity, but took up a firm Marxist position on the analysis of the causes and the character of the Roosevelt Industrial boom. It should be recognised as a service of the editorial board and the leadership of the Party that from the very beginning they correctly determined, on the whole, the tactics of the bourgeoisie, the A.F. of L. and the Socialist Party. The article in the *Daily Worker* on June 28 gives a clear analysis of the rôle of the A.F. of L. and the tasks of the Party, with the shortcomings mentioned above, and an exposure of the programme of Roosevelt. The paper correctly emphasised the slogan of higher wages, though it did not put it forward sufficiently agitationally. The paper did not sufficiently popularise the slogan against the intensification of labour, against capitalist rationalisation, including the struggle against dismissals, not to speak of a still weaker agitation around these slogans.

THE STRUGGLE FOR REVOLUTIONARY TRADE UNION WORK.

The development of the Labour movement of the U.S.A. at present has raised two questions in their full magnitude: the question of the relations between organised and unorganised workers, and the question of the attitude of the revolutionary unions to other trade union organisations of the workers. The Party must be perfectly clear on these questions, particularly at the present moment. Without clarity on these questions no successful work can be done in creating a broad united front of the working class against the Roosevelt programme.

From what has been said in the preceding section it is clear that the paper, although it exposed the Roosevelt laws before its readers comparatively well and carried on an extensive campaign against them, did not sufficiently *organise the struggle* of the masses against Roosevelt's policy. This is particularly acutely felt in the trade union question. With what tasks was the paper faced?

Firstly, to expose Roosevelt's trade union policy. Secondly, to show the part played in carrying out Roosevelt's act by the A.F. of L. leaders, the Musteists, and the leaders of the Socialist Party.

Thirdly, to explain to the workers questions of the work of the A.F. of L., to mobilise them for the struggle against the policy of Roosevelt and of the A.F. of L. leaders supporting him.

Fourthly, to show how the revolutionary elements must carry out these tasks in order always to be with the masses and at their head.

The first and second tasks the paper has, on the whole, carried out satisfactorily, although without a sufficiently carefully thought-out plan. It gave materials exposing both the Act on the

labour question and the concrete application of the Act in the sphere of trade unions. In a series of articles and other material the paper showed that the clause of the Act declaring that a worker has the right to belong or not belong to any trade union organisation, as he wishes, is a hypocritical and false statement, which in practice aims at preventing the workers from setting up their own independent organisations. During the negotiations about the codes, the employers and the Act administration recognised as the workers' representatives only the leaders of the A.F. of L. After loud mass protest the representatives of the revolutionary unions were admitted, but only in order that they might state their views; two miners elected by the workers of Brownsville, Pa., were discharged, to which the workers replied with a strike. At the same time a furious campaign is being carried on against the revolutionary unions, which are continuously persecuted by the police. Roosevelt has declared a moratorium on strikes, and the revolutionary leaders of strikes have in a number of cases been arrested.

The paper showed that the government and the employers put forward the American Federation of Labour, in opposition to the independent organisations of the workers, set up company unions, and, where possible, prevent any kind of workers' organisation in order to disorganise and split the workers. It printed a number of articles and much other material on the policy of the A. F. of L., showing how the A.F. of L. breaks strikes by persuading the workers to wait until a code is drawn up, or, where there already is a code, to wait for the question to be settled by the arbitration commission, and so on.

The paper also printed matter on the co-operation of the A.F. of L. leaders with the employers in establishing low wages, sweatshop systems, etc. It exposed the "Left" manoeuvres of the A. F. of L. leaders, which were at times plain swindles (at a secret meeting the leader of the A.F. of L. textile union agreed to the employers' low-wage proposals, while at an open meeting he "protested," "demanding" a decent wage).

But its other tasks, the tasks of *organising the struggle of the masses,* the *Daily Worker* carried out altogether unsatisfactorily. It would be incorrect to say that the paper has done nothing, or nearly nothing, in this respect. It printed information about workers' action in favour of the unions, against company unions, about workers' action against the will of the A.F. of L. leaders, about the creation of independent unions, the activity of the revolutionary unions, etc. But, in the first place, it gave this information in quite insufficient quantities, and, secondly, it did not systematically, with concrete examples, explain to the workers what to do and how to do it, how to build and use the unions, how the opposition should work, who would be elected to be the leaders, how to organise a strike, to negotiate with the employers, to elect a factory committee, etc.

Only on June 22, as we have already pointed out, did the *Daily Worker* begin an intensive campaign against the Act. It printed a good editorial against the Act, which gave directions on the struggle against it. The paper advised the workers not to rely on the promises of the Act and the A.F. of L. leaders, but to act, to fight; it pointed to the example of the Brownsville miners, and called on the workers to set up committees and militant unions, to strengthen the rank-and-file opposition in the A.F. of L., to carry on an energetic struggle against the policy of the company unions. This is all true, and the paper has repeatedly stressed it. But surely the point is not just to go on repeating it. Every day material should have been given illustrating how all this should be done, what practical work had been done in each instance, what the mistakes, achievements, or good examples in every case were. This the paper did not do enough of. It did give some information; but this was very little if the tasks were to be explained to the workers with these examples. In particular, there was not enough material on how organisations should be built up, and how the opposition in the A.F. of L. should work. And yet these are the most important points in the fight against the Act, and the central task of the Party in general.

Let us take as an example this same issue of June 22. On page three there are three letters: one from Indiana, on the plans of the owners of the Gary metal works to create a company union; one from Detroit on the intentions of the A.F. of L. agent, Martel, of creating a reformist automobile workers' union to fight against the revolutionary automobile workers' union; and one from Cleveland, about the successful action of 300 workers in a metal works against a 33 per cent. wage cut. It is good material, although it is given in a rather dry, telegraph manner. The heading at the top of the page is correct, too. But there is no explanation of what follows from this material. The heading tells the workers to create their own factory committees. Evidently the workers are for some reason not doing so, if they have to be called on, evidently there is lack of understanding, some sort of difficulty, etc. Therefore, the workers must have this explained to them, must be shown examples. The same applies to the company unions. And the paper either gives material only or repeats general formulas. As for explaining how to apply these

formulas to the struggle, giving examples, and in this way itself coming to understand these formulas, the paper is weak. And this means that it is weak as an organiser and leader of the masses, as the mass agitator and organiser of the Party.

Nor is the issue of June 22 the worst in this respect. Compared to others, this issue is one of the best on the trade union question during the period under review. There were several of these relativly satisfactory issues, as, for instance, those of June 24, 27, 29, and of July 1, 11, 13, 15, and 19. But of these issues only that of July 13 has a leading article explaining the policy of the Party in such a important question as independent unions, company unions, etc. Besides these, mention should also be made of the issue of June 2, which gave material on the experience of opposition work.

There were also some points which are not clear in the few cases when the paper raised questions of trade union policy. This applies to the editorial of June 17, the first editorial dealing with the Act, and also to a number of articles and paragraphs in other issues (June 8, 10, 20, 27, etc.). The shortcoming of this editorial consists in that, in connection with the Act, it gives first place to the question of the "closed shops," as if that were the main question. Secondly, the whole question is not put clearly. The paper simply and without reservation put forward the slogan of the closed shops. It is doubtful whether this is right. It is well known that the A.F. of L. applies this policy of the closed shops to prevent the admission of opposition elements into the factories, to rob the union members in order to provide large salaries for the A.F. of L. officials, to carry through measures against the workers, gagging all protest by the threat of expulsion from the union and dismissal from the factory, to crush all internal union democracy, and so on. The revolutionary elements and the rank-and-file workers must fight against such a policy of the closed shops.

Such distortions of the revolutionary trade union policy must be eliminated and their harmfulness explained to the workers. So that, while supporting the workers in their fight for the closed shops and organising them against the attempts of the owners to do away with the closed shops, we must at the same time fight against the A.F. of L. closed shop policy, against the distortion of the Party's trade union policy by the revolutionary unions under the slogan of the closed shop system, by all means stressing in this struggle our task of organising all the workers in a factory into a trade union, a factory committee; stressing the right of the workers to conclude through their representatives a collective agreement with the employers providing for conditions of hire, transfer, wages, hours, factory rules, etc., the task of uniting organised and unorganised workers, in short, stressing the task of really rallying and organising the workers in the factories, in order to make the factories really "closed" to strike-breakers, obvious spies and agents of the employers and the officials.

But the question of the closed shop, although a most important question, is only one of the questions of the trade union policy of the Party. As a matter of fact, during the period under review only one editorial—of July 13—dealt with the trade union questions which arose in connection with the Act and with the new situation which recently came into being. This short editorial of the greatest importance deals with the question of the relations between the Party and the A.F. of L., the independent unions, which particularly began to come into existence lately, the company unions and the revolutionary unions. The editorial is perfectly right in trying to explain these questions with the examples of the action taken by the workers of two metal works—in Gary and near the Great Lakes in Michigan. It is right in greeting the workers who broke down the attempt of the employers to set up a company union and organised their own independent union.

The paper is also right in warning the workers not to let the independent union fall into the hands of elements hostile to the workers, or of the direct agents of the employers. But after that there is a series of questions vaguely dealt with.

From the whole article it follows that there are only two kinds of unions—those which assert a community of interests between the workers and the employers, and those which adopt the standpoint of class struggle. The paper puts the question this way: The former, whatever they may be called, are company unions, and the latter labour unions. So it makes several mistakes; what are they?

In the first place, if there are only two kinds of unions—one of them class and the other company—then the A.F. of L. unions are evidently company unions. This conclusion is not drawn from that formulation alone. The editorial gives grounds for it, declaring that the reformist metal-workers' union is in fact a company union. Is it right to put the question that way? Very wrong and very harmful. It is true that the A.F. of L. unions are not class proletarian unions. It is also true that the A.F. of L. leaders in their unions carry on the same policy, though often disguised, as the company unions, i.e., a bourgeois policy. But are the company and A.F. of L. unions the same thing? Of course not. In both kinds there

are workers, in both kinds work must be carried on. But the company union the workers regard as the employers' organisations; they now want their own organisations, and have the possibility of having them. They will not openly join the employers' organisations *en masse*. An A.F. of L. union the worker, even when he sees the treachery of its leaders, still regards as a workers' organisation, created by the workers themselves, although it is bossed by mercenary bureaucrats. That is the difference, an enormous difference. In the first case we are directly against company unions, for their destruction. In the second, we are not, as a rule, against the union as such, but against the treacherous policy of the leaders, for the workers' taking the union into their own hands, throwing out the employers' agents, clearing the unions of corrupt leaders; for they and their union can do this.

This difference became particularly important as the economic crisis developed, when the opposition began to grow up inside the A.F. of L. And it became still more important lately, in connection with the further radicalisation of the masses and with the tactics of the bourgeoisie, which puts forward the A.F. of L. in opposition to the independent organisations of the workers. Precisely in connection with the radicalisation of the masses, the growth in the number of mass actions, the bourgeoisie has been faced with the question of methods of fighting the workers in action, who are not yet sufficiently class-conscious, but who do not want to lie down under the crisis and the attacks of the employers, and who are attempting to set up their own organisations. And this is where the rôle of social-fascism as a whole, and of the A.F. of L. in particular, comes in. Precisely because the leaders of the A.F. of L., in spite of having been very considerably discredited in the eyes of the workers, are nevertheless the leaders of the workers' own organisation, the employers can advance the A.F. of L. in order to attract into it the workers, who want to defend their interests, for which they want to have their own organisation, and who may regard the A.F. of L. as such an organisation. The A.F. of L. itself is doing everything in this direction. First of all, we have all sorts of "Left" manoeuvres and demagogy, such as the decision of the Cincinnati Congress on unemployment insurance, the slogan of a 30-hour week, the leadership of many strikes (in order to cleverly betray them), and also a series of organisational measures, such as the reduction of entry and membership fees, facilitation of membership for the unemployed in this respect, a recruiting campaign, etc. All this means that the employers are advancing the A.F. of L. in order to disorganise the masses, after extending its mass basis and its policy; although in fact this policy serves a more fascised system of the bourgeoisie than before, when the A.F. of L. adopted a more reactionary manner. For this reason, if from the very beginning of the crisis we stressed the necessity for strengthening our work in the A.F. of L., for setting up an opposition within it, and censured the attempts made in the resolution of the Fourteenth Plenum of the C.C. to define the A.F. of L. as an organisation of the labour aristocracy, we must now fully adopt and establish the point of the impossibility of successfully mobilising the masses against Roosevelt's policy, of building up a mass revolutionary trade union movement and a mass Communist Party, without seriously directing our efforts to work in the A.F. of L. where it has or is getting a mass basis. It is therefore clear that in such a situation, in the face of such tasks, it is a harmful mistake to identify the A.F. of L. unions with the company unions.

Secondly, this is enough to show that one cannot simplify the question so that it boils down to the existence of only two kinds of unions, just because there are two main classes—the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. But three types of unions (company, A.F. of L. and revolutionary) do not sum up the situation, particularly now. There is still a fourth type of union—the independent unions. If in two large metal works the workers have established independent unions, that is already an important fact. And these are not single facts. So where are these unions to be classed, according to the D.W. definition? Although in a number of cases they may not be class unions, neither are they A.F. of L., they are more Left than the A. F. of L. While according to the D.W., if they are not class unions, then they are company unions. But the situation is such that the revolutionary elements must, in the first place, establish these unions wherever the workers want to be organised, but are not yet prepared to enter a mass revolutionary union, or no longer wish to join the mass A.F. of L. union and, secondly, must work in all these independent unions, develop joint action with them, in order to strengthen in them the ideological and organisational influence of those elements which are really devoted to the cause of the working class.

In conclusion, we must draw attention to the following point. The importance of building up revolutionary unions of automobile workers and seamen is well known. During the period under review conferences took place of both these unions. But the worker would not gather any concrete information about these conferences from the *Daily Worker*. Nor is this surprising, if the *Daily Worker* gives only two short articles about

the congress of the automobile workers' union—a concentration union in a most critical period of its existence, when the agents of the A.F. of L. aim at, and are already succeeding in, creating a reformist union in opposition to it.

We shall not in this review touch on a number of other most important questions of the paper's work (strike struggles, united front, the fight against the danger of war and intervention in the U.S.S.R., etc)—its weakness as a mass organiser shows in other questions, too. Therefore, steps for improving the paper must be directed mainly towards overcoming this weakness.

4.—CONCLUSIONS.

The review of the *Daily Worker* for June-July shows a certain improvement in the paper towards the end of this period. This improvement consists in the paper's giving more topical material, and presenting it in a more popular form to the working class readers. However, together with this, the paper (a) has not succeeded in carrying on campaigns on questions of the greatest importance to the Party, particularly on the popularisation of the Open Letter, on the economic struggles and on the trade union question; (b) has, although supplying better and more topical informational and partly also propagandist material, still been very weak as *agitator and organiser;* (c) does not show a sufficiently careful and politically worked-out plan for carrying through the campaigns of the Party; (d) has had very weak connections with the local organisations, particularly the Party organisations. In view of this it is necessary to take a number of practical measures to strengthen the cadres of its workers, both centrally and locally; to secure assistance and control by the Political Bureau of the Party, to strengthen the participation of the local Party organisations in the work of the paper, in order further to improve the contents of the paper and increase its rôle as a class agitator and organiser of the work of the Party in the masses, and as builder of the Party. It is necessary to carry out in practice the decision on the work of the D.W. representatives in the districts chosen as points of concentration, on the regular pages to be directed to work in each such district.

The principal task of the paper at the present time is the struggle against Roosevelt's policy, the popularisation of the Open Letter and the fight for carrying it into life.

At the monthly discussion of the work of the paper by the Central Committee it is necessary each time not only to summarise the work of the paper in the most important campaigns and give instructions based on it, but also to discuss how the paper fought for carrying out the principal tasks of the Party, e.g., the building of the Party in districts for concentration, the development of revolutionary trade union work, particularly the opposition inside the A.F. of L. in the branches of industry where it has mass organisations; leadership of strikes, popularisation of the experience and lessons of strikes, the daily popularisation and organisation of the united front from below in mass work and mass action—the fight against social-fascism on both fundamental questions (democracy and dictatorship, fascism, way out of the crisis, state capitalism, danger of war, unity of the working class, etc.), and on daily questions of mass action—the attack of capital, etc.; the fight against the danger of war and in defence of the U.S.S.R., a point which as yet is very insufficiently stressed in the paper.

(b) The *Daily Worker* must decidedly strengthen the struggle for developing revolutionary trade union work, in the first place by systematically popularising the tasks of the Party in this work, particularly in the building up of revolutionary trade unions and the creation of independent unions in the steel and automobile industries, in the organisation of a mass opposition in the A.F. of L. by showing the experience of this work, regularly printing pages on work in the most important branches of industry; to carry this out the paper must have permanent connections with the *active* Party members in the trade unions; secondly, by specially explaining to the *non-Party workers*, in the most popular manner possible, the current tasks of trade union work, with concrete examples (e.g., the Gary strike against a company union, the miners' strike against the will of the A.F. of L. leaders, etc.), with workers' letters, at conferences with worker readers of the paper, etc., so that not the least detail of trade union life, of the trade union policy and work of the Party should remain unexplained to the non-Party masses; and particularly questions of opposition work in the A.F. of L. (mobilisation of the membership masses against the A.F. of L. leaders, who are supporting Roosevelt, for strikes, against the persuasion of the A.F. of L. as in Pennsylvania), work in the independent unions, questions of trade union unity, attitude towards the Musteists, the policy of the reformist trade unions, etc., for which it is necessary to extend the network of non-Party local worker-correspondents, in the local organisations of the trade unions, carrying on systematic work among them. Questions of trade union work should occupy a central place in the paper; for that reason this work must undoubtedly be carried on by a comrade with a profound understanding, who has had serious experience of trade union work, with a good understanding of the

policy and task of the Party in this question, and of the work of the A.F. of L.

(c) In spite of the great growth in the strike struggle, particularly after the passing of Roosevelt's laws, the popularisation of the experience and lessons of these strikes (strikes of metal workers and miners for higher wages, recognition of unions, etc., the rôle of the A.F. of L. and of the revolutionary elements in these strikes) have not occupied a corresponding central position in the paper, in connection with and together with the daily trade union work. The paper must not only increase the quantity of information on strikes, which has up to now been quite insufficient, but must systematically explain, giving concrete examples (strikes in Detroit, Buffalo, etc.), the aims of the strike struggle and the problems of its tactics, so that the working class reader should receive not only information about strikes, but also explanations of the mistakes or shortcomings in the organisation of a particular strike; this is necessary in order that the strike may be more successfully carried on, etc.; systematically to print editorials summarising the experience of strikes, etc., constantly leading the workers towards an understanding of the necessity for their own leadership of strikes on the basis of the united front.

(d) The *Daily Worker* has printed several articles dealing with questions of the united front. However, these articles explain the policy of the Party only to the *active* Party members, and not sufficiently either. It is necessary to extend the popularisation of the practice of the united front in the districts, particularly taking into consideration the level of the understanding of the rank-and-file non-Party worker, showing good and bad examples of the united front. Besides this, it is necessary to give a number of popular articles on the united front, making use of concrete examples of strikes, hunger marches (the metal workers' strike in Buffalo and the hunger march to Ford's in Detroit) to explain such questions, for example, as what the united front is, why it is necessary from below, and not from above, the Communists' attitude towards rank-and-file workers in the A.F. of L. and the Socialist Party, and towards their leaders; why the Communists consider these leaders, traitors, splitters, social-fascists, etc., and the attitude of the social-fascist leaders towards the united front as a manoeuvre.

(e) The D.W. has considerably strengthened the struggle against social-fascism along the lines of exposing the policy of the social-fascists on current events. While continuing to carry on this most important work in the same spirit, it is necessary, in the first place, to expand the information and criticism of the practical work of the Socialist Party in the local strikes (e.g., the textile industry), demonstrations, in the factories, the unions, in the municipalities e.g., (Milwaukee) and so on, and, secondly, to begin to carry on extensive criticism of and polemics against the social-fascists, making use of definite points (i.e., the attitude towards Roosevelt's laws, etc.), in the principal questions of programme which divide the Communists from the social-reformists (democracy and dictatorship, fascism, the capitalist and the revolutionary way out of the crisis, state capitalism, the danger of war, the unity of the working class, etc.).

(f) The D.W. carries on a campaign of some magnitude against Roosevelt's forced labour camps. This work must be intensified, by printing not only information, as has been done up to now, but also a number of political articles on the questions and methods of struggle in these camps. The paper has dropped its work among the unemployed: very little material is printed on this subject, and the campaign for social insurance, which was renewed in June, has again subsided. It is necessary to carry out systematically the decision on the campaign for social insurance, the importance of which has not decreased through the adoption of Roosevelt's laws, but has, on the contrary, increased, particularly in view of the coming fifth hungry winter of the crisis. The same applies to the work of the unemployed councils.

(g) The paper's network of worker-correspondents is still very weak, and no serious work among them is evident. The paper must very soon take steps, first and foremost, to create a strong network of worker-correspondents in the localities, in order to instruct and help them in writing their letters and to raise their political level; not only to print letters, but to point out the political importance and the lessons of any given fact described by the correspondent, instructing him on his work and the paper's requirements, etc., through the paper or by post, systematically discussing the work of particular correspondents or groups of correspondents over a certain period (e.g., a month), in order to reveal a correspondent's main shortcomings and achievements and to help him in his further work.

It is necessary to enliven the work of the workers' editorial councils in the centre and the concentration districts, to develop the initiative of the members, carrying out their proposals, arranging regular (e.g., weekly) discussions of D.W. questions with them, in which leading comrades should take part, thus drawing them into the daily work of the paper.

(h) The work carried on by the paper to popularise the Open Letter and carry out its in-

structions in life is very weak. And yet, the popularisation of the Open Letter and the fight for realising it have now become still more important in connection with the mobilisation of the Party against Roosevelt's measures. It is necessary systematically to print articles explaining various points of the letter in connection with the situation and current events of the class struggle in the country, to give information on discussion of the Open Letter in the localities, and, first and foremost, to organise a checking up on the carrying out of the Open Letter with regard to the tasks set in concentration. The paper must combine its foremost task—the fight against Roosevelt's measures—with popularisation of the Open Letter and fight for it, in concrete questions (concentration, trade unions, united front, strikes, etc.).

(i) The D.W. does not deal with questions of *building the Party*. And yet these questions are of a decisive importance for the development of the C.P. U.S.A., its transformation into a mass Party, its Bolshevisation. The paper must create a section of *Party life and Party construction,* which would, however, in its work take into consideration all the conditions necessary for conspiracy, which are secured directly by the C.C. of the Party. In this section the paper must, in the first place, explain the line of the Party in the most important current questions and fight for this line; secondly, it must fight for a check-up on the execution of the Party's decisions, of the tasks set by it, showing how this execution is going on, explaining the tasks of the Party with concrete examples, and showing how to carry them out, etc.; thirdly, it must particularly give information on the tasks and methods of mass work of the Communists, in mass organisations, particularly the trade unions; fourthly, it must popularise the experience of the organisational building of the Party, the work of the cells, the fight against bureaucracy, for discipline, against membership fluctuation; recruiting work, work among new members, etc.; fifthly, it must give information on questions of propagandist work, on the work of the school, on questions of agitation, on the work of factory papers.

(j) In the work of the paper not enough planning and care is evident. Although the paper's leading articles have become shorter and more popular, they often resemble an editorial or just incidental paragraph, which is not connected with the rest of the paper's contents. It is necessary to make the leading articles politically instructive and supported by the main concrete material printed in the paper. This requires better organisation of all the material, the addition to sections and important letters of editorial notes, a better and clearer grouping, etc., in order that each issue should have a definite task, around which the material should be organised, and that each issue should therefore bring a definite point or task home to the worker, to inform him on them concretely and from all angles.

Therefore the paper must work according to a plan, the leading articles must be carefully thought out, the most important leading articles must be discussed beforehand by the C.C., together with members of the editorial board; and, generally, the leading articles must be agreed upon by the C.C., so that the Party should really regard the paper's editorials as leading political articles.

In all its work the paper must remember that all information must serve for educating and organising the masses and the Party itself; for that reason it cannot limit itself to giving information, but must carry on, on the basis of information, explanatory work, a fight for the line of the Party; must agitate for the Party's slogans, organise the workers, pointing out what the workers should do and how they should do it in their struggle, in work in the trade unions, etc., bringing the workers to an understanding of the main questions of the C.P.s tactics and the main tasks in the fight for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

D. Z. MANUILSKY

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SOCIALIST INDUSTRY ON THE EVE OF THE SIXTEENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

By M. Tsaguria.

THE policy of the industrialisation of the Soviet Union has led on the border-line between the first and second Five-Year Plan to the creation of a powerful industrial base, which assures the completion of the independent reconstruction of the national economy at a rapid socialist rate. This decisive victory of the Party's general line during the period of the first Five-Year Plan has created the principal prerequisites for the solution of the most important socialist problems of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The completion of the socialist construction of the first Five-Year Plan has led to the final undermining of the roots of capitalism in the countryside and the sphere of agriculture generally.

*"The Soviet Union has been transformed from a country of small and dwarfish agriculture into a land with the largest-scale agriculture in the world, based on collectivisation, extensive state farms and widespread application of modern machinery."**

As a result of the first Five-Year Plan the construction of the foundation of socialism in the U.S.S.R. has been completed, which means the unalterable decision of Lenin's question of "who will beat whom?" in favour of socialism.

This most important political task was set by Lenin when the Soviet power had only just been established, when the dictatorship of the proletariat was attacked by the internal and external enemies of socialism. Lenin wrote:

> "Therefore a new, highest form of struggle against the bourgeoisie, the transition from the very simple task of further expropriating the capitalists to the much more complex and difficult task of creating conditions under which the bourgeoisie could not live or revive, is placed on the order of the day."†

The Seventeenth Party Conference has summed up the results of this "more complex and difficult task" as follows:

> "As a result of the maintenance of the Bolshevik rate of socialist construction and the virtual elimination of the parasite classes, the basis and source of exploitation of man by man are being liquidated in the period of the first Five-Year Plan."

These successes of the first Five-Year Plan, of world historical importance, were achieved by the Soviet workers under the leadership of the C.P.S.U. and its Leninist Central Committee *in a stubborn class struggle* against the remnants of capitalism in the U.S.S.R.

The Bolsheviks organised and put themselves at the head of the labour enthusiasm of the working class, of the development of socialist competition and shock-brigades among the workers in factories, mines, ports, machine and tractor stations and Soviet farms; on this foundation they secured an increase in the political activity of the country's proletariat which formed the basis of the victorious extended advance of socialism against the remnants of capitalism in the U.S.S.R.

At the same time the Bolsheviks, by means of a whole system of steps which were carried out with unvacillating insistence and discipline, secured the final voluntary turn of the middle peasantry from the road of capitalism and petty production of commodities to that of socialist collective farm construction. Having put agriculture on a new technical base, which became possible through the successes of socialist industrialisation, and having organised the poor peasantry around the soviets on the basis of all-round collectivisation. the Bolsheviks carried out the liquidation of the kulak as a class and finally undermined class differentiation in the countryside.

At the same time they shattered all the attempts of the interventionists and of the counter-revolutionary groups inside the country to break down socialist construction by means of wrecking in industry and agriculture. All these, and many other difficulties with which the Party was faced in the process of socialist construction and class struggle, were overcome by the Party, which smashed the counter-revolutionary Trotskyists and Right capitulators and so secured the victory of its general line.

Both the political and economic tasks set by the Party for the period of the second Five-Year Plan considerably exceed those carried out during the first Five-Year Plan, as in their magnitude, so also in their complexity.

> "The chief political task of the second Five-Year Plan is completely to do away with the

* Resolution of the Seventeenth Party Conference.

† "The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Power" (Lenin), *Collected Works*, Vol. XXII., 2nd Russian edition, p. 443.

capitalist elements and classes in general; fully to destroy the causes which give rise to class distinction and exploitation; to abolish the survivals of capitalism in economy and in the minds of people; to transform the whole working population of the country into conscious, active builders of a classless, socialist society."*

The carrying out of the task of overcoming the survivals of capitalism not only in economy, but also in the consciousness of the people, who must become the conscious builders of socialism—in the classless society—means the fulfilment of the historic mission of the proletariat—the freeing of humanity from the chains of capitalism.

The economic results of the first Five-Year Plan are only the construction of the foundations of socialism in the land of the Soviets. During the period of the second Five-Year Plan the reconstruction of the national economy must be carried out on a broadly extended front, in rapid tempo, and on the basis of grounding the whole socialist economy on the latest machine technique.

"The Seventeenth Conference of the Party holds, therefore, that the chief and decisive economic task of the second Five-Year Plan is to complete the reconstruction of the whole national economy, to lay a new technical base for all branches of national economy."

The special characteristic of the second Five-Year Plan is the fact that the Central Committee of the Party has made the centre of Communists' attention *the task of mastering* the giants of industry created during the period of the first Five-Year Plan simultaneously with constructing other giants.

"In the first period of the first Five-Year Plan we succeeded in organising enthusiasm, *pathos, for new construction*, and achieved decisive successes. This is very good. But now this is not enough. Now we must supplement this with enthusiasm and *pathos* for *mastering* the new factories and the new technique, for seriously increasing the productivity of labour, for seriously reducing cost of production" (Com. Stalin's report at the January Plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. of the S.P.S.U.).†

In the first year of the second Five-Year Plan, as also during the whole period of the second Five-Year Plan, industry, following the directions of the Party and the government, must in its development direct its forces first and foremost to the achievement of good quality—the raising of labour productivity, lowering of costs, improvement of quality of production, etc.

These achievements in quality must be brought about simultaneously with a considerable increase in the quantity of production.

The rate of growth of industry during 1933 is planned as follows: in the whole state industry the gross output for 1933 is to amount to 116.5 per cent. of last year's total, of which the growth of output in group A will constitute 21.9 per cent.

In 1932 heavy industry, in the charge of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, had an output to the value of 14,200,000,000 roubles, and in the first year of the second Five-Year Plan the value should reach 17,300,000,000 roubles — an increase of 21.9 per cent.

Such a large increase in the output of heavy industry is to take place mainly through increased labour productivity, on the basis of mastering the new plants and new technique. In heavy industry the increase of 21.9 per cent. in output will be achieved to the extent of 16.5 per cent. through increased productivity of labour and 4.6 per cent. through an increase in the number of workers employed. This point in the plan for the first year of the second five-year period dictates the transferring of the centre of gravity in the struggle at the plants to the achievement of quality. It requires from all Party organisations an insistent Bolshevik fight for the correct organisation of labour, for the inculcation of a socialist attitude to labour, and the further development of socialist competition and shock-brigading, for mastering the technique of production, for the final liquidation of equalisation in wages, for full utilisation of the working day, for improved supplies for the workers.

At the same time it presupposes a still more determined struggle against absentees and idlers, against the breaking down of labour discipline, against every kind of backward petty-bourgeois tendencies which penetrate, through various channels, into the workers' midst.

From the results of the leading branches of industry, whose achievements we will show below, the successes with which industry faces the sixteenth anniversary of the October Revolution are particularly plain.

RESULTS IN THE MAIN BRANCHES OF INDUSTRY.

Electrification.

The decisive rôle in the reconstruction of the industrial and general national economy is played by the electrification of the country, which Lenin, already in the first years of socialist construction, called the second programme of the Party.

Lenin, in his thesis of the report at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, defined the problem of electrification as follows:

"Large-scale industry, corresponding to the

* Resolution of the Seventeenth Party Conference.

† Results of the First Five-Year Plan. M.B., W.L.P.

level of the latest technique, and able to reorganise agriculture, equals the electrification of the whole country."

The plan of the Goelro, which was drawn up on Lenin's initiative as far back as the years of the Civil War, presupposed a growth of ten times as compared with the pre-war level and of six and a half times as compared with the level of 1921.

Not only has the plan of the Goelro been fulfilled, but the tempo of socialist construction has exceeded the "fantastic" intentions of the authors of the plan. Ten years after the endorsement of the plan of the Goelro, in 1931, the power of the district electric stations reached 2,080,000 kilowatts, overfulfilling that historic plan, which was intended for ten or fifteen years.

During the first Five-Year Plan the Bolsheviks have achieved an increase in the total power of all electric stations from 1,874,000 kilowatts in 1928 to 4,567,000 kilowatts in 1932, an increase of 2.4 times; the increase in the power of the district stations during the same period was from 610,000 kilowatts to 2,624,000, an increase 4.3 times.

During the six-year period of the growth of industrial economy, from 1923 to 1929, the U.S.A. increased production of electrical energy by only 67.8 per cent., whereas the Soviet Union has in four years increased the production of electrical energy 2.6 times.

At the time when the capitalist world is splitting in all directons under the crushing blows of the crisis, socialist industry, armed by the experience of the first Five-Year Plan, continues its development in rapid tempo during the first year of the second Five-Year Plan.

During the eight months of 1933 the district electric stations of the Glavenergo* have produced 7,148,000 kilowatt hours, which is an increase of 5,845,000 kilowatt hours, *i.e.*, 22.3 per cent. as compared with the production of the corresponding period of 1932; so the production of electrical energy by the district stations exceeds the high level reached last year by more than one-fifth.

The powerful energetical base, which is growing every year, is rapidly increasing the energetic strength of the worker, facilitates his work and raises labour productivity. The electrification of the country is the main lever for the reconstruction of the technical base of socialist industry.

Anthracite.

The rapid growth in the electrification of the country and industry as a whole has greatly increased the need for fuel. In order to satisfy this increased requirement the fuel industry had to be reconstructed rapidly, grounding its production on the latest technique, which would be able to mechanise the difficult processes of labour in fuel industries.

The anthracite industry of pre-war Russia was not mechanised at all. In 1921 the mechanised production in the Donbas made only 3.3 per cent. of the total, whereas in 1932 mechanised production constitutes 71.9 per cent. In the first three quarters of the first year of the second Five-Year Plan the Donbas has made a considerable stride forward in the mechanisation of production, having now reached 76.6 per cent.

The history of the development of the anthracite industry in capitalist countries shows that the Soviet tempo greatly exceeds the capitalist in the sphere of mechanisation also. For example, the U.S.A. have increased the amount of mechanised production of bituminous coal (anthracite production is hardly mechanised at all) from 24.9 per cent. in 1900 to 77.5 per cent. in 1932, *i.e.*, in 32 years the U.S.A. have increased mechanised production by 52.6 per cent., whereas in the U.S.S.R. mechanised production has been increased in all the basins from 15.7 per cent. in 1927-28 to 63.3 per cent. in 1932, *i.e.*, by 48 per cent. During the same period mechanised production in the Donbas has been increased from 18.4 per cent. in 1927-28 to 71.9 per cent. in 1932, an increase of 53.5 per cent.

In the Ruhr district in Germany, where the location of coal is exceptionally favourable to mechanised production, the percentage of mechanised production has increased during 19 years (1913-1932) from 2.2 per cent. to 93 per cent.

In England the amount of mechanised production has increased during 32 years (1900-1932) from 1.4 per cent. to only 36 per cent.

The workers of the Soviet anthracite industry have outstripped the capitalist countries, not only with regard to the tempo of the mechanisation of coal production, but also with regard to the productivity of the machines. Thus, the productivity of the coal-cutting machine in the Soviet Union in 1932 was 36,700 tons, as against 21,900 tons in the U.S.A., 21,600 tons in England, and 26,100 tons in the Ruhr. Having achieved such results in the mechanisation of production (coal cutting) the Soviet coal industry is fighting for the mechanisation of the further stages of coal production.

In the first year of the second Five-Year Plan the coal industry has, by carrying out the decisions of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, achieved a very considerable advance.

Thanks to the great efforts made by the Party

* Central Electric Power Department.

organisations and to the self-sacrificing work of the worker and technician shock-brigaders, the increase in the output of coal has been as follows :

Production in 1933 *as compared with* 1932.

1st Quarter	*2nd Quarter*	*July*	*August*	*Sept.*
97.1%	113.8%	130.8%	140%	140%

After a considerable decrease in output during the first quarter, in the second quarter a considerable increase was achieved as compared with the corresponding quarter of 1932 (13.8%) and also with the first quarter of 1933 (6%).

In the third quarter of 1933 the level of production was very high, as compared with the total production of the corresponding quarter of 1932, exceeding it by over one-third.

This year, beginning with January, the production of coal steadily grew, and during the summer months, which are the most unfavourable for coal production, in contrast to past years, it remained at a high level. The Bolsheviks have proved that the seasonal decrease is not an unalterable law of the development of the coal industry, and that the Party, when once it has set itself this task, has all the possibilities for fulfilling it.

With regard to the successful overcoming of seasonal fluctuations in the first year of the second Five-Year Plan the coal industry is no exception. In all the main industries subject to the usual seasonal decrease, the production curve in 1933, in spite of seasonal "regularity," has not only remained at a high level, but gone up.

In spite of the considerable successes mentioned above, the production of coal is not yet keeping pace with the plan. Thus, in the third quarter the total of coal production in the Soviet Union amounted to 18,535,000, which constitutes 90 per cent. of the plan for the quarter, while in the principal coal district—the Donbas—the plan has been fulfilled by 93.7 per cent.

The Bolsheviks in the anthracite industry of the Soviet Union are still faced with an insistent struggle for the fulfilment of the plan on the basis of the recent decisions of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. and of the Council of People's Commissars, which provide for operative management of production in the mines.

FERROUS METALLURGY.

During the first Five-Year Plan the quantity of pig iron smelted increased from 3,283,000 tons in 1927-28 to 6,206,000 tons in 1932—an increase of 89 per cent.

The achievements of the first Five-Year Plan consist not only in practically doubling pig iron smelting, but also in the fact that the foundations have been laid of the new ferrous metallurgy, which is based on the latest international technical achievements and which assures the development of production and construction at a rapid socialist tempo during the period of the second Five-Year Plan.

The Magnitogorsk, Kuznetsk, Azovstal and other giant metallurgical plants are still building new blast and open-hearth furnaces and rolling-shops; they have not yet completed their construction plan, but the Soviet Union has mastered the most advanced technique of construction on this decisive industrial front.

Ferrous metallurgy in the first year of the second Five-Year Plan shows a considerable strengthening in organisation, and a no less considerable advance in the mastering of technique.

In order to carry out the immediate task of sending up the production curve of ferrous metallurgy, it was necessary to solve this problem first and foremost in the coal industry. As we saw in the results of coal production, production remained at a high level even during the summer months, and the fuel for metallurgy was secured.

The coke and iron ore industries, which feed the furnaces of metallurgy, have also excellently carried out the task of increasing production.

Ferrous metallurgy has made full use of the favourable conditions created by these industries and has achieved a record in work, not only as compared with the summer months, but in relation to the best periods as well. The figures given below clearly show the advance in production during the first Bolshevik summer as compared to last year.

Pig iron and steel smelting in 1933, as compared to 1932, are characterised by the following figures :—

Production in 1933 *as compared to* 1932.

	1st quarter	*2nd*	*July*	*August*	*Sept.*
Pig Iron.	100.9%	112.7%	129.1%	127.4%	122.4%
Steel.	92.2%	105.9%	128.7%	139.5%	139.2%

In the first quarter pig iron smelting increased by only 0.9% as compared to the same quarter of 1932. In the second quarter it was already 112.7% as compared to the same period in 1932, the quantity smelted in June amounting to 123.2% of the amount smelted in June, 1932. In June and the following months the high level in smelting was reached not so much as the result of the decrease in the corresponding months of 1932 as owing to a marked increase in the quantity smelted this year.

Thus, in the first summer month—June—of 1932 the average daily smelting of pig iron fell by 2% as against May, whereas this year it

increased during the same month by as much as 14.6%; the steel smelting in June, 1932, fell by 1.6%, whereas this year it increased by 12.5%; in July, 1932, the production of rolled iron fell by 12.2% as compared to May, whereas this year it increased by 3.5%.

Last year, beginning with May, both iron and steel smelting and rolled iron production fell steadily until September, whereas this year the production curve has not only not fallen, but gone sharply up.

The dynamics of production in this decisive branch of industry this year show that the industrialised Soviet Union is decidedly overcoming the backwardness it inherited from Tsarism.

The overcoming of seasonal fluctuation in ferrous metallurgy is an important victory of Bolshevism, and shows the high industrial-technical level which has been reached by socialist construction.

The iron and steel smelting during the summer and autumn months of this year have reached an unprecedented increase over the corresponding months of 1932; in July the pig iron smelting exceeded the level attained during July, 1932, by almost 30 per cent, while in August and September the steel smelting exceeded the output of August, 1932, by almost 40 per cent.; with regard to rolled iron the level reached in August exceeded the level of August, 1932, by 38 per cent. and in September by 35.4 per cent.

However, the people employed in ferrous metallurgy have not yet completely mastered the production of new aggregates in which complex technique is involved, and for that reason ferrous metallurgy does not keep up with the plan set it for the first year of the second Five-Year Plan. This hinders the rapid growth of machine building, which, according to its production capacity, could produce much more than the very considerable total already produced this year.

Ferrous metallurgy has the possibility of establishing within the next few months new records in production both by production in new plant and improved work in the old; it must attain these records.

As a result of the construction completed during the first Five-Year Plan, the ferrous metallurgy of the Soviet Union has taken one of the first places in pig iron smelting on an international scale; with the beginning of the second Five-Year Plan, the Soviet Union has entered into competition for first place in the world, challenging the present holder of that place—the U.S.A.

MACHINE BUILDING.

Soviet machine building, which is the principal base of the technical reconstruction of both the industrial and general national economy, has by its great development exceeded the maximum laid down by the first Five-Year Plan. The five-year machine building plan has been fulfilled in three years. The quantity of production in machine building stipulated by the Five-Year Plan has in fact been over-fulfilled by 57 per cent. by the end of 1932.

During the four years of the first Five-Year Plan a four-fold increase in the machine building industry has taken place.

According to the figures of the Berlin Statistical Institute, the change in the relative position of the most important machine building countries is as follows:—

*In percentage of world production.**

Years	*U.S.S.R.*	*France*	*England*	*Germany*	*U.S.A.*
1928	4.0	2.2	10.8	13.7	56.9
1931	21.4	3.8	15.0	13.9	36.9

In 1928 the machine building production of the U.S.S.R. made up only 4 per cent. of world production, and the U.S.S.R. occupied fourth place; in 1931 the U.S.S.R., whose production constituted over one-fifth of the world production, took second place in the world. As early as 1930 the U.S.S.R. produced a considerably greater quantity of machines and equipment than England and France put together, and 50 per cent. more than Germany.

The rapid growth of Soviet machine building continued in 1932, when the quantity of production rose by 29 per cent.

The powerful Soviet machine building industry, which has practically been created anew by the Soviet Power, contains the latest international technical achievements. This high technical level of Soviet machine building allows of the reconstruction of socialist economy on the basis of the latest technical achievements, which the Soviet power has put in the service of socialism.

THE TRACTOR INDUSTRY.

"We are moving at full speed along the path towards industrialisation and towards socialism; we are leaving behind us the age-old "Russian" backwardness. We are becoming a metal country, an automobile country, a tractor country. And when we have put the U.S.S.R. on an automobile, and the muzhik on a tractor, let the worthy capitalists, who boast so loudly of their 'civilisation,' then try to overtake us! We shall then see which countries are to be 'classified' as backward and which as advanced."†

These words of the leader of modern Commun-

* Bulletin of the Berlin Statistical Institute. No 19, 1932.

† Stalin, Leninism, Vol. II.

sm, Comrade *Stalin*, uttered by him in the "year of great change"—on the eve of the twelfth anniversary of the October Revolution, when only the first year of the first Five-Year Plan had been completed—have in the main been carried into life with honour by the eve of the sixteenth anniversary of the October Revolution, when the first year of the second Five-Year Plan has been completed.

The socialist automobile and tractor industry, which depends on Soviet metal—the high quality steel of the Soviet plants—has become a model industry prepared for competition with the greatest international enterprises of this branch of industry.

The collective and Soviet farms have become the main forms of agriculture in the Soviet Union, owing to a considerable extent to tractorisation and mechanisation, owing to the victory of the general line of the Party in industrialising the country.

The rapid tempo of tractor production has served as the main lever for the reconstruction of agriculture on the basis of the most recent technique and of collectivisation.

In the tractor industry, which is wholly a child of the Soviet power, the Soviet Union has become the foremost country in the world. In this most important branch of machine building the Soviet Union received no heritage from Tsarist Russia.

Not only backward Tsarist Russia, but advanced European countries, to this day, have no tractor plants which even approach in power the socialist giants in this branch of industry.

The history of the tractor industry shows that the only country which has widely developed the production of tractors is the U.S.A.

The U.S.A. began to produce tractors some twenty-five years before the Soviet Union. In 1902, 2,000 tractors were produced in America. Twenty-five years later, i.e., in 1927, 874 tractors were produced in the U.S.S.R.

Beginning with 1927-28 the production of tractors in the U.S.S.R. developed as follows :—

Machines.						Nine months of
1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
937	1,448	4,499	12,727	39,155	49,866	54,624

Percentage of previous year's output.						Nine months of
1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
—	154.5	310.7	282.9	303.7	127.4	168.7

The total number of tractors produced in the U.S.S.R. during this period is over 163,000.

In the first year of the second Five-Year Plan the Chelyabinsk caterpillar tractor plant, the most powerful in the world, began operations. For the first year of the second Five-Year Plan, while the plant still has to master technique, it has been set the task of delivering 2,000 powerful caterpillar tractors, and is carrying this task out splendidly.

The plan for 1933 estimates the output of all three tractor plants at 60,500 tractors. In nine months, i.e., in 75 per cent. of the time, 54,624 tractors have been delivered, i.e., 90.3 per cent. of the annual plan has been fulfilled. Thus the plants of the tractor industry are working with a considerable over-fulfilment of the plan in tempo. Provided the plants are supplied with metal, there can be no doubt that over 70,000 tractors will be produced, as against 60,500 according to plan.

Below we give the figures for 1931 to ascertain the rôle of the U.S.S.R. in the world production and utilisation of tractors, as the production of tractors in capitalist countries' has greatly decreased. The output of tractors in 1931 in countries producing tractors is shown by the following figures :—

U.S.A.	*U.S.S.R.*	*Ireland*	*Germany*
70,866	39,155	400	2,218

The output in Ireland is that of the Ford plant in Cork, Ireland.

Of the U.S.A. production of 70,866, 28,816 were exported, of which 23,432 tractors were exported to the U.S.S.R., according to the statistics of the Department of Commerce of the U.S.A.

Thus even in 1931, when the economic crisis was not so serious as later years, of the total world output of over 116,000, 62,587 tractors—that is, more than half—were utilised on the fields of the collective and Soviet farms of the Soviet Union. The further rapid growth of the output of tractors puts the U.S.S.R. in the first place, not only in the utilisation of tractors, but also in their production.

The productivity capacity of the Stalingrad and Kkarkov tractor plants alone reaches 100,000 tractors a year with a draught capacity of 1,500,000 h.p. The Chelyabinsk caterpillar tractor plant, which began production in the first year of the second Five-Year Plan, is calculated to produce 40,000 tractors a year, with a draught capacity of 2,000,000 h.p. Thus the tractor plants working on the sixteenth anniversary of the October Revolution (without the Krasny Putilovetz Plant) possess a capacity of 140,000 tractors a year, with a total draught capacity of 3,500,000 h.p.

In stating all these figures it should be borne in mind that under a capitalist individual system of economy, tractors are utilised considerably less effectively than in a socialist economy, where the

means of production are freed from private ownership and work according to a previously prepared rational plan of utilisation with maximum effectiveness.

AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY.

Powerful mechanical draught capacity in the form of tractors, which is being rapidly introduced into agriculture, has already brought about a radical change in the production of agricultural machinery. Individual methods of agriculture used horses, and the old plants produced simple machines which were calculated for individual economy. The tractors have forced the plants to switch over from serving the petty farmer to producing powerful agricultural machinery—to producing the means of a technical re-equipment of agriculture. During the first period of the first Five-Year Plan, the plants producing agricultural machinery proved able, not only to switch over to the production of new complex and universal types of machinery, but even to reach a rapid increase in production. The production of the total agricultural machine building industry during the first Five-Year Plan has multiplied 5.5 times.

In the first year of the second Five-Year Plan agricultural machine building, mastering the technique of new plants and new machines has achieved further successes. The plan of production of reaping machines, which was to be fulfilled mainly in the first half of the year, has been completely fulfilled, and even overfulfilled in respect of some of the most important machines; thus heavy industry has fulfilled its obligations to agriculture in regard to reaping machines, replying to this year's excellent harvest, the result of Bolshevik sowing and ploughing, by a Bolshevik fight for the plan of the first year of the second Five-Year Plan in Industry.

In regard to this year's most important task—grain combines—this year's plan visualises the production of 12,000 machines. In the first half-year 6,756 combines, i.e., 56.3 per cent. of the annual plan, have been produced. During the corresponding period of last year 4,032 combines were produced. Thus the production of the first half-year constitutes 167.6 per cent. of the number produced in the corresponding period of 1932. The production of windrowers in the first half-year has increased as compared with the first half-year of 1932 by 59.3 per cent.; of harrows it has been multiplied 3.3 per cent., etc.

The capacity of the three plants producing combines ("Kommunar," the combine department of the Rostov agricultural machinery plant, and the Saratov combine plant) reaches 40,000 combines a year, which is equal to the maximum, 1929, output of combines in the U.S.A.

Finally, the introduction of electrical energy into the process of agricultural production must be noted, for it is a most important achievement of the first year of the second Five-Year Plan and the best page in the history of the reconstruction of agriculture on a new highly technical basis.

This year tens and more of threshing machines are for the first time working by electrical energy, supplied by the powerful district stations.

According to the directives of the sixteenth Party conference, "the most important element in the technical reconstruction of the national economy is the creation of an up-to-date energetical base, with its foundation in the general electrification of industry and transport and the gradual introduction of electrical energy into agriculture."

The electrification of agricultural production, which was begun on a small scale in the first year of the second Five-Year Plan, must be broadly developed during the second Five-Year Plan period, transforming the collective and Soviet farms into factories with a high technical level.

THE MASTERING OF NEW PLANTS AND NEW TECHNIQUE.

Heavy industry has arrived at the sixteenth anniversary of the October Revolution with splendid results in carrying out the directives of the Party's leader, Comrade Stalin, on the mastering of new plans and new technique.

In the first year of the second Five-Year Plan the builders of socialism have proved with all possible conviction that they can solve the most complex problems of quality, as successfully as they solved the problems of new large scale construction. Having concentrated their attention in the first year of the second Five-Year Plan mainly on quality, as the Party directed, the new giant plants have achieved colossal success in raising the productivity of labour. These successes are particularly outstanding in the principal new machine building plants. Thus, the Stalingrad Dzerzhinsky tractor plant in the second quarter of last year employed 13,478 workers, and in the corresponding quarter of this year it employed 14,101, i.e., 4.6 per cent. more; it produced 5,106 tractors in the second quarter of 1932 and 11,149 tractors in the second quarter of 1933, i.e., an increase of 118 per cent. Therefore the Stalingrad tractor plant, employing only 4.6 per cent. more workers, has produced more than twice as many tractors. The second tractor plant, the Kharkov Orjonikidze Tractor Plant, has in the same period (the second quarter of 1932 to the second quarter of 1933) increased the number of workers employed by 7.2 per cent. and the number of tractors produced by as much as 95.5 per

ent. The Stalin automobile plant has, during he same period, increased the number of workers y 7.8 per cent. and the production of motor trucks y 76 per cent. The Gorky Molotov Plant has creased the number of workers by 59.9 per cent., hile the number of automobile trucks has been creased by 224.7 per cent., in addition to which has produced 1,920 passenger automobiles, hich last year it did not produce at all.

The automobile and tractor industry is not ceptional this year for the high level of its bour productivity. Thus the Kaganovich Ball-aring Plant No. 1 has, during the same period, creased the number of workers employed by .7 per cent. and the quantity of production by 4.6 per cent.

In agricultural machine building the largest ant, the Rostov Stalin Agricultural Machinery ant, has decreased the number of workers em-oyed by 3.8 per cent. and increased the produc-on of commodities by 58.3 per cent.

In machine-tool construction the Fraser Lathe ant has increased the number of workers by .6 per cent. and gross output by 237.3 per cent.; e automatic lathe plant have increased the mber of workers by 54.9 per cent. and its gross tput by 377.3 per cent.

No less considerable are the successes in other anches of industry. Thus in the Beresniki emical Plant the number of workers has grown 26.3 per cent. between the second quarter of 32 and the second quarter of 1933, and the oss output during the same period has increased 6 per cent. In the Voskresensk Combinat the mber of workers has decreased by 21.5 per nt. and the gross output has increased by 69.3 r cent.; in the Neva Combinat the number of rkers has decreased by 3.7 per cent. and the oss output has grown by 45.1 per cent., etc.

To this list of plants one could add the other w and reconstructed plants, but the general ture showing the great advance in mastering chnique and raising the productivity of labour uld not be changed.

In the first year, and in the whole of the second e-year period the centre of gravity, in the ruggle at the plants, is transferred to mastering e new enterprises and the new technique of mass d serial production.

These results of important achievements on the cisive front of the mastering of technique, hich are being summed up on the eve of the six-enth anniversary of the October Revolution, e only the beginning of the great advance hich the Party directives dictate in this sphere r the period of the second Five-Year Plan.

On the eve of the sixteenth anniversary of the tober Revolution it should be particularly noted that socialist construction, in contrast to the while capitalist world economy is the only sphere in which technique is progressing, and there it is progressing at a tempo which its history never met with before.

If, in the U.S.S.R., a struggle is developing for the mastering of technique and its progress, in the foremost capitalist countries the opposite is taking place. Not only is a struggle being waged against technical progress, but also against the advanced technique which has already been achieved. Under the banner of the fight against unemployment the fascist government in Germany on July 15, 1933, published a decree forbidding the instalment of new perfected machines for the production of cigars, and proposing that the old abandoned machines should be used. The Thuringen authorities of fascist Germany have forbidden the use of machines for the production of glassware, proposing that hand labour should be used. In this way the fascist rulers attempt to turn advanced Germany back to the middle ages, not only in the sphere of culture, which they do by burning the work of genius, but in the economic sphere, too.

In the U.S.A., too, during the last few weeks, a law has been issued prohibiting the introduction of new machines in the textile industry without the permission of the National Recovery Administration.

PRODUCTIVITY OF LABOUR AND PRODUCTIVE COSTS.

During the period of the first Five-Year Plan a great advance has taken place in Soviet economy, in the creation of a material basis for large-scale industry; the fuel and raw material base of industry have been greatly extended. A radical reconstruction has taken place in machine-building, simultaneously with a great increase in output. Having gone through the first and decisive stage of reconstruction during the first Five-Year period, industry has entered the second Five-Year Plan, having at its disposal the main prerequisites for a rapid increase in labour productivity.

As is well known, the gross output of heavy industry in the first year of the Second Five-Year Plan is to exceed the total for 1932 by 22 per cent., i.e., a sum of 3,100,000,000 roubles. Of these 3,100,000,000 roubles of increase in output, the country will receive as much as 2,500,000,000 roubles as the result of increased labour productivity, the remaining 600,000,000 roubles being accounted for by an increase in the number of workers and employees. This means that, in order that the plan of gross output in heavy industry may be fulfilled, the productivity of labour must be raised by as much as 16.5 per

cent., and the number of workers by only 4.6 per cent.

The figures given above on the mastering of the new enterprises and the new technique have a vivid reflection in the figures for labour productivity.

In the first half of 1933 the productivity of labour for one worker on the payroll is characterised by the following preliminary figures.

	First quarter of 1933 in relation to first quarter of 1932.	Second quarter of 1933 in relation to first quarter of 1932.
For the whole of industry in the charge of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry	110.1%	117.4%

As we see, in a short period of time heavy industry has reached a high level of production per worker; in the second quarter the output per worker exceeded the figures called for by the planned increase in the productivity of labour for this year as against the average productivity of labour for 1932 by 16.5 per cent. This means that in 1933 the country has received an increase in production to the value of 850,000,000 roubles on the basis of increased labour productivity alone.

The increase in productivity of labour shown above takes place both on the basis of the daily output and of full utilisation of the work day, i.e., of more regular and punctual beginning of work and the sharp cutting down of absences. The daily output of the worker in the first quarter of 1933 increased by 8.5 per cent. as against the same quarter of 1932, and in the second quarter by 13.9 per cent., as against the second quarter of 1932. The output per worker on the payroll exceeds the output per man/day worked owing to the decrease in absences. During the first half-year of 1933, 3.2 days more were worked per worker than in 1932.

By cutting down absences in the first half-year, heavy industry has produced an additional output to the value of more than 150,000,000 roubles.

In the second half-year the productivity of labour progressively continues to rise. Thus, in the basic industries the daily output of a worker in August was on the following level as compared with the output for August, 1932:

Anthracite	109.8 per cent.
Iron Ore	122.6 ,,
Ferrous Metallurgy	111.5 ,,
Chemicals	120.8 ,,
Machine Building	122.1 ,,

As we see, the output in August in the basic industries per man/day worked achieved very considerable successes; in the coal industry, nearly 110 tons were produced in August as compared to 100 tons for August, 1932; 122.6 tons of iron ore, as against 100 for last year, and so on. Such great successes could be achieved only through the enthusiasm of the masses in mastering the new plants and mines. The decision of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. and of the Council of People's Commissars on the organisation of the management of shafts, mines and trusts in the Donbas and in transport helped the successful struggle for high labour productivity, which was carried on this year. By bringing the apparatus of the management closer to production, by simplifying the apparatus, and adapting it to the concrete needs of production, as was done in the whole of industry, on the basis of the decision of the C.C. and of the Council of People's Commissars, mentioned above, considerable results in the improvement of quality indices have already been achieved. This organisational reconstruction, which is of great importance, is still far from being completed in the whole of industry.

Although the successes achieved in the sphere of raising labour productivity are very considerable, they should be considered only as the beginning of the change which can and must develop. First of all, the further mastering of new enterprises and new technique is a great reserve for raising labour productivity. The further mastering of the technique of production must improve the figures for the expenditure of raw materials and fuel, and also must sharply cut down spoilage.

A no less considerable reserve for raising the productivity of labour, which has up to now been untouched, is the full utilisation of working hours. If we have à considerable change in fighting against absenteeism and in increasing the percentage of workers regularly reporting for duty, in the sphere of full utilisation of working time we have not yet achieved such a change.

The practice of the largest plants shows that of seven working hours, not more than five or six are productively used, owing mainly to poor organisation of work and shortage of suitable supplies of work (material, tools). The initiative of the foremost workers of Leningrad and Moscow for the full utilisation of working time must be supported at every plant, mine and factory.

The splendid achievements in the sphere of labour productivity, and also the measures which have been energetically carried out from the beginning of 1933 for cutting down all unproduc-

tive overhead expenses, have led to considerable successes in lowering costs in production.

Thus, in the industry in the charge of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, the lowering of costs for the first half-year of 1933 is shown by the following figures :—

Decrease in costs in relation to the average cost for 1932.

1st quarter	April	May	June	2nd quarter
0.0%	—4%	—4.6%	—5.8%	—5.0%

In the first quarter, owing to certain difficulties in industry caused by the winter conditions, costs remained at the average level for 1932. In the second quarter costs were lowered by as much as 5 per cent., *i.e.*, they reached the level planned for this year. In the second quarter costs were lower every month and in the last month—July—the decrease exceeded the figures provided in the plan. In the first half-year as a whole costs were lowered by 2.6 per cent. as against the average for 1932. Thus, in order to fulfil the annual plan, a still more insistent fight must be carried on in the second half-year.

An insistent struggle for cutting down costs has been developed in heavy industry during the past months of 1933; there is no branch of industry which is not steadily improving this most important figure for quality every month.

However, as in the sphere of labour productivity, industry still has at its disposal great reserves for the lowering of costs, the further utilisation of which is the next urgent task of industry.

In the fight for good quality indices, every manager in industry must remember and be guided by the following directive of the party :—

> "The Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission instructs all business, Party and trade union organisations to concentrate their main attention in 1933 on the complete fulfilment of the tasks relative to increasing labour productivity and lowering the cost of production. The extent to which this will be realised will receive primary consideration when the activity of each enterprise and trust will be verified."

THE INCREASE IN THE WAGES AND GENERAL WELFARE OF THE WORKERS.

Under the socialist system the welfare of the workers and of all toilers is directly connected with the growth of socialist economy, i.e., the welfare of the workers is continuously improved, corresponding to the growth in output.

Thus, in August, 1933, corresponding to the increase of output and the productivity of labour, the wages of the workers rose as compared with the average for 1932 as follow :—

Coal industry	10.4 per cent.
Iron Ore	22.6 ,,
Oil	16.9 ,,
Ferrous metallurgy ...	9.7 ,,
Non-ferrous metallurgy ...	10.0 ,,
Machine building	7.7 ,,

An analogous increase took place in the wages of the engineers and technicians and other categories of employees.

However, the increase of wages alone does not sufficiently show the improvement in the welfare of the workers and of the whole toiling population.

In 1933 the workers have, apart from the centralised supplies, received considerable additional supplies of food products provided by the departments of workers' supplies, which were created since 1932 on the directive of the Party and the government.

In heavy industry alone the departments of workers' supplies have up to October 10 stored 279,000 centners of grain, 228,000 tons of potatoes and 218,000 tons of other vegetables.

With the aid of the government, which advanced considerable sums of money and means of production, the workers have received considerable additional supplies through the departments of workers' supplies.

Light industry is increasing the output of general commodities, too, having received a considerably larger quantity of raw materials as the result of the good harvest in agriculture in the first year of the second Five-Year Plan.

All these successes are not by any means sufficient to satisfy the growing requirements of the workers and the whole toiling population. The struggle for carrying out the fighting directive of the Seventeenth Party Conference must continue with Bolshevik insistence during the second five-year period. The prerequisite for the rapid development of the light industry and food industry—for the increase in the output of commodities of general and personal use—has, in the form of heavy industry, which produces the means of production, been created in the land of the Soviets.

THE STRUGGLE OF THE PARTY FOR BOLSHEVIK COLLECTIVE FARMS, FOR WELL-TO-DO COLLECTIVE FARMERS

By Nikulikhin.

THE first Five-Year Plan, which was completed by 1933, was, in respect to agriculture, a *five-year plan of collectivisation.* The passing of the small individual farms of the poor and middle peasants to the new socialist path, the path of the collective farms, began from the time of the October Revolution. It developed with full force only after the Party, as the result of the policy of industrialisation, had formed a powerful socialist industry, capable of giving a modern technical basis to agriculture; in proportion as the Soviet Power and the Communist Party convinced the toiling peasants of the advantages of the socialist, *artel** form of labour, convinced them of its tremendous superiority. As the result of the first Five-Year Plan, 5,000 state farms were formed and over 200,000 collective farms, and in the chief districts, collectivisation was completed on the whole. Thus the Party carried out the transition of the small individual peasant farm to the lines of big collective farming, undermined the roots of capitalism in the villages —the differentiation of the peasants into the poor and the kulaks—and destroyed the kulak class.

From a country of small peasants, the U.S.S.R. was converted into a country of extremely large-scale agriculture. The sown area was enlarged by 21 million hectares compared with 1927-28, and at least 75 per cent. of the surplus of grain available for the market was concentrated in the hands of the collective farms and the state farms. At the same time the Bolsheviks saved at least 20 million poor peasants "from poverty and ruin, saved them from the oppression of the kulaks and converted them, thanks to the collective farms, into people well provided for" (Stalin). Thus the Party secured a world historic victory, winning a decisive battle against Russian capitalism which originated in petty commodity peasant farming, constructed the foundations of socialist economics, solved finally the question of who will be the victor, in favour of socialism, strengthening the collective farms and finally closing the path to the old individual farming.

Thus the chief difficulties in the construction of socialism in the U.S.S.R. were overcome in sharp class struggles. The bourgeois theories of counter-revolutionary Trotskyism — that it was impossible to construct socialism jointly with the basic masses of the peasants—were utterly confounded. The prophecies of the right opportunists that in the U.S.S.R. the small individual farm of the peasant would dominate for many years to come, that collective farms and state farms were the "music of the distant future," were brought to naught. The conversion of the U.S.S.R. into a country of the largest scale agriculture in the world on socialist lines solved one of the most difficult problems of the proletarian revolution. At the threshold of the second Five-Year Plan, new tasks arose urgently for the Party in the domain of agriculture, chiefly the task of the *organisational and economic consolidation of the collective farms,* the *socialist re-education of the collective farmers,* the conversion of the collective farms into *Bolshevik* collective farms, and their members into *well-to-do collective farmers.*

This fighting task of making the collective farms Bolshevik and the collective farmers well-to-do was put before the Party in its fullest form by the leader of the Bolshevik Party, Comrade Stalin, at the January Plenum of the C.C. C.P.S.U., and in his speech at the 1st All-Union Congress of collective farm shock workers.* Comrade Stalin formulated the new task of the Party in respect to agriculture for the first few years of the second Five-Year Plan as follows in these speeches:

"The task is now to consolidate the collective farms *organisationally,* to expel the sabotaging elements from them, to recruit real tried Bolshevik cadres for the collective farms and to make them really Bolshevik collective farms. That is the principal thing to-day" (speech on the results of the first Five-Year Plan at the January Plenum of the C.C.).

"In order to advance further and finally strengthen the collective farms, we must take a *second* step, we must make a *new* achievement. What is this second step? It is to raise the collective farmers—both the late poor peasants and the late middle peasants — still higher. It is to *make all collective farmers well-to-do.* Yes, comrades, well-to-do" (speech at the 1st All-Union Congress of Collective Farm Shock Workers).

What was it that made it necessary to carry

* "Artel"—a limited form of productive co-operative. Ed.

* The work in the Rural Districts.

out new big economic and political steps in the villages? And what are the results of the eight months of the struggle carried on by the Bolsheviks since the Plenum to make Bolshevik collective farms and well-to-do collective farmers?

Collective farms, as a socialist form of production, are able to ensure the brilliant development of agriculture on socialist lines, able to be schools for the socialist re-training of the masses of collective farm peasants, schools for eliminating the relics and habits of petty-bourgeois individualism. But, as Comrade Stalin pointed out in his programme speech on work in the villages, the socialist collective farm form of economy will not of itself ensure the proper conducting of the affairs of the collective farms, the correct planning of the economy of the collective farm, the conversion of the collective farms into model socialist farms. The collective farm method of economy does not of itself give a guarantee against the utilisation of this form, by anti-Soviet elements for their own purposes. Everything depends on who stands at the head of the collective farms, who leads them.

"The collective farm is a socialist form of *economic* organisation, just as the Soviets are the socialist form of *political* organisation. The collective farms and also the Soviets represent greatest achievements of our Revolution, the greatest achievements of the working class. But the collective farms and the Soviets are merely the *form* of organisation, a socialist form, it is true, but nevertheless the *form* of organisation. Everything depends on what *contents* are moulded into this form" ("The Work in the Rural Districts").

Comrade Stalin pointed to the example of how, during the Kronstadt mutiny, the Cadets, S.R.s and Mensheviks tried to use the form of the Soviets for their counter-revolutionary aims. The counter-revolutionaries understood at that time that "it is not a question of the Soviets themselves, but, above all, who will lead them."

"The collective farms, as a socialist form of organising agriculture, can show wonders of economic construction when genuine revolutionaries, Bolsheviks, Communists, are at their head. And, vice versa, the collective farms can for a certain period become a hiding place for all kinds of counter-revolutionary bargaining, when they are controlled by S.R.s, Mensheviks, Petlura officers and other white guardist, former supporters of Denikin and Kolchak" (Ibid).

The capitalist elements, deprived of their productive basis as the result of the liquidation of the kulaks as a class, have changed the tactics of their struggle against the Soviet power, against socialist construction. They have passed from the open head-on attack to inconspicuous sapping, creeping into the collective farms, state farms and machine-tractor stations and trying to disrupt socialist production from within. It is known how, in 1932, the kulak elements who had crept into the collective farms displayed special activity in the North Caucasus, in some districts of Ukraine, the Lower Volga Province, etc., organising kulak sabotage of the fulfilment of the plans of the Soviet government, disrupted the fulfilment of grain deliveries, carried on wrecking activity, and tried to bring the collective farms into conflict with the proletarian government. As the result of this, at the end of 1932 and the beginning of 1933 the agriculture of the Soviet Union underwent considerable difficulties. Comrade Stalin exposed these new tactics of the class enemy, severely criticised the shortcomings of Party work in the villages, where many Communists did not understand the new tactics of the class enemy, his inconspicuous "sapping work," did not understand that the victory of the collective farms and state farms does not reduce but increases the trouble we must take with agriculture; did not understand that it is we Communists who are responsible, first of all, for the condition of agriculture, for the planned guidance of such *big* enterprises as collective farms. Naturally, the late individual peasants had no experience of leadership. Many Communists regarded the collective farms as a kind of "ikon," not realising the task of providing socialist contents for the socialist form of the collective farms. Many Communists forgot that the socialist re-education of the collective farmers only begins in the artel. They forgot that the members of the collective farms, though they had become the new, real and firm support of the Soviet power in the countryside, nevertheless still retained many of the customs and habits inherent in small commodity production. They forgot that the "consciousness of people lags behind their actual situation in its development. The collective farmers, as far as their situation is concerned, are no longer individual peasants, but collectivists, but their consciousness is still the old private owner's consciousness. And so the people who formerly formed the exploiting classes utilise these private owner habits of the collective farmers to organise the theft of social property and thus to weaken the foundations of the Soviet system—social property (Stalin). Hence the task of the struggle for the socialist re-education of the masses of collective farmers. In order to put socialist contents into the collective form it is necessary to ensure Bolshevik leadership for the collective farms, to rally the collective farmers, and first of all their active members, around this Bolshevik leadership. It

is necessary to expose and expel the class enemy from the collective farms and the state farms, to develop a wide and stubborn work for the socialist education of the masses of collective farmers, to move with firm steps along the path of strengthening the collective farms and mastering big collective production. To ensure Bolshevik leadership for every side of the life of the collective farms, and first of all the leadership of the political organisational and economic consolidation of the collective farms — such is the immediate task which must be solved—before it is possible to move a step forward along the path of fulfilling the tasks of the second Five-Year Plan.

Under the leadership of Comrade Stalin, the Party in the decisions of the January Plenum of the C.C. gave the slogan of struggle for Bolshevik collective farms. It created an instrument of tremendous importance for strengthening the proletarian leadership of the collective farms, in the form of political departments in the machine-tractor stations and state farms. As the finest members of the political departments it selected and sent into the villages 15,000 experienced and well-tested Bolshevik organisers. The political departments are a "most important lever of the Party in the organisational consolidation of the collective farms and machine-tractor stations, for cleansing them from hostile class elements, strengthening the organising rôle of the Communists and Y.C.L.ers in the collective farms and correcting shortcomings in the work of the village Party organisations . . . the political departments must become genuine centres around which the best and most advanced elements of the collective farm villages can gather" (decisions of the C.C. C.P.S.U. on Political Departments, "Pravda," June 16, 1932).

The Party reorganised the ranks of the Party organisations of the villages, formed collective farm Party cells, subordinating them to the leadership of the political departments and separating the functions of the political departments and the territorial Party centres, directing the majority of the Communists of village organisations immediately into agricultural production, putting them at the head of collective farms, brigades, groups, dairies, etc. Simultaneously, the Party increased its efforts with regard to agriculture in the matter of still further increasing the production of tractors, automobiles, combines, agricultural machines and implements, chemical fertilisers. In the spring campaign in 1933, it increased the number of machine-tractor stations to 2,650, supplying them with the means of production to the value of two billion roubles. It took a number of steps to provide an economic stimulus. The former methods of collecting agricultural products, by means of contracts, was replaced by a system of definite deliveries to the government, having the force of a tax. This made the collective farmers confident that, after they had handed over to the government, at a fixed price, a definite quantity of grain which they knew in advance, they could freely use the remainder of the products and receive a larger income in proportion as they worked better. The Party established the system of payment for the work of machine-tractor stations as a fraction of the harvest, which stimulated the work of the machine-tractor stations. The Party organised the struggle for the harvest as the central task in agricultural production. The Party linked up the struggle for Bolshevik collective farms very closely with the extremely important slogan launched by Comrade Stalin at the Congress of Collective Farm Shock Workers: "to make all the collective farmers well-to-do." This slogan was one of the most decisive importance in rousing the labour enthusiasm of the millions of collective farm peasants. It played a tremendous rôle and became a powerful weapon in the hands of the Party for the political, organisational and economic consolidation of the collective farms.

All these new slogans and new measures of the C.P.S.U. were advanced at the time of the January Plenum of the C.C. in connection with the great difficulties which had manifested themselves in the collective farms. The social fascists and the counter-revolutionary Trotskyites gloated over these difficulties, slanderously distorting the extent, the meaning and the cause of them, spreading the lie that the collective farmers were "on strike," that this was the result of them being "forcibly driven into the collective farms," that they were exploited by methods of primitive accumulation. The social-fascist and counter-revolutionary Trotskyites croaked that this was the very sector on which the Soviet power would be defeated. The C.P.S.U. took up an attitude of the deepest contempt to these howls of the bankrupts. Based on the deep conviction that these difficulties were the difficulties of growth, that the present difficulties of the collective farmers were "child's play compared with the difficulties which the workers lived through 10-15 years ago," Comrade Stalin at the January Plenum of the C.C. boldly criticised such work in the countryside as did not take account of the new conditions, and he pointed out new tasks. Less than a year has passed since then, and the social fascist prophesies have been utterly discredited. Again and again the Bolshevik Party has shown to the whole world its great power. What successes did the Party achieve, in the first year of the second Five-Year Plan, on the basis of these measures, on the basis

the new slogans? What are the new achievements of the Soviet Union in the sphere of collective farm construction at the time of the 16th anniversary of the October Revolution? How have the shortcomings of the Party organisations in the villages, which were pointed out by Comrade Stalin, been corrected?

In 1933 the C.P.S.U. took decisive steps for the conversion of all the collective farms into Bolshevik farms. Based on the political departments, the Party sternly crushed kulak sabotage. The collective farms and machine and tractor stations were cleansed from kulaks and other class-hostile elements. The cadres of leaders of the collective farms were verified and to a considerable extent replaced by new ones. Kulak agents, right-opportunists and all kinds of degenerate elements who had lost their class vigilance were removed from their posts and expelled from the Party. Tens of thousands of collective farm Party cells and candidate groups were formed directly at the place of work. Tremendous work was carried on to form a body of collective farm activists. Hundreds of thousands of people, active fighters for the collective farm system, already form a firm body of activists grouped around the collective farm Party cells, and working under the directions of the political departments. During the brief period of their existence, the political departments have shown what a tremendous force they represent in the villages in the matter of converting the collective farms into Bolshevik farms, in the matter of consolidating the proletarian leadership in the villages. They have raised new hundreds of thousands of organisers, leaders of collective farm work, from among the collective farm masses. Through the political departments the Party entered, as Comrade Stalin demanded, into all the details of collective farm life and collective farm production." It became possible for the Party to know "all that was taking place in the collective farms," to multiply its contacts with the collective farms and to begin to really master the whole of collective farm production. The political departments give tremendous assistance to the collective farms in the organising of production, labour, in planning, in the creation of a firm leadership. Hence the tremendous authority of the political departments among the masses of collective farmers, and the voluntary, conscious and unhesitating fulfilment of all their directives. Not only the collective farm leaders, but also the rank and file collective farmers apply to the workers of the political departments with all their needs, for assistance in solving some difficulty or other, and receive advice and help from them. It is not surprising that many collective farmers now call the political departments the "heart and brain of the collective farms." Never has the authority of the Party been so high in the Soviet villages, never has it had such firmly welded and capable cadres of supporters, such a wide base of sympathisers, as it has now. All the levers of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the villages are now stronger. Owing to the political departments, the machine and tractor stations and the state farms, the base points of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the countryside, have become organisational and political centres in the villages.

The Party has done tremendous work in 1933 to give socialist contents to the socialist form of the collective farms. This can be seen, above all, in the attitude of the collective farmers to the fulfilment of their obligations to the proletarian government in the matter of sowings, the heightening of the harvest yield, the deliveries of agricultural products. The plan for spring sowing was completely carried out. The state farms and the collective farms sowed about 88.4 per cent. of the entire cultivated area. The positions of individual farms have been finally and irretrievably undermined. The plan for the fixed grain deliveries, which, together with the payment in kind to the machine and tractor stations, amounts to about the same as the grain deliveries last year, is being carried out in an incomparably shorter period than in the previous year, and many districts, provinces and territories are completing it in advance of schedule (Crimea, Tartary, Nijni-Novgorod Province, Moscow Territory). By September 20th, 1933, the plan of grain deliveries for the Soviet Union had been fulfilled by 60 per cent. while in 1932 only 25 per cent. had been delivered on the corresponding date, and by the anniversary of the October Revolution will be complete. We have now a tremendous level of mobilisation of collective fa m masses themselves for the prompt fulfilment of the obligations of grain deliveries.

The increase in the socialist content of the collective farms can be seen also in the growth of the socialist attitude towards labour, and the rise of the labour activity of the collective farmers. In previous years it had been noticeable that many collective farmers slacked on their jobs, but in 1933 practically all the basic masses of the collective farmers took up an honest attitude to the work assigned to them, experiencing genuine labour enthusiasm. This was displayed, above all, in the increase in the total number of workdays registered per family, by each able-bodied collective farmer. Individual collective farmers who, in 1932, had "dodged the column" and had put in practically no work days, registered this year 200 workdays each. The majority of the collective farm families which were investigated,

with several able-bodied people in them, had over 300 workdays, and many had from 600 to 1,000 workdays. Of course, even now in a number of collective farms there is still weak labour discipline. There is still no small number of collective farmers who do not take a conscientious attitude to labour, who stay away from their jobs, or do not carry out the quota of work. But they are already the minority, and the public opinion of the masses of the collective farmers themselves is directed against them. The struggle for labour discipline has become a matter not only for the leaders of the collective farms, but for all the collective farmers, for they understand that the more accurately all come to work, the better the quotas of work are fulfilled or surpassed, and the shorter the time in which the agricultural work is carried out, then the higher will be the harvest and the higher will be the pay for each workday. We have such a clear indication of the growing socialist attitude to labour, the working out of the new socialist discipline of labour, as the enormous growth of socialist competition and shock work in 1932. In the U.S.S.R. there are already millions of shock workers in the collective farms. The political departments have taken the lead of the labour enthusiasm of the masses of collective farmers, ensuring a tremendous scope to the socialist methods of labour—socialist competition and shock work.

The third proof of the growing socialist maturity of the collective farmers is the tremendous degree of mobilisation of the collective farmer masses in 1933, for the defence of socialist social property from thieves and pilferers, and the more careful attitude which was taken towards the social means of production. Social property is the basis of the collective farm system. This is now understood by millions of collective farm peasants. Whereas in previous years the grain and the property of many collective farms was stolen by hidden kulak elements and their agents, by slackers, whereas in previous years collective farm possessions were scattered to the winds without resistance, and socialist property was undermined, however, in 1933 a sharp change has been brought about in the attitude towards social property. Millions of eyes have watched for the safety of the collective farm harvest. Not only the specially appointed riders and watchmen, but the whole masses of the collective farmers have guarded the harvest against thieves and pilferers. In 1933, new forms of mass work found application in this matter (crusades of pioneer children's detachments to the fields, etc.). In 1933 there was a more careful attitude towards the tractors and horses. The amount of work to be done by each horse this year was not less than in previous years, but more, but as the result of better treatment the horses look better. The deaths of horses from disease is decreasing and in many collective farms has completely stopped. There can be seen a tendency to increase the number of horses. Foals are appearing in the collective farms.

On the basis of the Bolshevik consolidation of the collective farms, the upsurge of labour activity on the part of the masses of the collective farmers, the first year of the second Five-Year Plan has passed under the flag of the widespread application of all the advantages of large-scale agricultural production, a sharp turn to the struggle for quality, to the struggle for a good harvest.

Even in the first Five-Year Plan the collective farms and state farms, as big socialist enterprises, showed their tremendous advantages over small individual farms. Owing to this advantage, the sown area of the U.S.S.R. increased in four years by 21 million hectares, or the speed of extension was five times as high as the speed of extension of the sown area of the U.S.A. in the first quarter of the 20th century and two and a half times as great as the speed of enlargement of the sown area of the U.S.S.R. in the restoration period.* If we take collective farms separately, the sown area in them was 50 per cent. more than the area which the peasants sowed before joining the collective farms (from 63 million hectares in 1928 to 92 million hectares in 1932). The collective farms, having ploughed up 9 million hectares of uncultivated steppe, took in 12 million hectares of kulak land and 8 million hectares of the land of individual farmers who reduced the area they were cultivating. The sowings of the state farms in the first Five-Year Plan increased by eight times (from 1.7 million hectares to 13.5 millions).

This increase took place simultaneously with the departure of over 10 million persons from agriculture into the towns, to the new gigantic industrial construction works. It took place with a simultaneous large increase in the area devoted to industrial crops which require a big expenditure of work compared with grain for their cultivation. This became possible, thanks to the supply of 150,000 tractors, tens of thousands of automobiles and combines and new agricultural machinery to the value of 1,600,000,000 roubles. It became possible on the basis of the growth of the efficiency of socialist labour. Thanks to this, the U.S.S.R. was able to solve the grain problem on the whole, to increase the production of agricultural raw material, to free itself from dependence on imports in respect to cotton and a number of other crops.

* In the period 1900-1925, the sown area in the U.S.A. increased by 22.4 million hectares. In the U.S.S.R., from 1925-28, when small individual farms predominated, the sown area increased by 8.7 million hectares.

But in the first Five-Year Plan, socialist agriture did not realise all its advantages in the atter of increasing the harvest yield, although en here, thousands of collective farms and hunreds of state farms showed a much greater yield an the individual farms, and some of the state rms and collective farms reached the level of e harvests of the foremost countries with high elds. This was explained firstly by the fact that e collective farms and state farms received land om the individual farmers overgrown with eeds, exhausted by the primitive and frequently edacious farming of the ground for centuries. his in the first instance explains the strong resistce of the capitalist elements. It is explained the inability to run a large planned agriculture. ot being able to prevent the formation of collecre farms, they offered strong resistance in the atter of the harvest yield and in cattle rearing, ying to discredit the collective farms and distegrate them from within. It is sufficient to int out the wrecking practice of shallow ploughg, the enormous losses in the harvest which the laks tried to bring about. This wrecking was ssible owing to the poor acquaintance of the ajority of the cadres of the state farms and llective farms with scientific farming.

At the end of 1932 the C.C. of the Party and Soviet of People's Commissars made a special ision, setting the struggle for a good harvest the main task in agriculture. The first year the Second Five-Year Plan (1933) took place der the slogan of the turning of all the collece farms and state farms towards the struggle increasing the harvest. This turn made itself dent, above all, in the earlier sowings and the rtening of the sowing period, in the higher ality of the cultivation of the land. In the jority of the territories and provinces, the speed sowing in 1933 was higher than that of the vious three years, beginning with 1930. At time of the quickest sowing, i.e., in the first days and especially between May 1st and 16th, area sown in 1933 exceeded by 10-12 million tares the area sown in 1932. Winter fallow s ploughed up much earlier and was much more efully worked. A very important proof of the n in the struggle for the quality of agricultural duction is the extremely wide application of otechnics in 1933, the introduction of proper ations of crops. In addition to the introduca of crop rotation, a struggle was carried on inst weeds by deep ploughing, the weeding of eral million hectares of grain crops in addition he industrial crops. A decisive struggle was ried on with inefficient methods of working the l. Fertilisers were used more fully and corlly. A stubborn struggle was carried on with losses when harvesting the grain. The attention of tens of millions of workers on socialist agriculture was focussed on the struggle for the harvest. As the result, *in 1933 the Soviet Union obtained a harvest such as the country never received in the past.*

Some regions had an average harvest of 1.2 tons per hectare, whereas in the past it had usually not exceeded 0.7 to 0.8 tons. Many collective farms and state farms obtained a yield of two tons per hectare or over for the main crops. For some crops, the yield in a number of collective farms reached three to four tons. Some writing hacks of the bourgeois and social fascist camp try to belittle the achievements of the Soviet power in the sphere of the harvest by calling attention to the favourable weather conditions, but in a number of the chief grain districts of the U.S.S.R. the weather conditions were still more favourable in 1930. Nevertheless, in 1933 the Soviet Union had a higher harvest. No one can gloss over the achievements of the Bolsheviks in the matter of increasing the harvest, which was ensured by the tremendous organisational work of the Party among the masses of the collective farmers and the workers of the state farms, thus providing an unprecedented wave of labour enthusiasm among the workers of socialist agriculture and on the basis of this, a better utilisation of all the means of production. The change which was evident in 1932 in the development of productive animal rearing was consolidated in 1933. The socialised herds in the collective farms and state farms are growing. There is an increase in the number of cattle possessed by the collective farmers themselves, in connection with the solution of the task of assuring a cow for every collective farmer. In 1933 the Soviet Union made a close approach to an unprecedented blossoming of the productive forces of agriculture, the wide development of its agricultural production as a whole. The year 1933 has become the last year of food difficulties.

In 1933 in the Soviet Union, the necessary prerequisites were formed for a further rise of the material level of the masses. Comrade Stalin, in estimating the results of the first Five-Year Plan in agriculture, said that we have thousands of collective farms and scores of state farms which are on a good paying basis, forming the pride of our Party, the pride of the Soviet power. In this sphere, 1933 brought new victories. Now tens of thousands of collective farms and hundreds of state farms are on a completely paying basis. Such collective farms were able to fulfil all their obligations to the government ahead of schedule or in the appointed time, to give a full guarantee of food for the collective farmers, to ensure high payment for the workdays and to set aside con-

siderable resources for widening production. In such collective farms there is taking place a wide construction of working buildings, and cattle rearing is beginning to develop at a high speed.

As an example, we will give a few collective farms which were investigated in autumn, 1933, by the agrarian institute of the Communist Academy.

land properly, to take care of collective farm property" (Stalin : Speech to Congress of Collective Farm Shock Workers).

For the first time in history there is now country where the growth of social riches, thank to the conditions of socialist economy, means rise in the cultural and material level of the whol of the great masses of the toilers.

Gross Yield of Grain and Legumes in Collective Farms.
(in tons)

Province	Name of Collective Farm	1932	1933	1933 in per cent. of 1932
Central Black Earth Region	"Victory of Proletariat" ...	1,291.3*	1,581.1	218.1*
Central Black Earth Region	"Second Five-Year Plan"...		1,235.5	
Central Black Earth Region	"Red Shock Worker" ...	335	871.8	260.2
Lower Volga	"Comintern"	2,700	5,094.1	188.5
Ukraine	"Chubar"	1,130.1	2,165.1	191.6
Ukraine	"Profintern"	810.8	1,624.8	200.6
North Caucasus	"Free Labour"	422.1	975.3	231.1

* "Victory of Proletariat" and "Second Five-Year Plan in 1932" were united into a single collective farm.

There was a considerable increase in the harvest field and a larger production of cotton, beet, flax and other industrial crops. Thus in the collective farm "Path of Lenin" (Tokar District of the Central Black Earth Region), the yield of beet increased from 11 tons to 18½-19 tons per hectare. This collective farm alone produces beet sufficient for a whole train-load of sugar. The Voroshilov collective farm and a number of others raised the yield of beet above 20 tons per hectare, increasing the production of beet by 50-60 per cent. compared with 1932. There can be no doubt that in the next two or three years, all collective farms and state farms without exception will become highly paying enterprises.

In the conditions of private individual farming, an increase in wealth increased the differentiation among the peasants signifying riches for a few and poverty for the overwhelming majority. Now matters are otherwise. Now the conditions are different.

"In order to become well-to-do collective farmers, it is not at all necessary to cheat or exploit their neighbours. And also, it is not easy to exploit anyone, as private property in land or rent no longer exists among us, the machines and tractors belong to the government, while people with capital are not fashionable in the collective farms at the present time. Once there was such a fashion, but it has gone for ever. For the collective farmers to become well-to-do, only one thing is now needed—to work honestly in the collective farm, to make proper use of the tractors and machines, proper use of the draught animals, to cultivate the

The year 1933 has already made many collective farmers well-to-do. For example :—

In the collective farm "Golden Shepherd, Tomakovsky District, Dneipropetrovsky Region the average income per able-bodied worker roubles was :

In 1930, only 152 roubles ; in 1931, 252 roubles and in 1933, 557 roubles.

For each workday in 1931 the payment was kopecks, in 1932 it was 1 rouble 32 kopecks, and in 1933 it was 2 roubles 97 kopecks.

In 1931 the amount of products distributed per workday was 1.7 kilograms. This year 10 kilograms were distributed in kind for each workday.

Here are some examples of individual collective farmers from this collective farm :—

Sergei Likholat formerly possessed absolutely nothing. He was a hired farm labourer. He worked for the kulaks Strus and Sereda. Sergei himself tells how in a famine year he weeded the garden for Sereda, and when he had finished a hectare and a half, he asked Sereda to give him a dinner instead of money. Sereda told his wife to give Sergei Likholat a cup of rye beer and said "Let his guts do a bit of work." And here is the situation of Likholat in 1933 : "They gave me the house of this same Sereda (he was deported), helped me to buy a cow. Now I am in a very good position. I have now a cow and a pig and 20 hens. At the present moment I have already registered 321 workdays. For them I shall get over 200 poods of grain and about 1,000 roubles in money. I never expected such things even in my dreams."

In this same collective farm is a former middle

sant who was possessed of small means. His ne is Philip Likholat. He has now a cow, a ; pigs and hens. "For the first half year he istered 437 workdays, and for the whole year will have over 800 workdays. He will receive poods of grain, and in addition 2,375 roubles money. Philip wants to buy a gramophone. complains about the co-operative store because till lives the life of yesterday, still thinks that countryside is poor, and sells junk."*

nd here is the "3rd International" collective n in the Zaporozhe district of Dneipropetrovsk gion. We will give an extract from a letter n this collective farm to Comrade Stalin, which published in "Izvestia" on August 11, 1933.

ccording to our accountant, we have threshed 57,104 centners of grain. We shall bring in he government 1,451 tons, pay the machine tor station for sowing, reaping and threshing .9 tons. We shall leave a lot for seed—not oods of winter wheat per hectare, as in an vidual farm, but, all told, 662 tons, and a her 86 tons as an insurance fund. We have l for the animals—as much as we need—60 ds per horse, 12 poods per cow and 42 poods pig. We shall return to the government all loans which we drew. We shall pay back nce 205 tons, and that will leave us with 5 tons. Taking the whole workdays for the , this means 10 kilos per workday. Besides we have a vegetable garden of 500 hectares, after we have hauled in vegetables to the ernment and filled our contract to Dneipros- , we shall still have something to sell and ething to distribute in payment for workdays, ough the collective farmers have their own dens, and not small ones at that. They get -1,000 roubles on the market from half a are. If we were to divide the grain among people in the collective farm (merely for cal- tion, for we shall really share it out according workdays), it comes out at 3 tons per head. merly, no one in the village could have had much. Not only the poor peasants but the dle peasants could not have so much left.

At the end of the year, the average family ng us will have no fewer than 400 workdays, some will have 600, 800 or even over 1,000. *That means that even a man with a big family, little children, if his wife works, will receive, ordinary luck, 4 tons of grain."*

his collective farm is making increased ands on the Soviet market. "We all want ts, overcoats, shirts, sewing machines, beds. want to dress like the city folk, to live ntly. Our brigadier is thinking about a watch, a bicycle or a motorbike—he needs one for his work."

This collective farm thinks about leaving part of the grain, over and above the grain deliveries to the government and the payment in kind to the machine and tractor station, for the accumulation fund, in order to buy a hundred horses or so, to get new implements ("our carts are old and broken"; "buy real good carts," etc.).

There is no small number of such collective farms in the Soviet Union. There are many thousands of them. As a rule, in the majority of the collective farms in the grain districts, the average payment for a workday is 6 to 8 kilograms of grain. A collective farmer who works conscientiously not only provides himself with a good supply of grain and other agricultural products, but has considerable surpluses of them for sale at the collective farm bazaars. The payment per workday in many collective farms has increased in many collective farms to two or three times and the payment in kind frequently to three or four times. The collective farmer no longer thinks only of bread. On the basis of collective farming, he and his family are well provided for. The collective farmer now thinks of buying good clothes and boots, of furniture, of creating a certain degree of comfort in his house. Here is what the old men of the collective farm "Culture" in the German Volga Republic write:

"We have built our clinic. Now we are finishing the building of a big and airy school, where all our children can learn in their own German language. Half the children are pioneers.

"We have now all become literate. Every homestead gets several newspapers. We have radio, gramophones, dramatic circles, choirs. Every brigade has its own library. We often have movies. It cannot be compared with our former life.

"Tablecloths and window curtains have appeared in the houses. When you go into a house, you do not have to stoop as in the old days. The ceilings are high, the windows are wide. We want to live long, to work, to be strong and firmly defend what we have won."

The vast majority of the collective farmers dream of acquiring automobiles for their collective farms.

Yes, the men and women collective farmers, many of whom not long ago had not even a horse or a bullock, now dream of an automobile! This feeling was well shown at a meeting of the women collective farm shock workers in October, 1933, in the collective farm, "Path of Lenin" (Tokarevsky District, Central Black Earth

* See "Pravda," Sept. 3rd, 1933.

Region). They stated: "We have a tractor detachment. We have agricultural machines. If we could get two automobiles, we would be real farmers." And there can be no doubt that the collective farmers of the Soviet Union will soon have their own automobiles. The machine and tractor stations which serve the collective farms have already their automobiles. They will soon be directly in the collective farms.

The great achievements of the collective farms in the first year of the second Five-Year Plan are giving rise to a new inflow of individual farmers into the collective farms. Now hundreds of thousands of individual farmers have entered the collective farms in 1933. The level of collectivisation has risen to 65.4 per cent. throughout the Union. As soon as the distribution of incomes takes place in the collective farms and the collective farmers receive their grain and money for the workdays they have registered, application will be made on a mass scale to join the collective farms. Outside the collective farms will only be a very small number of individual farmers. In winter, 1933, collectivisation will be completed on the whole in the entire Soviet Union.

On the basis of the progress and full development of productive forces in socialist agriculture and the new rise in the material level of the masses of collective peasants, there is taking place in the villages a cultural revolution such as the world has never seen.

> "Our opponents have often said to us that we are undertaking a senseless matter — the introduction of socialism into an insufficiently cultured country. But they are mistaken, because we did not begin from the end which is provided for in the theories of all pedants, and with us the political and social revolution is the forerunner of the cultural revolution which we have now before us." (Lenin, article on Co-operation.)

Not so very long ago, the patriarch of social-fascism, Kautsky, was croaking that complete collectivisation would break down with the Bolsheviks, "owing to the absence of sufficient technical means, owing to the absence of a sufficient number of leading scientifically trained forces capable of making proper use of these means." Life has plainly shown that the Soviet Union has formed, on the basis of the socialist industrialisation of the country, the necessary technical means for the reconstruction of agriculture in the Soviet Union. In the process of the radical socialist reconstruction of agriculture, the Soviet Union found the necessary human material, found the necessary conditions for the preparation of millions of skilled cadres who are already working in socialist agriculture. In the U.S.S.R. there are already collective farms in which half the able-bodied people are able to drive a tractor and automobile, and there are collective farms where scores of women work as tractorists and chauffeurs. Millions of people have made their acquaintance with motor technique. Millions of people in the U.S.S.R. have started to make a thorough study of scientific agrotechnics and zootechnics. The winter of 1933-1934 will be a winter of mass study on a scale never before seen. Tens of thousands of short courses of all kinds will be organised, at which the workers on socialist agriculture will pass through the school of mastering the new technique.

In addition to political and technical study, there has begun on a gigantic scale the construction of all kinds of cultural institutions. Clubs, cinemas, theatres, libraries, etc., are spread in a dense network over the villages and hamlets of the Soviet Union. Thousands of printed newspapers of machine and tractor stations and state farms are already being published. There are tens of thousands of wall newspapers in the collective farms, written by those who directly participate in socialist agricultural production. The central newspapers, the papers of the regional centres, are distributed in millions of copies in the villages. All the peasant children go to school. Centres for the liquidation of illiteracy among adults are teaching the last strata of illiterates. The percentage of literacy in the village population has passed 90. The Soviet Union is becoming a country of complete literacy and high new culture. From all sides, the "idiotism of village life," which was inherited from the past, is being wiped out. Gradually the distinction between town and village is being wiped out.

While noting the great achievements of the Soviet Union in socialist agriculture, we must not forget the shortcomings, difficulties, and unsolved problems. The Soviet power does not try to hush up these difficulties and shortcomings. It mobilises the masses of the collective farmers and workers of the machine and tractor stations and Soviet farms to overcome them.

We have achieved a considerable increase in yield in 1933, but its level is still far from corresponding to the possibilities of socialist agricultural production. During the next few years it can easily be multiplied two or three times. The losses of grain in the collective and Soviet farms are still great. Where these are eliminated the yield per hectare is often increased by several centners. The time taken by various agricultural operations has been decreased in 1933 as compared with previous years, but it is still too great.

d can be considerable reduced, which will result an increased yield of several centners per hec-re. Utilisation of internal resources for fer-sation is still far from complete, and the eater part of the work of introducing chemical tilisers is still to be faced. As yet it is not erywhere that correct crop-rotation has been roduced, nor that land is cultivated rationally, d in accordance with the requirements of agri-ltural technique. We have done much in astering large-scale machine technique in agri-lture. In the Soviet Union the tractors, in the jority of the Soviet farms and machine and ctor stations, do three or four times the work ne by tractors in capitalist countries. But still tractors are often idle, and complex harvest-machinery is not made to work at full capa-y. We need only carry out further improve-nts in cultivation, extend the utilisation of chinery, completely master agricultural and ge-scale machine technique, and the produc-n of agricultural products will be multiplied o or three times. Then we shall transform all lective and Soviet farms, without exception, o highly profitable enterprises, and shall make collective farmers *well off*.

The difficulties in the further construction of ialist agriculture exist in the respect of resist-e on the part of the remnants of capitalist ments, which are supported by interventionist cles. The kulaks have been smashed, but not mpletely crushed. The difficulties are also sed by relics of petty-bourgeois ideology, ich induce in many collective farmers care-sness in fulfilling their obligations before the letarian state; which cause an unsocialist tude to labour and public property, equalisa-n tendencies in the distribution of profits, the ire to cut down the funds to be formed by in-ased production with the next crop, to ke surplus labour power in the collective farms,

Much insistent work is yet to be carried to transform all collective farms, without eption, into Bolshevik collective farms.

In the second Five-Year Plan, the collective ms, the machine tractor stations and the state ms will be organisationally strengthened, con-ted into model enterprises. The final liquida-n of capitalist elements will take place. The lective farmers will be converted into active lders of classless socialist society. Agricul-al labour will be converted into a variety of ustrial labour. By the end of the second e-Year Plan, the mechanisation of agricultural duction will be completed, on the whole. By ng, 1934, there will be over 200,000 tractors about 50,000 automobiles working on the lds of the U.S.S.R. During the second Five-ir Plan, new hundreds of thousands of tractors will arrive in socialist agriculture, agricultural machinery to the value of hundreds of millions of roubles, all kinds of implements and fertilisers. These means of production will be concentrated mainly in the machine and tractor stations and the state farms, i.e., will be the property of the proletarian government. On these conditions, the proletarian government, i.e., "the organ which manages all property, will have an influence on these (co-operative societies) which is necessary to convert the peasant society gradually into a higher form, and equalise in rights and duties, both the society as a whole, and its separate members to the other branches of socialist society." (Engels.)* The further strengthening of the proletarian leadership of the collective farms, the conversion of these collective farms into Bolshevik farms, while concentrating the greater part of the means of production in the hands of the proletarian government, will ensure the success of the socialist re-education of the collective farm masses.

While in all capitalist countries the severe crisis is ruining the small producers, increasing their indebtedness, leading to the forced sale of the property and land of the farmers and peasants on a mass scale, dooming the masses to poverty and unemployment, in the Soviet Union, with the support of the proletarian government there is taking place a powerful upsurge of productive forces of socialist agriculture, there is going on a rapid rise of the material and cultural level of the collective farm peasants. The capitalist system is step by step taking the outlook from the small farmer and peasant, and is cutting off all hope for the achievement of prosperity. It is dooming them to a half-starved existence, to ruin and poverty. The socialist system has led the masses of the poor and middle peasants on to the arena of great historical actions. It has put an end for ever to poverty, and is leading the collective farm masses on to the broad road of a well-to-do life. It is making a clean sweep of all the traces of exploitation and barbarity. It is leading to the abolition of the contradictions between town and village.

Such is the result of the proletarian revolution in the sphere of the socialist reconstruction of agriculture. This result became possible owing to the establishment and consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Soviet Union has shown plainly that for the toiling peasants of capitalist countries the only path out of the grips of the capitalist crisis, out of plunder and robbery, is in support of the proletarian revolution in their own country.

* Engels, "The Peasant Question in France and Germany."

LESSONS OF THE HAMBURG RISING

(Tenth Anniversary of the Armed Insurrection in Hamburg.)

By V. Palmberg.

TEN years ago, on October 23, 1923, the proletariat of the Hamburg suburbs of Barmbeck, Eimsbuttel and Schiffbeck, took up arms so that, together with the proletariat of all Germany, they could put an end to the unbearable situation which had arisen by Autumn, 1923, for the proletariat and toiling masses of Germany. "The Hamburg rising arose out of the revolutionary situation of 1923. Put into motion by the poverty of the inflation period, driven by the unprecedented want of the toiling masses, inspired with the spirit of Bolshevism, the best and most revolutionary part of the Hamburg workers took up arms against the capitalist oppressors" (Ernst Thaelman).

The fighting in the streets of Hamburg lasted two days. It would have lasted longer and the flames of the armed revolt would undoubtedly have spread to all Germany if the then leaders of the German Communist Party, the cowardly right opportunist group of Brandler, had not given directives to the German workers to "postpone" the struggle, i.e., to capitulate without a fight.

The two days of armed struggle, two days of Soviet power in the proletarian sections of Hamburg, are one of the finest pages in the history of the revolutionary struggle of the working class, not only of Germany, but the entire world revolutionary movement. The revolutionary proletariat of all countries and their leader, the Communist International, regards the armed struggle of the Hamburg proletariat as one of the most heroic insurrections, proceeding in the circumstances of an immediate revolutionary situation, from the experience of which the proletariat of all countries can and must learn. If the revolutionary proletariat and its advanced section, the Communists, repudiate with disgust such provocational acts as the explosion at the Cathedral of Sophia in 1925 and the burning of the Reichstag by the German fascists in February, 1933, if they definitely and unequivocally condemn all individual terroristic acts which are not part of the mass armed struggle, they equally definitely, enthusiastically and unequivocally announce their sympathy and attention to such manifestations of the real proletarian class struggle such as the Hamburg rising, which took place at the crest of the revolutionary wave in 1923.

But the attitude of Communists to the armed class struggle is not limited merely to an expression of sympathy with the heroism and the victims of the struggle. The title of Communist makes it obligatory to regard insurrection as an art, t take up a practical business attitude to the ques tions of its strategy, tactics and technique so a to be prepared to lead the proletarian masses i the approaching armed conflicts between classes Such an attitude to the armed insurrection wa taught us repeatedly by Marx, Engels and Lenin

> "One of two things : either we are really an firmly convinced that the war creates a revolu tionary situation in Europe . . . , that all th economic and socio-political circumstances o the imperialist epoch lead up to a revolution o the proletariat—then it is our bounden duty t explain to the masses the necessity of a revolu tion, to appeal for it, to create befitting organi sations, to speak fearlessly and in the mos concrete manner of the various methods o forceful struggle and of its 'technique,' thi bounden duty of ours being independent o whether the revolution will be strong enoug and whether it will come in connection with th first or second imperialist war," etc. ("Revolu tionary Marxists at the Socialist Conference." Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XVIII., p. 347)

In the battles of October 23 and 24, 1923, th Hamburg proletariat displayed not only heroism and courage worthy of the foremost fighters fo the proletarian revolution. These two days o struggle also gave a great deal of useful experi ence in the sense of "various concrete methods o forceful struggle." The proletariat of all coun tries where the decisive struggles for power stil lie ahead can learn a great deal from them.

* * *

The Hamburg rising took place in the condition of a deep revolutionary crisis. The imperialis war of 1914-18, the unbearable burdens of th Versailles peace and the results of the passiv resistance in the Ruhr, led to the deepest economi and financial crisis by autumn, 1923. The unceas ing fall of the mark finally reached astronomica figures. The real wages of the workers, owing to the rapid devaluation of money, could not ever ensure them a semi-starvation existence. The factories closed down and threw hundreds o thousands and millions of proletarians into the streets as unemployed. Riots and clashes with the police took place at the food stores in the towns. In many places the starving masses organised marches into the country to obtain the necessary food by confiscation from the landlords. The working masses swiftly moved to the left. The influence of the Communist Party grew with

extreme rapidity. Ruined by war and inflation, driven to desperation, the masses of the petty-bourgeoisie strongly vacillated between Communism and fascism. The bourgeoisie, unable to cope with the situation, were in a position of hysteria and panic. During these days the Reichskanzler Stressemann hysterically stated that "after us either Communists or fascists will come."

The Social-Democrats, on the side of the bourgeoisie, did everything possible to destroy the German working-class movement proceeding to proletarian revolution.

According to the estimate of the Comintern, the situation at that time was such that it was possible for the German proletariat to obtain the victory, and consequently the Communist Party was obliged to lead the millions of German proletarians to the decisive struggle. Up to October, Brandler himself loudly and repeatedly stated his unwavering determination to go to the decisive struggle. But when it was necessary to pass on from these loud-sounding words to deeds, the Brandlerite leadership of the Party proved to be incapable of leading the struggle of the German proletariat. Instead of entering into the fight, they sounded the retreat, retired without a fight, capitulated to the enemy, covering up their cowardice by the slanderous statement that "the masses do not want to fight."

In reality, the masses wanted to struggle, but they lacked the chief thing—*leadership*, which they expected in vain from the Brandlerite Central Committee of the Party. It is true that Brandler and his comrades had no shortage of loud-sounding revolutionary phrases. But they neglected to prepare the Party and the broad masses of workers for the armed revolt. In this respect, the Brandlerite leaders were an example of what should not be done. Serious preparations of the masses for the armed insurrection pre-supposed a bold development of the strike struggle and other forms of the mass actions of the proletariat. Only in these partial struggles, lead by the Communists, could the masses rally firmly around their vanguard, obtain fighting experience and firmness, necessary for the transition to the highest form of mass struggle, to the armed insurrection. Instead of this, the Brandlerite C.C. prohibited any partial actions on the grounds that the fighting energy of the masses should be preserved for the "decisive struggle"! Such a mode of reasoning on the part of Brandler and his associates was nothing but the concealment of cowardly opportunism, fear of the revolution, reliance on the coming to power according to the Saxon recipe, by agreement with social democracy.

It is true that the Brandlerite C.C. did take some steps for the purely military preparation of the revolt. The so-called "Ordner Dienst" was formed, i.e., an illegal fighting organisation. A call was made for the organisation of proletarian "Hundreds." But even in this matter the central question of the preparations for insurrection was forgotten and neglected, namely, the question of the *arming of the proletariat.* Brandler himself, sitting in the Saxon government, did not move a finger to utilise this position for the arming of the mid-German proletariat, although this was his direct duty, although this is the only justification for the participation of Communists in the Labour Governments of Saxony and Thuringia at that time. If the Brandlerite leaders in general thought about the arming of the German workers at all, they dreamt of obtaining arms by some "special" method, instead of dissipating the harmful illusion among the masses that they would be "given" arms, instead of telling the masses the truth that "no party will arm the masses" (Lenin), that the proletariat arms itself, tearing the weapons out of the hands of the enemy. The absence of this clear and absolutely correct position on the question of the arming of the proletariat led, among other things, to the fact that the proletarian Hundreds were doomed to inaction and a useless playing at soldiers, when the time came to develop furious energy in obtaining arms for themselves by disarming the police and the fascists, intense work to disorganise the armed forces of the bourgeoisie, the preparation of auxiliary weapons in the factories, etc.

Serious preparations for the armed revolt presupposed that the widest sections of the toiling population, who were getting into motion, would be attracted to the side of the revolution and rallied around the proletariat and their Communist vanguard. Instead of serious work in this direction, the Brandlerite leaders completely neglected this task. They did not agitate for the organisation of Soviets, orientating themselves exclusively on the "organised workers."

An expression of the cowardly opportunism and the childish playing at rebellion by the Brandlerite C.C. was the fact that it regarded the commencement of decisive struggles as dependent on the result of the Chemnitz Conference of Factory Committees on October 21st, which was to make a decision on the declaration of a general strike, which in turn, according to the Brandlerite recipe, should later have been converted into an armed insurrection. For Brandler and his comrades the lessons of October, 1917, were of no significance when Lenin, in fighting against such views, repeatedly exposed the illusion that "the revolutionary Congress of Soviets can solve the question which can only be decided by the rebellious proletariat, by its own forces." It was still less permis-

sible to forget such a lesson of October, 1917, if we remember that the factory committees, whose "resolutions" were to have decided the fate of the rebellion, were far from being Soviets.

* * *

It is not superfluous to mention that the mistakes made by the Brandlerite C.C. on the road to "the German October" are connected with erroneous views of Rosa Luxemburg on the armed uprising. According to Rosa Luxemburg, the armed struggle is not the highest, decisive form of struggle, but a sort of inevitable evil, only "a special side," a by-product and accompaniment of the general strike, which decides the outcome of the struggle. Very insufficiently serious military preparations for the uprising could be considered the expression of such a Luxemburgian underestimation of the armed struggle. But it is quite impossible to ascribe the Brandlerite fear of the revolution, and renunciation of developing the strike struggle in other mass actions to the ideas of Rosa Luxemburg, the great revolutionary. In this decisive question Brandler and his supporters, in essence, in no way differed from the Social-Democrats.

* * *

Such was the situation in the country, and such were the hands which held the leadership of the Communist Party when the Hamburg proletariat, on the morning of October 23rd, came out into the streets with arms in their hands.

In Hamburg itself the situation at that time was very tense. Strikes in various factories, enormous demonstrations of workers and unemployed, hunger riots, in which the starving working women and the wives of the workers took an active part, clashes between the workers and the police, were on the order of the day, in spite of the urging of Brandler and his comrades to "postpone" all such actions until the moment of the decisive struggle. Social-Democracy, which previously regarded Hamburg as one of its strongest fortresses, rapidly lost its influence among the masses, who came ever more definitely to the side of the Communists.

The first big move of the Hamburg workers began in October in some of the shipyards. The movement, which at first was purely economic in character, led to a lockout in all the shipyards on October 20. On the same day, October 20, there were big demonstrations of the unemployed, who broke through the police cordons and marched to the centre of the town. On the same day it became known that the Reichswehr units near Hamburg were being sent to Saxony to crush the movement of the Saxon workers. This created uneasiness among the masses and convinced them of the necessity of acting immediately to save the Saxon workers.

On October 21 a trade union conference of workers of all the shipyards of North Germany met in Hamburg. The feeling among the delegates was in favour of a struggle, for declaring a general strike in reply to the lockout. A decision on a general strike could only be avoided with difficulty, based on the categorical directives of the C.C. of the Communist Party not to permit partial struggles "before the decisive struggle."

On the evening of October 21, the Party leaders of the north-west district, led by Comrade Thaelman, decided to begin a revolt in Hamburg on October 23, considering that it was necessary to come to the help of the Saxon workers by immediate action, who were in danger of attack by the Reichswehr, and taking into account that, otherwise, there was a danger of scattered armed risings. At the same time it was decided to declare a railway strike to hinder the transport of troops to Saxony. The rising in Hamburg was to have given the signal for the general armed insurrection which the Chemnitz Conference of Factory Committees was to sanction.

At the beginning of the fighting, the illegal fighting organisation, "Ordner Dienst," in Hamburg, had about 1,300 members. Its arms consisted of only 80 weapons, chiefly revolvers. It included many ex-soldiers and its training was excellent in many respects. Besides the "Ordner Dienst" in Hamburg at that time, there were 15 proletarian "Hundreds," which, however, had no weapons at all, and which were badly trained.

The government militarised police in Hamburg consisted of about 5,000 men. They had first-class armament, including six armoured cars. Large supplies of arms, intended for arming the fascists, according to information of the rebels, were stored in the police stations and barracks.

In Hamburg, as in all Germany, the Party did not carry on systematic work before the rising among the armed forces of the bourgeoisie, although the strong vacillations which were observed among the police in the course of the struggle clearly showed the favourable conditions for successful revolutionary work among them.

Having received instructions from the district committee to begin the rising on October 23 at 5 o'clock in the morning, the leaders of the illegal fighting organisations of the northern proletarian districts of Hamburg, who had gathered together, decided in view of the great shortage of arms among the workers to direct the first blow at the police stations in order to disarm the police and get posession of the weapons there. This blow was to have caught the police unawares. Therefore, the first blow should have been carried out

ntirely by the forces of the illegal fighting rganisations without mobilising the working asses to participate in the rebellion from the eginning. Further, after the capture of the olice stations, it was intended to advance from ie proletarian districts on the centre of the town.

On the night of October 23 the fighters gathered the previously appointed places. The total umber who gathered was not more than 250-300. hey were divided into 20 shock groups, of which ach received a task of capturing one police ation. Each of these groups received two evolvers or one rifle and one revolver.

Exactly at the appointed time, at 5 o'clock in ie morning, an attack was made on 20 police ations in the northern proletarian districts of amburg. The result of the first blow was that half an hour 17 police stations were occupied the fighters. They proved to be masters of ie situation in Barmbeck, Eimsbuttel and chiffbeck. In other parts of the town the ghters did not make the attack for various easons.

The police now concentrated all their forces for ie struggle against the proletarian suburbs hich were in the hands of the rebels. This was ade easier for them by the fact that the workers other districts did not rise. Two attacks of the olice, supported by two armoured cars, were eaten back by the fighters at Eimsbuttel. They eased fighting on the same day after they were reatened with complete encirclement by superior olice forces.

In Barmbeck the workers held out firmly roughout October 23 until evening, in spite of ie fact that even in the morning the news was read among them of the decision of the Chemtz Conference to "postpone" the general strike nd rising. By building numerous barricades, the hole of Barmbeck was turned into a powerful rtress of the fighting workers, into which the olice were unable to penetrate, in spite of the conntration of big forces which were far superior to e armed forces of the rebels, and in spite of the ct that the police made their attack under the ver of five armoured cars. Only on the night October 24, the fighters, unnoticed by the olice, abandoned the positions which they had efended throughout October 23, and retreated to e northern part of Barmbeck, where they conued the struggle until the evening of October 4, expecting support from the workers of the her districts of Hamburg. Only in the evening October 24, they gave up the struggle at the rect orders of Urbans, who was then secretary the Hamburg district organisation, and scatred unnoticed by the police, taking with them e killed and wounded and hiding their weapons.

On the same day the struggle was abandoned in Schiffbeck, where the fighting had also been distinguished by the fact that a Soviet government had been declared during the struggle and an executive committee of the Soviets elected. According to the statements of the police colonel, Gartenstein, the representatives of the Soviet power in Schiffbeck occupied the post office, made searches *for arms* in private houses, arrested active counter-revolutionaries, organised a regular reconnaissance service in the streets and proclaimed the death sentence for resistance to the orders of the Executive Committee of the Soviet.

On October 25 and 26 there were still individual attacks by the fighters in Barmbeck, attacking the police who were searching the houses of workers.

* * *

The despicable rôle of Social-Democracy during the Hamburg rising should be specially noted. At that time, the government in Germany consisted of the so-called Great Coalition, with the participation of the Social-Democrats, who occupied leading police posts everywhere. Before October, the Social-Democratic president of the German Republic, Ebert, handed over the entire power to General Seckt, who first of all undertook the crushing of the movement of the mid-German workers. In Hamburg itself, the Social-Democrats participated in the local government, took an active part in the crushing of the rising by the most varied methods. They released the numerous harbour police for the direct struggle against the rebels, mobilising in their place 600 "reliable" Social-Democrats as auxiliary police. When the working masses gathered on the day of the rising for a demonstration before the Trade Union building, they were met with rifle fire from the police, who, at the orders of the Social-Democratic leaders, had occupied the trade union building in advance. After the revolt, as is usual in such cases, they branded the rising of the Hamburg workers as a "putsch" and called the heroes of the Hamburg barricades criminals and thugs. Their attitude to these proletarian fighters did not differ from that of the police colonel, Gartenstein, who saw in the rebels "scoundrelly won't-works," "criminal types," "lousy curs," etc. The proletarian women, who took an active part in the fights, were simply described as "prostitutes, bribed by the Spartacists."

Speaking about the disgusting part played by the Social-Democracy in the suppression of the Hamburg uprising, the resolution of the Presidium of the E.C.C.I. of January 19, 1924, points out that "their behaviour in this case is only the other side of the medal whose front was the behaviour of Zeigner and his 'Lefts' in Saxony."

The tactics of the "Lefts" were, in their

essence, the tactics of crushing the revolutionary movement of the German workers on the general principle of the division of labour in the camp of the Social-Democrats.

When the German Social-Democrats had previously sat at the Government feast, they tried to convince the workers that a violent revolution was "unnecessary," since everything was going on well and they could arrive at Socialism by the democratic path! At the present day, after the establishment of a naked fascist dictatorship in Germany, they understand that they cannot find many simpletons among the German workers, who will let themselves be caught by such a bait. Therefore, they now give chief prominence to another argument, namely, the "proof" of the hopelessness of an armed struggle owing to the military power of the bourgeoisie. They try to win over the workers by the horrors of civil war. The exposure of this argument is now one of the immediate tasks of the Communists both in Germany and in other countries. Such an exposure is facilitated by the fact that in Hitler's "third empire" the German workers cannot fail to become convinced that the only choice left them is that between the horrors of fascist dictatorship and the sacrifices of civil war. Faced by the logic of events with this relentless question, they will sooner or later come to the conclusion that no course is left them except that followed in 1917 by the proletarians of Russia and taken by the proletarians of the suburbs of Hamburg in 1923. The great successes won by a small section of the Hamburg workers in those fights show convincingly that the victory of the proletariat in the future armed uprising is certain, provided it is an uprising of the masses and takes place simultaneously everywhere.

The fascist plunderers, Hitler and Göring, also decided to "destroy" Communism by spreading the well-known truth that the Communists are in favour of an armed uprising against the fascist dictatorship. But the more the fascists and Social-Democrats keep on this subject, the worse for them, for that subject inevitably becomes more and more popular among the masses of the people.

Together with these positive lessons taught by the armed struggle in the streets of Hamburg, certain mistakes and shortcomings were shown in the organisation and carrying out of the uprising, and these cannot be passed by in silence. In this connection attention is first of all attracted by the great disproportion between the numbers of the "Ordner Dienst," an illegal fighting organisation which was to serve as a sort of cadre supply among the mass of revolutionary workers, and the proletarian hundreds, the mass fighting organisation of the workers. The proletarian hundreds did not comprise more members than the "Ordner Dienst," although the militant spirit of the workers provided the prerequisite for drawing vast masses into the proletarian hundreds. And in Hamburg the slogan of the proletariat's arming by "hook or crook" was not firmly implanted in the masses.

These and similar mistakes in the preparations for the uprising led to corresponding serious defects in the *plan of the uprising*. This plan, as it was described above, was built entirely on sudden action by a small illegal fighting organisation, the masses of the proletarian suburbs spontaneously joining. The plan does not even mention a previously organised introduction into the fight of the proletariat hundreds, and of wider masses of the workers.

Sudden unexpected action by an illegal fighting organisation cannot, in itself, be considered a mistake. On the contrary, this action justified itself, for it placed in the hands of the insurgents a considerable quantity of arms, and, which is no less important, the success achieved by the fighting squads in full view of the workers helped greatly to raise the militant spirits of the masses, their certainty of victory. The whole trouble was that, in view of the fact that the masses themselves were unprepared for the uprising, the fighting squads' action could not receive immediate support, and the brilliant success they achieved could not be developed directly by the working masses. Suddenness, the unexpected blow, is one of the most important rules of the armed uprising, as in any war. But an element indispensable to the victory of the uprising is also that it should be a mass uprising.

It was, and is, disputable whether the organisers of the Hamburg rising were right in spreading out their small forces in order to disarm twenty police stations, instead of concentrating all forces to gain possession of some point of important in the centre of the city, such as the police headquarters, a big munitions store, etc. There are no facts to give an exhaustive answer to this question. But if we take the fact into consideration that the masses of the workers were not prepared beforehand for an uprising, that without the support of the masses the uprising was doomed to defeat, and that the successes achieved by the fighting squads, small though they were, were a powerful means of mobilising the masses for active participation in the uprising, it is very difficult to condemn the tactics adopted by the squads. Besides, the experience of all uprisings, without exception, confirmed Engels' rule on the necessity of catching the enemy unawares, while his forces are still scattered, i.e., of not giving him the opportunity

take action against the insurgents with col-cted forces and, among other things, in this ay protect his troops from the "revolutionary ague."

If the vast masses of the Hamburg workers d been prepared and mobilised for active par-ipation in the uprising, it would *have been abso-tely necessary to concentrate the overwhelming eponderance of the forces against the points of ost importance* (munitions stores, post and tele-aph offices, the port, etc.), striving, at the me time, to paralyse the enemy wherever ssible. No uprising can be victorious unless e masses take part in it. And, moreover, an olated uprising, which is not supported by an rising throughout the country, is doomed to feat. These most important lessons of the amburg uprising were remarked on by the esidium of the Executive Committee of the mintern in its resolution of January 19, 1924, hich reads as follows:

"The opposite pole from Saxony was the *amburg uprising.* It proved that by bold, im-tuous action on the part of determined fight-g squads, the enemy may be caught unawares far as military preparations are concerned. t it proved, at the same time, that even where, in Hamburg, such an armed struggle is re-rded not unsympathetically by the population d where it is supported by the mass movement, is doomed to failure if it remains *isolated,* and not supported locally by Soviets, whose absence s especially painfully felt in Hamburg.

A country-wide struggle was hindered by self-ntradictory orders, and even the strikes which d already began were broken by the absence information about the course of the struggle other parts of the country, and by the news the result of the Chemnitz conference."

From the point of view of the tactics of street ttles, the Hamburg fights are of tremendous portance. The carefully prepared and energetic-y conducted first blow by the almost unarmed hters produced splendid results. Seventeen ice stations were completely disarmed. Ex-mely flexible and mobile tactics at the second ge of the struggle, in the defence of the sec-ns won by the proletariat against the numeric-y greatly superior enemy, are a model of olutionary tactics in such circumstances. The in distinguishing feature of these tactics was fact that the barricades themselves, which re built on a mass scale, with the active par-pation of the masses of the population, were upied only by sharpshooters or were not occu-d at all, while the fighting groups concealed mselves in the adjoining houses, on the roofs, balconies and garrets, at windows, from which they maintained an accurate fire on the police.

By these tactics the Hamburg workers showed in practice the falseness of the statements of the Social-Democrats, that street fighting is doomed to failure in view of the present level of military technique. They confirmed in practice the conclusion of Engels that the development of military technique gives no proof of the necessity of abandoning street fighting, but only of the necessity of radically changing the tactics of street fighting. As for barricades, they have only become obsolete in the form in which they were used in the revolutions of last century, namely, in the sense of strongholds behind which the rebels entrench themselves.

The Hamburg fighting showed another instructive use of barricades as a means of active struggle. In two cases, the armoured cars of the enemy, which approached the barricades with the aim of attacking them, were closed in by means of other barricades and trenches which were hastily thrown up behind them and in the side streets. As a result, the armoured cars found themselves in a trap. In a third case, an armoured car was put out of action by fighters who suddenly rushed out of a gate, ran up to the machine, put a revolver to the spyhole and killed the driver with a point-blank shot.

During the defence, the rebels constantly made short counter-attacks, getting round the positions of the enemies in small groups.

Such clever and mobile tactics of the rebels explain the very small losses of the fighters. They only lost 46 killed, while the number of police killed reached 60. True, that the police reports speak of the large number of the rebellious population killed, though they admit that they were unable to establish the exact number, because the rebels always rapidly carried away their killed and wounded.

* * *

In spite of the heroic and clever struggle of the best section of the Hamburg proletariat, the German working class was defeated in October, 1923. The "German October" did not take place, although the objective prerequisites for victory existed. However favourable the objective conditions, the working class can only conquer if it has proper leadership, which the Brandlerite C.C. was unable to give to the German workers. Of course, we must not identify the entire Communist Party of Germany, at that time, with the Brandlerite leaders. Even then, the Bolshevik core which is now leading the heroic struggle of the German proletariat had begun to mature in it. But on the other hand, Comrade Thaelman is right in his article on the Fifth Anniversary

of the Hamburg Rising, when he speaks of the immaturity of the Party at that time, which was not yet in a position to correct the mistakes of the Brandlerite leaders.

This Bolshevik self-criticism applies also to the then leaders of the Hamburg organisation of the Communist Par' ·. Although the actual armed rising in Hamburg on the initiative and under the leadership of the Party is a clear contrast to the Saxon Parliamentary Comedy, the Party organisation of Hamburg displayed great weaknesses in preparing and conducting the armed rising. These weaknesses consisted of insufficient preparations of the masses for active participation in the rising. Owing to this, the armed rising was unexpected, not only for the enemy, which was quite correct, but also for the working masses. The struggle of the workers of Barmbeck, Schiffbeck and Eimsbuttel was not supported by promptly bringing into the fight the revolutionary forces in the other parts of the town, although there was no lack of fighting preparedness among the masses.

The historic significance of the two-day barricade struggle in the streets of Hamburg is tremendous. The heroic struggle of the Hamburg proletarians stands out in vivid colours on the gloomy background of cowardly opportunism, unprincipled conciliation and shameful capitalation of the Brandlerite leaders. If the German workers have not lost their faith in the German Communist Party after the heavy defeat of the German October, but have rallied still more firmly around it, this was to a great extent, owing to the heroic example of the Hamburg workers. This example gave them confidence that the working class can form a Party which is able to lead them to the decisive struggle and to victory.

"The revolutionary fighters of the barricades saved the honour of the Communist Party of Germany with their bodies and their lives." (Thaelman).

Thus the "defeat" of the Hamburg Rising was in reality a great victory for the German Communist Party and for the German working class

The fact that the Hamburg Rising was a vic tory for the workers not only in this histori sense, is shown by the police reports after th rising, which admit that the resistance of th rebels was not broken by the police attacks, bu that the rebels themselves abandoned the figh after a successful struggle, having receive orders for this from the Party leaders. Th police reports show the helplessness and hesita tions of the police in the struggle against th rebels wherever the latter used active methods o struggle.

According to the police reports, the rebellious workers, who were compelled against their own wish, to retreat and scatter on the orders of thei Party, carefully concealed their weapons. W do not know the further fate of these weapons and it is hardly of decisive importance. W mention this detail because it once more charac terises the proletarian heroes of Barmbeck Schiffbeck and Eimsbuttel, who at the momen of bitter retreat, looked forward, burning wit the desire to take up arms once more at the firs command of their Party.

The bold revolutionary initiative displayed b the majority of the Hamburg district Party com mittee, headed by Comrade Thälmann, befor they received the expected directives of the C.C on the uprising, shows that among the leader of the German Communists there were comrade who, unlike the cowardly capitulators of th Brandler group, regarded the armed struggl seriously and proved able to pass from words t deeds, at the time when events put the questio of the armed uprising on the order of the da for the German proletariat. The best section o the proletarian revolutionaries of Germany, headed by the leader of the heroic Hamburg uprising, Comrade Thälmann, is leading the struggle of the German proletariat for power, for socialist Soviet Germany.

O. PIATNITSKY

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THE GROWTH OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN KUOMINTANG CHINA

By Kon Sin.

A NOTICEABLE growth is taking place in the organisations of the C.P. of China in some of the important cities and provinces of China.

Organisation.	No. of members at time of IV. Plenum C.P.C. Jan., 1932.	No. of members at time of XII. Plenum E.C.C.I. Aug., 1932.	No. of members now.
Shanghai	500	1,300	4,000
Kiangsu Province	3,000	5,000	8,000
Hebei Province	11,200	2,500	4,000
Manchuria	1,000	1,500	3,600

In local groups such as Peiping, from February 7 to March 18, 1933, the number of members doubled. From September 18, 1932, to January 3, 1933, the Party organisation in the Kiangsu Province showed the following picture of development:

10 new Party cells were formed in the main branches of industry.

6 new Party cells were formed among the municipal workers.

15 new Party cells were formed in the spinning factories and cells were re-established in a number of important factories.

Strong Communist Party cells were formed in the basic factories of the yellow trade unions.

A base was formed in the most important military and strategic points.

19 Party cells were formed among the unemployed.

A strong cell was formed in Shanghai with 50 members, the first large cell in the Chinese Communist Party.

The social composition of the membership is as follows: At the time of the IV. Plenum of the C. C. P. of China there were 7 per cent. workers in these organisations, now there are 20 per cent. workers. This 20 per cent. is an average figure for Kuomintang and Soviet China. If only the industrial enterprises are taken, this percentage is considerably higher. In Shanghai workers constitute more than 80 per cent. in the Party. The growth of the Party organisations, the increase in the percentage of the proletarian elements among the Party membership, strengthening the leading rôle of the proletariat in the Chinese revolution, formed closer contacts between the Party and the masses and represent the further guarantee that the Party is really moving ahead on the road to Bolshevisation.

In the conditions of brutal white terror, which is raging in Kuomintang China, the Party succeeded in obtaining this growth entirely because, in spite of difficulties ,it transferred its main attention and energy to developing Party organisations in the factories. For preparing a recruiting campaign on September 18, 1932, the Party put forward the following slogans: "Enter the factory cells," "Thoroughly understand the work in the factory cells," "Examine the reasons which hinder the development of the Party organisations inside the factory cells." From the C.C. to the District Committees, verification commissions were formed for the checking-up on the work of the factory cells. For this purpose the C.C. mobilised a large number of responsible comrades, including the members of the Polit-Bureau. From the very beginning of the campaign a decisive struggle was carried on against the formalists, who made their investigations in a perfunctory manner. But the commissions did not confine themselves to controlling the work of the Party cells, but *gave them practical help also.*

At the very beginning of the work of the verification commissions, two main reasons were discovered which hindered the work in the factory cells: Firstly, the fear of accepting new comrades, which arose from the failure to understand illegal work. One comrade from a spinning factory explained this as follows: "If we widen our Party work, many spies will creep into it, and arrest us all."

Secondly, *serious sectarian tendencies.* For example, the secretary of one of the ship cells, having worked there already for one year, considered all the workers on this ship as blockheads, with the exception of a few comrades.

Besides this, it was possible to expose other shortcomings in the work of the factory cells. Many comrades did not know how to concretely recruit Party members and how to enlarge the Party organisation. As a result of this investigation work, it was possible to get concretely acquainted with the situation of the various Party cells. The reasons which hampered the development of the factory cells were revealed. It was possible to discover the reason for the insufficient contact of the district committees with the factory cells.

After making all these questions clear from all sides, the following directives for work in the factories were worked out:

1. To develop patient educational and explanatory work, correct the wrong understanding of the Party cells as to the importance of work in the factories, and the recruiting of new members and concrete instructions for the development of this work.

All these questions were not only subject to discussion in the cells, but short-term courses for preparing cadres for the cells were also organised.

2. To help the active members of the cell and mobilise them for recruiting new members among the workers. To utilise the active members as model groups for mobilising the other comrades. In utilising the results of the work of the active members, those comrades should be convinced, who do not want to or are afraid to recruit new members. To utilise the results of the work of the model cells for inspiring the backward cells.

3. To reorganise and strengthen the factory cells.

In this connection a number of achievements can already be mentioned. Many comrades became active, the bureau of the cell was strengthened, as a result of this their working ability increased.

4. To reorganise the local Party Committees in connection with the reorganisation of the factory cells. To attract a large number of comrades from the factories into leading committees.

In Shanghai there are secretaries of district committees who still work in the factories. In this way the Party was able to establish close personal contacts between the factory cells and the local Party committees.

Very soon a considerable enlivenment of the activity of the cells could be seen. An example of this is a competition agreement signed by two large cells in Shanghai—cell "A" in the centre of Shanghai, and cell "B" in Western Shanghai. At a joint meeting, both these cells worked out the text of the agreement, and the provincial Party committee was to call a meeting of the jury in order to control and determine the winner. By this agreement cell "A" took upon itself the obligation of increasing its membership to more than 100 members and to go into all the departments of the factory. Cell "B" also undertook to increase its membership to more than 100 members and to embrace all the departments of the factory (to form Party groups in departments X and Y).

The cells took upon themselves the obligation of aiding in the development of Party organisations in other cells and to recruit twenty new members for them; Com. B. took upon himself the obligation of recruiting twenty new comrades in the factory. Cell "A" undertook to organise the struggle of the workers inside the machine department against the dismissal of two trade union workers. Cell "B" was to prepare the struggle against the introduction of a three-day week.

The cells began to develop the revolutionary trade union opposition. The cells took upon themselves the obligation that there would not be a single Party member without a Party assignment, that every comrade should pass through Party courses, should read the Party press and Party documents.

Of course, the growing activity of the Party cells is not only reflected in agreements like these, as is shown above all by their practical work.

The recruiting week, from January 28 to February 5, in Shanghai, produced considerable results. In the French concessions 181 new members were recruited, in Western Shanghai—86, in special districts of Shanghai—76, in Chapei—49, in the Centre—45, in Eastern Shanghai—25, in Busun—15 and in the seamen's union—11.

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